Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDWARDO STULTZ, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2840-AJB-DDL CDCR #AR-0732, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 [Doc. No. 2] AND CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS 16 AND REHABILITATION, CALIPATRIA, (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 CALIPATRIA WARDEN, CALIPATRIA WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR MEDICAL STAFF, CENTINELA, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 18 CENTINELA WARDEN, CENTINELA PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 19 MEDICAL STAFF, JOHN DOES, et al., 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) JANE DOES, et al., 20 Defendants. 21 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 Edwardo Stultz (“Stultz” or “Plaintiff”), a state inmate proceeding pro se, has filed 25 a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In 26 Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1; 2.) In his Complaint, Stultz alleges Defendants 27 violated his civil rights by failing to protect him, requiring him to take COVID tests which 28 were improperly administered, and tampering with his mail. (See Doc. No. 1.) For the 1 reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Stultz’s IFP motion and DISMISSES the 2 Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). 4 II. IFP MOTION 5 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 6 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 7 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire 8 fee at the time of filing only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant 9 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 10 cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] 11 IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the 12 fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 13 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of 14 all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account 15 statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding 16 the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 17 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “assess[es] and when funds 18 exist, collect[s], … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average 19 monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the 20 prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly 21 payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s 22 account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1)–(2)). In short, while 23 prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the full statutory filing upfront, 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 IFP. Id. 1 they remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly payments. See Bruce v. 2 Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 3 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 In support of his IFP Motion, Stultz provided a copy of his Prison Certificate and 5 trust account, which reflect an average monthly balance of $85.25, average monthly 6 deposits of $71.66; and an available account balance of $0.00. (Doc. No. 3 at 4.) 7 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Stultz’s’s IFP motion and assesses no initial payment. 8 Stultz will be required to pay the full $350 filing fee in installments which will be collected 9 from his trust account as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 10 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 11 A. Standard of Review 12 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court must screen a 13 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, 14 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 15 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 16 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has 17 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the 18 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 19 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint 20 to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 21 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 23 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a 24 claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- 25 harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 26 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 27 In his Complaint, Stultz states that in 2018 he was wrongfully convicted of 28 murdering “Johnny Rodriguez.” (Doc. No. 1 at 16.) After his sentencing, Stultz was taken 1 into the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). 2 He was initially sent to Wasco State Prison “Reception,” where he was classified. (Id.) He 3 was then transferred to Calipatria State Prison (“CSP”) in February of 2019. (Id.) 4 After arriving at CSP, Stultz “discovered” that that “employees that worked in the 5 prison as custody staff” were “related to . . . the deceased victim” in Stultz’s criminal case. 6 (Id. at 17.) In March of 2019, a correctional officer “made a verbal threat” against Stultz in 7 which he referenced the family of the victim and told Stultz he would “never allow [him] 8 the option to prove his innocence.” (Id.) 9 At some point, Stultz wrote to the California Innocence Project regarding his 10 “wrongful conviction.” (Id.) Stultz alleges this, and other mail which was related to his 11 criminal conviction and was supposed to remain confidential, was “tampered with.” (Id.) 12 Shortly thereafter a correctional officer told Stultz “he knew Stultz was a rat” and he 13 was going to tell all the inmates on the yard. (Id. at 18.) Later, Stultz lost the privilege to 14 use recreational equipment and therefore was “forced to run laps” for exercise. (Id.) 15 Sometime later, Stultz spoke to Lt. Newmen2 at CSP and expressed his concern 16 about the “close proximity of the deceased victim’s family,” but Newmen failed to “enable 17 a safe path to rehabilitation” for Stultz. (Id. at 19.) On another occasion, Stultz asked the 18 CSP Classification Coordinator to “help enable a safe transfer” because he “knew he was 19 being targeted by custody officers” connected to the victim’s family. (Id.) 20 In March of 2020, “Defendant 2” referenced “physical objects/evidence” in 21 Plaintiff’s criminal court case that “contained DNA” and told Plaintiff he was “fucked.” 22 (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff states he was subject to “verbal and inappropriate statements that [he] 23 was a snitch” but it is unclear from the facts alleged in the Complaint, who made these 24 statements. (See id. at 21.) 25 26 27 2 Stultz does not name Newmen as a defendant. 28 1 Stultz alleges that during his time at CSP he was “forced” to take COVID tests, 2 during which “medical staff displayed bias, unprofessional conduct and mishandle[ed] his 3 DNA.” (Id. at 20.) On February 4, 2021, after he was exposed to COVID, Stultz refused to 4 be tested “because he knew medical staff and correctional officers were conspiring to 5 tarnish his life.” (Id. at 21.) That same day, Stultz told Sergeant Reyes3 he was concerned 6 about staying at the same prison of Johnny Rodriguez’s family.” (Id.) But Reyes 7 disregarded his concerns. (Id.) 8 Stultz states that on October 16, 2021, while in custody at CSP, he was “battered” 9 by four inmates. He alleges this was because he “reported” the Rodriguez family and 10 medical personnel. (Id. at 22.) After the assault, Plaintiff mas moved to administrative 11 segregation for his safety “pending transfer.” (Id.) 12 Plaintiff was transferred from CSP to Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) on November 13 23, 2021. (Id.) On December 4, 2021, Stultz was again “subject to COVID-19 testing” and 14 during the process, his DNA was “mishandl[ed]” (Id. at 23.) 15 On December 28, 2021, “Defendant 2 made it clear he would utilize [a] COVID 16 swab to plant evidence in a case where . . . Stultz was wrongfully convicted.” (Id. at 21.) 17 On January 30, 2022, a “med tech” at CSP4 “obtained a COVID-19 swab [from Stultz] and 18 never documented [the] procedure to establish a safe chain of custody.” (Id. at 20.) 19 Stultz states that on October 10, 2023, he “suffered from severe puncture wounds 20 and was badly beaten,” requiring him to be sent to the “ER.” (Id. at 24.) It is not clear where 21 Stultz was housed at that time, and he does not elaborate on the specific circumstances of 22 the incident. (See id.) 23 24 25 26 3 Stultz does not name Reyes as a Defendant. 27 4 While in one portion of the Complaint Plaintiff states he was at CSP in December of 2021 and January of 2022, see Doc. No. 1 at 20, 21, in another portion, Plaintiff states he was transferred from CSP to CEN 28 on November 23, 2021. Id. at 22. 1 At some point, Stultz was housed at “Cois Byrd Detention Center.” (Id.) An inmate 2 who was placed in Stutz’s cell there “confessed” that he was an “agents [sic] informant.” 3 (Id. at 25.) While at SBDC, Stultz was “refused a shower and a blanket.” (Id.) 4 C. Discussion 5 In his Complaint, Stultz names the following Defendants: CDCR, CSP, CEN, CSP 6 Warden, CEN Warden, CSP Medical Staff, CEN Medical Staff, “John Doe, et al.” and 7 “Jane Doe, et al.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 11–13.) Stultz raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 8 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and Fourteenth 9 Amendment rights. (Id. at 28, 32, 33.) He also raises pendent state law claims, 10 including “medical negligence,” “fraud,” and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 11 (Id. at 29–31.) Stultz seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 34.) 12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a right secured 13 by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) the alleged violation 14 was committed by “a person” acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 15 42, 48 (1988). Federal courts may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 16 claims, but a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 17 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 18 1. State Agency Defendants 19 First, Defendants CDCR, CSP and CEN must be dismissed. The Eleventh 20 Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing a § 1983 lawsuit in which damages or 21 injunctive relief is sought against a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons 22 (such as CSP and CEN), absent “a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override.” 23 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Franceschi v. 24 25 26 5 It is unclear when Stultz arrived at Cois Byrd Detention Center, which is a local jail facility in Riverside 27 County, California. Allegations in the Complaint indicate Stultz was in custody there on or before March 11, 2023, see Doc. No. 1 at 25, until March 14, 2023, when he was “transferred back to Wasco 28 State Prison” and then ultimately “relocated” to CEN. See id. at 26. 1 Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which 2 seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its 3 instrumentalities, or its agencies.”). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh 4 Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.” 5 Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26; see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 6 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding CDCR and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh 7 Amendment immunity). 8 Here, because CDCR, CSP and CEN are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, 9 and instead are agencies and sub-agencies of the State of California, they are immune from 10 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 11 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state 12 agencies); Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he State is not a 13 ‘person’ for purposes of § 1983.”); see also Dragasits v. California, 2016 WL 680947, 14 at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“The State of California’s Department of Corrections and 15 Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department under 16 its jurisdiction, are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983.”). The Court therefore 17 dismisses Defendants CDCR, CSP and CEN. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 1915A(b). 19 2. Warden Defendants 20 Next, Stultz names as Defendants, the “Wardens of Calipatria” and the “Wardens of 21 Centinela” who held the positions during the “events described in th[e] complaint.” (Doc. 22 No. 1 at 11, 12.) Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions 23 of their employees. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. When a named defendant holds a 24 supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation 25 must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). To 26 do so, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that the supervisory defendant either: 27 (1) personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) knew of 28 the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or (3) promulgated or implemented a policy 1 “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights” and is “the 2 moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 3 1989) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)); Taylor v. List, 880 4 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 5 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey 6 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 Here, Stultz has not alleged any facts indicating that the CSP or CEN Wardens 8 personally participated the alleged deprivations of constitutional rights, knew of the 9 violations and failed to act to prevent them, or promulgated or “implemented a policy so 10 deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving 11 force of the constitutional violation.’” See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. In the absence of any 12 such allegations, Stultz has failed to state a claim against Wardens of CSP or CEN. See 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). 14 3. “Medical Staff” Defendants 15 To the extent Stultz names “Calipatria Medical Staff” and “Centinela Medical Staff” 16 as Defendants, he fails to state a claim because he does not make clear what specific 17 conduct is attributable to any specific individual. As noted above, to state a claim under 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions 19 of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 20 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another 21 to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 22 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which 23 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 24 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 25 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. 26 See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each 27 individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. 28 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 “Generic identifiers” such as “Centinela Medical Staff” and “Calipatria Medical 2 Staff” are insufficient to link a specific defendant’s actions to the alleged deprivation. See 3 Wright v. Pleasant Valley State Prison Med. Staff, 2009 WL 546214, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 4 Mar. 4, 2009) (“Generic identifiers such as ‘PVSP Medical Staff,’ ‘Chief Medical Staff,’ 5 and ‘Medical Doctors’ (without surname specificity) are insufficient to link a specific 6 defendant to offending actions.”). Therefore, Stultz has failed to state a claim against 7 Defendants “Centinela Medical Staff” and “Calipatria Medical Staff.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 8 at 678; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). 9 4. Doe Defendants 10 Stultz also names “John Doe, et al.” and “Jane Doe, et al.” as Defendants, but again 11 fails to provide sufficient facts to identify any individual Doe Defendants. First, the use of 12 fictitiously named Doe defendants, such as “John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” is generally not 13 favored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, amendment 14 may be permitted to substitute true names for fictitiously named defendants. Merritt v. 15 Cnty. of L.A., 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 Here, Stultz has failed to make any specific allegations against any clearly and 17 separately identified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe.” Instead, he references unidentified 18 defendants collectively in some portions of the Complaint, and in other portions, he 19 references a “Doe” but does not provide any distinguishable identifier. Stultz also 20 references “John Doe, et al.,” and “Jane Doe, et al.” as to both medical staff and 21 correctional staff. (See Doc. No. 1 at 12, 13.) In other portions of the Complaint, he 22 references “Defendant 1” or “Defendant 2.” (See id. at 18.) Stultz also refers to two 23 different groups listed as “Does 1–5,” one from CSP and another from CEN, but fails to 24 provide information necessary to distinguish between them. (Id. at 12, 13.) The lack of 25 clarity and consistency makes it impossible for the Court to determine what allegations 26 relate to which “Doe” Defendant. 27 Even where a plaintiff is unaware of a particular defendant’s name, he must still 28 allege facts specific to each Doe defendant. As such, Plaintiff must name each Doe 1 Defendant individually and separately (i.e., Doe 1, Doe 2, etc.) and clearly specify what 2 each unknown individual did. A plaintiff “must allege sufficient facts to show how each 3 doe defendant individually violated his constitutional rights. If he does so, he may be given 4 leave to obtain the names of doe defendants during discovery and seek leave to amend to 5 name those defendants.” Finefeuiaki v. Maui Police Dep’t, 2018 WL 4839001, at *3 (D. 6 Haw. Oct. 4, 2018) (citing Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999)). 7 Because Stultz has not clearly identified any specific action taken by any separately 8 identifiable Doe defendant, he fails to state any claim against any unnamed Defendant and 9 as such, the Court dismisses all Doe Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 10 1915A(b). 11 5. Dismissal With Leave to Amend 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety without 13 prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim against any Defendant. See 28 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend. See Akhtar v. 15 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se 16 complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 17 complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) 18 In amending his pleading, Stultz should consider the following legal standards 19 applicable to his claims, as discussed below. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th 20 Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 21 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating a court should briefly explain a pro se litigant’s pleading 22 deficiencies when dismissing claims with leave to amend). 23 a. Eighth Amendment: Failure to Protect 24 Stultz appears to allege his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was 25 housed at a correctional facility where “custody staff” who were “related to . . . the 26 deceased victim [in Stultz’s] criminal case” worked. (Doc. No. 1 at 16–17, 28.) The Eighth 27 Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety 28 of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison officials 1 have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833; 2 Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 3 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). But the failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by 4 other inmates, or from dangerous conditions at the prison, violates the Eighth Amendment 5 only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently 6 serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health 7 or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows 8 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable 9 steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 10 Neither negligence, nor gross negligence, warrant liability under the Eighth 11 Amendment. Id. at 835–36 & n.4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that 12 he should have perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the 13 infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have been 14 ‘wanton,’ which turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints 15 facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. 16 Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1991)). 17 In his Complaint, Stultz alleges that at some unspecified time while he was confined 18 at CSP, he “experienced . . . verbal and inappropriate statements” from staff implying that 19 he was a “snitch.” (Doc. No. 1 at 21.) On February 4, 2021, Stultz told “Sgt. Reyes” that 20 he feared being held at CSP because he believed staff had ties to his victim’s family, but 21 Reyes ignored his concerns. (Id.) On October 16, 2021, Stultz states he was “battered by 4 22 inmates.”6 (Id.) He also alleges that on October 10, 2023, he “suffered from severe puncture 23 wounds and was badly beaten” but provides no additional facts regarding the incident. (Id. 24 at 24.) While Plaintiff appears to assert these attacks were the result of his reporting 25 26 27 6 After the October 19, 2021 incident, Stultz was housed in administrative segregation for his safety until 28 he was transferred to CEN on November 23, 2021. (Doc. No. 1 at 22.) 1 concerns about officers having ties to the “Rodriguez family,” to state a plausible claim, 2 Stultz must allege sufficient facts to show a causal connection or link between the actions 3 of the defendant(s) and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. 4 at 373–75. As currently pleaded, however, Stultz’s allegations are vague, conclusory, and 5 insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.7 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ivey, 673 6 F.2d at 268. 7 b. First Amendment: Mail Tampering and Access to Courts 8 Stultz alleges his legal mail related to his criminal case was “tampered” with and 9 some of his legal materials were “confiscated.” (Doc. No. 1 at 32.) Inmates have a right 10 under the First and Sixth Amendments to have their properly marked legal mail opened in 11 their presence, and prison officials may not read their legal mail. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 12 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the First Amendment protects a 13 prisoner’s right to be present when his civil legal mail is opened); Mangiaracina v. 14 Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that pretrial detainee had a Sixth 15 Amendment right to privately confer with counsel and not have legal mail opened outside 16 his presence); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that 17 the Constitution prohibits reading ongoing attorney-client correspondence). To state a 18 claim, however, a plaintiff must “clarify who sent the mail or whether it was properly 19 marked as ‘legal mail.’” Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211. Additionally, a plaintiff must allege more 20 than mere negligence. Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) 21 22 23 7 To the extent Plaintiff also alleges unspecified Defendants “conspired” to violate his Eighth Amendment rights (see Doc. No. 1 at 32), he cannot state a claim because he has not adequately alleged an Eighth 24 Amendment violation. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 641 (“To state a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive any person or class of persons of the 25 equal protection of the laws; (3) an act done by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy; 26 and (4) a personal injury, property damage, or deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere 27 allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.”). 28 1 (“Stevenson has not shown, based on this record, that Koskey’s conduct concerning 2 plaintiff’s mail rose beyond the level of mere negligence.”). 3 To the extent Stultz states that “on numerous [occasions] [his] legal mail was opened 4 and tampered with” (see Doc. No. 1 at 17–18), his allegations as currently pleaded are 5 conclusory and speculative. Although Stultz states the mail in question was related to his 6 criminal case, he fails to clearly specify the items of mail he alleges were opened or 7 tampered with, who did so, and when. Nor does Stultz allege the items were properly 8 marked as “legal mail.” See Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211 (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s 9 claim regarding “legal mail” because the plaintiff had not met his burden of plausibly 10 alleging that the item opened outside his presence was protected legal mail and properly 11 marked as such); see also Mangiaracina, 849 F.3d at 1196 (concluding the district court 12 properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim at the pleading stage when he failed to allege the 13 envelopes were properly marked as legal mail). 14 Stultz also states he could “not properly argue his case” because some of his legal 15 materials were “confiscated.” (Doc. No. 1 at 32.) To the extent he seeks to raise a First 16 Amendment access to the courts claim, he must allege facts showing that he suffered an 17 “actual injury” as a result of a specific defendant’s alleged actions, by explaining how the 18 challenged official acts or omissions hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal 19 claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–55 (1996). Actual injury may be shown if the 20 alleged shortcomings “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim,” such as having his 21 complaint dismissed “for failure to satisfy some technical requirement,” or if he “suffered 22 arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts.” Id. at 351. As currently 23 pleaded, Stultz fails to adequately allege he suffered actual injury. 24 c. Due Process 25 Stultz appears to raise a due process claim, but it is difficult to parse. Stultz states 26 Defendants “violated due process by continuously forcing Plaintiff to be in confinement 27 where [Plaintiff] was safeguarded by state policy, to be housed in a different prison 28 facility.” (Doc. No. 1 at 33.) It is well settled that prisoners have no due process right to 1 placement in any particular prison, to any security classification, or to any particular 2 housing assignment.8 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 3 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (finding no liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause 4 is implicated in a prison’s reclassification and transfer decisions); Myron v. Terhune, 476 5 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty 6 interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson v. 7 Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citation omitted). Thus, Stultz has not stated a due 8 process claim as currently pleaded. 9 d. State Tort Claims 10 Stultz also raises state tort claims including “medical negligence,”9 “fraud,” and 11 intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Doc. No. 1 at 29–31.) Generally, state law 12 claims are not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983, which requires a 13 deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 14 (1976). As noted above, federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state 15 law claims, but a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 17 To the extent Stultz may seek to allege a pendent state tort claim for “medical 18 negligence,” he must allege sufficient facts to support the following elements: “(1) the duty 19 of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his 20 profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal 21 connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 22 damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 23 24 25 8 As discussed above, however, inmates have an Eighth Amendment right that prison officials take 26 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 27 9 Claims of negligence and medical malpractice do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A showing of medical malpractice or negligence 28 is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.”). 1 229–30 (1982). 2 Next, “[t]he elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to 3 induce reliance on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and 4 resulting damages.” Reeder v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 52 Cal. App. 5th 795, 803 5 (2020) (citing Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996)). 6 The elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under 7 California law are: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or 8 reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional 9 suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” Wong v. Tai 10 Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376 (2010) (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 11 946 (1979)). Conduct is “outrageous if it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 12 usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” Simo v. Union of NeedleTrades, Indus. & 13 Textile Emps., 322 F.3d 602, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 14 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999)). 15 The Court further notes that under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), set 16 forth in California Government Code §§ 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for 17 monetary damages against a public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented 18 the claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 19 (“Board”), and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort 20 Claims Act requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented to 21 and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1767, 22 1776 (1995). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” constitutes an 23 element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. Super. 24 Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, state tort claims included in a federal 25 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may proceed only if the claims were first 26 presented to the state in compliance with the claim presentation requirement. See id. at 27 1239; see also Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) 28 (affirming district court’s dismissal of state tort claims for failure to allege compliance with 1 California tort claim procedures). In his Complaint, Stultz fails to allege compliance with 2 the CTCA as to any of his state tort claims. 3 In sum, Stultz should consider the above standards and identified deficiencies in 4 preparing any amended pleading. See Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448 (“The requirement that courts 5 provide a pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint helps ensure 6 that the pro se litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively.”) 7 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 8 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 9 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 10 (Doc. No. 2). 11 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350 12 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount 13 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to 14 the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 15 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). All payments must clearly identify the name and case number 16 assigned to this action. 17 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff 18 Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, by 19 U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov. 20 4. DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety without prejudice for failure to state 21 a claim against any Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). 22 5. GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which 23 to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this 24 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his 25 original Complaint. See CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 26 Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 27 original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 28 dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 1 || ‘“considered waived if not repled”). 2 If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final 3 || Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a claim upon which relief 4 || can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1) and § 1915A(b)(1), and failure to 5 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 6 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity 7 ||to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into 8 || dismissal of the entire action.”). 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: March 5, 2026 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17