Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 3D SYSTEMS, INC., Case No.: 21-cv-1141-AGS-DDL 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING 5 v. RECONSIDERATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF 653) 6 Ben WYNNE, et al., AND GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL- 7 Defendants. AUTHORITY REQUEST (ECF 696) 8 This Court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on its trade-secret claims 9 because the alleged secrets were described with “forbidden generality.” (ECF 645, 10 at 3, 11.) Plaintiff seeks reconsideration. 11 RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 12 “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly 13 discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, 14 or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 15 Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). It is “the moving party’s 16 burden” to establish the need for reconsideration. Forte v. Schwartz, No. 1:13-cv-01980- 17 LJO-MJS, 2018 WL 1036403, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018). For reconsideration requests 18 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), like the one here, some district courts use a 19 slightly different four-issue framework, which largely covers the same concerns. See, e.g., 20 Gicharu v. Garland, No. 3:24-CV-349-AR, 2024 WL 2956957, at *1 n.1 (D. Or. June 11, 21 2024) (setting forth four-point test and collecting cases). Because the result is the same 22 either way, the Court will apply only the Ninth Circuit’s ACandS rule. 23 DISCUSSION 24 Under Rule 54(b), plaintiff 3D Systems moves to reverse the summary-judgment 25 ruling as to three of its alleged trade secrets. (ECF 653, at 9.) 3D Systems presents no 26 newly discovered evidence, so our analysis focuses on the last two bases for 27 reconsideration: clear error and new caselaw developments. 28 1 A. Clear Error 2 “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or 3 probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” United States v. Hollis, 506 F.3d 415, 421 4 (5th Cir. 2007). 3D Systems alleges clear error on both the facts and the law. 5 First, the facts. 3D Systems argues that this Court disregarded legally sufficient 6 trade-secret descriptions by improperly fixating on plaintiff’s “early discovery response to 7 Interrogatory 1” and by “overlooking” some evidence. (ECF 653, at 16.) Plaintiff 8 emphasizes that “trade secrets need not be identified in a single interrogatory.” (Id. at 15.) 9 While 3D Systems certainly was not required to rely solely on its interrogatory responses, 10 that is exactly where it claimed its trade-secret identifications would be found. (See 11 ECF 549, at 26 (3D Systems insisting that it “identified 12 trade secrets related to its 3DS 12 printing process” and citing to Interrogatory 1); ECF 519-5, at 12 (3D Systems’ attorney 13 to opposing counsel: “If you’re asking [this witness] what the company has identified as 14 its trade secrets, those are in the interrogatory responses.”).) The Court thus understandably 15 searched there (in vain) for an adequate description. 16 3D Systems protests that it “supplemented the initial trade secret descriptions” for 17 Interrogatory 1 and, in its summary-judgment papers, pointed to other “documents, 18 declarations, and/or discovery responses.” (ECF 653, at 15.) But it never detailed the 19 alleged secrets in any remotely digestible way. It appended over 1,000 pages to its 20 summary-judgment briefing. (See ECF 484; ECF 551.) The papers it specifically cited to 21 alone totaled “more than 250 pages” (ECF 645, at 10)—and even that understates the 22 reading burden. Over 80 of those pages included compressed transcripts, in which each 23 page contained four pages of deposition testimony, pushing the actual page count to around 24 500. (See ECF 519-5; ECF 545-3; ECF 551-5; ECF 551-9; ECF 583-1; ECF 583-2; ECF 25 583-3; ECF 583-4.) 26 Plaintiffs cannot meet their trade-secret-identification burden by burying a 27 descriptive needle in a haystack of papers and then dumping that haystack on the judge’s 28 desk. See InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1 2020) (“It is inadequate for plaintiffs to ‘cite and incorporate by reference hundreds of 2 documents that purportedly . . . reflect the trade secret information’” and then to “invite the 3 court to hunt through the details in search of items meeting the statutory definition.”). This 4 Court even anticipated that there may be “further identifying [trade-secret] information 5 lurk[ing] somewhere in this substantial record.” (ECF 645, at 10.) 3D Systems now 6 identifies three trade secrets in a more specific and consolidated manner than it ever did 7 before. But its deadline to do so has long passed. This Court refuses to reward such attempts 8 at last-gasp compliance. 3D Systems “knowingly incurred the risk that its [trade-secret 9 identifications] would not meet the ‘reasonable particularity’ requirement.” See 10 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 663 (emphasis removed); (see, e.g., ECF 102, at 5–6 (noting that 11 3D Systems’ “initial response” to the interrogatory asking it to identify and fully describe 12 each trade secret “was to refuse to respond at all” until the magistrate judge compelled an 13 answer); ECF 519-5, at 12 (3D Systems’ attorney stating: “If you’re asking [the 30(b)(6) 14 representative] what the company has identified as its trade secrets, those are in the 15 interrogatory responses.”); id. at 31 (opposing counsel asking 3D System’s 30(b)(6) 16 representative: “Is there like a list somewhere that lists all the trade secrets that 3DS has?” 17 Answer: “Not that I’m aware of.”).) 18 That leaves only the objections to this Court’s treatment of the caselaw. In particular, 19 3D Systems takes issue with the Court’s analysis of Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM, 673 F.2d 20 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), and Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., 152 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1998). But 21 plaintiff merely rehashes legal positions that this Court already considered and rejected. 22 (See ECF 549, at 27–28, 30; ECF 645, at 4–5; ECF 653, at 17–19). None of these recycled 23 arguments demonstrate that this Court’s legal reasoning was “dead wrong.” See Hollis, 24 506 F.3d at 421. 25 Thus, 3D Systems has not carried its burden of showing any clear error. 26 B. Changed Law 27 Finally, 3D Systems claims that two new Ninth Circuit cases represent an 28 intervening change in controlling law. The first, Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng 1 || Biztech, Inc., 149 F.4th 1081 (9th Cir. 2025), rejected a trial court’s imposition of a 2 || California state-law requirement that plaintiff identify its trade secrets with “reasonable 3 || particularity” “at the outset of discovery.” /d. at 1085. After all, federal law “does not 4 || require a plaintiff to identify with particularity its alleged trade secrets from the start.” □□□ 5 contrast, 3D Systems had years to sufficiently identify its alleged secrets before this 6 || Court finally ruled—at the summary-judgment stage—that the time for doing so had run 7 || out. Indeed, Quintara Biosciences agreed that the particularity inquiry “is usually a matter 8 || for summary judgment or trial.” /d. 9 In the other case, Zunum Aero, Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 24-5212, 2025 WL 2364602 10 || (9th Cir. 2025), the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge’s ruling that plaintiff “failed to 11 |/identify any of its alleged trade secrets with sufficient particularity.” Jd. at *1. Yet the panel 12 ||never quoted—nor even summarized—the relevant trade-secret descriptions, so it’s hard 13 || to understand how this nonprecedential opinion altered the legal landscape in any way. 14 In short, 3D Systems also fails to establish any intervening legal change. 15 CONCLUSION 16 3D Systems’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Its motion for leave to file 17 ||supplemental authority in support of that motion is GRANTED, and those authorities are 18 || discussed above. 19 Dated: March 12, 2026 20 4 21 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28