MD Nurulhuda SHAPAN v. Christopher LaROSE
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court considered a self-represented petitioner's motion for appointed counsel in a habeas corpus case. The court granted the motion, provisionally appointing Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. to determine eligibility and accept the appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF 7) granted“The Court provisionally appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially determine if petitioner qualifies for representation by that organization.” | agree with court The court applied the correct Ninth Circuit standard for appointing counsel in habeas cases (likelihood of success and ability to articulate claims). While the court noted the likelihood of success was not strong, it relied on the petitioner's lack of English proficiency and the complexity of immigration law to justify appointment. This is a defensible exercise of discretion under the 'interests of justice' standard, particularly given the specific language barriers and legal complexity cited. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standard for appointing counsel in habeas proceedings and applies it to the specific facts of the case (language barrier, complexity of immigration law). The reliance on prior experience with the petitioner is a factual determination within the court's discretion. The procedural steps for the appointed organization are clear.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 MD Nurulhuda SHAPAN, Case No.: 26-cv-0917-AGS-BLM 4 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 5 v. APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF 7) 6 Christopher LaROSE, 7 Respondent. 8 9 Self-represented petitioner MD Nurulhuda Shapan requests appointed counsel in 10 support of his habeas corpus petition. (See ECF 7); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas 11 corpus). Courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when 12 “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) 13 (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate an 14 indigent petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to 15 articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn 16 v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Although, at first blush, Shapan’s 17 likelihood of success on this petition does not look strong, the Court’s prior experience 18 with him and his lack of English proficiency convinces it that counsel is warranted. See 19 United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 20 immigration law is “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity” (quotation 21 marks omitted)); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Divining [the 22 immigration laws’] meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart.”). See generally Shapan 23 v. Warden, 25-cv-3817-AGS-VET, ECF 12 (S.D. Cal. 2025). The Court provisionally 24 appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially determine if petitioner qualifies 25 for representation by that organization. The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this order 26 to Federal Defenders. 27 By March 19, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning 28 whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must 1 || also state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.” 2 || As a result, the current hearing date is vacated and will be reset once the Court hears from 3 || counsel. 4 || Dated: March 12, 2026 6 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28