Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANE DOE, an individual Case No.: 3:25-cv-03686 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY [DOC. 3] 14 VALLEY CENTER-PAUMA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; RON MCCOWAN; 15 ALA HERNANDEZ; AARON LITTLE; 16 and DOES 2-50, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in this action under the 20 pseudonym “Jane Doe.” (Pl’s Mot. [Doc. 3].) Valley Center-Pauma Unified School District 21 (“Defendant”) filed a response in non-opposition. (Def’s Resp. [Doc. 12].) The Court 22 decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 23 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed 24 pseudonymously [Doc. 3]. This order is procedural in nature and does not constitute any 25 factual determination on the merits. 26 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The following allegations are recounted solely as provided in Plaintiff’s initial 3 complaint. Plaintiff, a minor at all relevant times, alleges that beginning in Fall 2021 at 4 Valley Center Middle School, Diego Ramirez “bull[ied] and sexually harass[ed]” her and 5 her friends during a shared lunch period by forcing them to watch pornography and sharing 6 explicit “sexual facts,” including videos depicting “a nude older man masturbating and a 7 woman masturbating with a jar,” alongside comments about sexual violence. (Compl. 8 [Doc. 1] at ¶¶ 35–36.) 9 Although Defendant eventually issued a Stay Away Order against Diego Ramirez in 10 March 2022, Plaintiff claims it was not enforced and that the conduct escalated, including 11 a December 2022 incident in which Diego Ramirez “kick[ed] JANE DOE and another 12 female student in the shins during lunch.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 42, 50.) This misconduct 13 purportedly culminated in a February 27, 2024 exchange in which he allegedly stated, “if 14 I were to shoot up this school . . . you would be the first one I shoot,” followed by graphic 15 threats. (Id. at ¶ 53.) The complaint further alleges that, although Ramirez had been 16 “removed” from campus, Defendant informed Plaintiff's family days before the Fall 2024 17 term that he would return, prompting Plaintiff to transfer to independent study as a long- 18 term plan. (Id. at ¶ 79.) 19 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to implement recommended support systems 20 despite medical documentation diagnosing her as a “child victim of physical and 21 psychological bullying” with “post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), acute adjustment 22 disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, and major depressive 23 disorder, single episode, mild.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 76–81.) Plaintiff also received counseling at 24 Rady’s Chadwick Center, “an accredited children’s advocacy center for traumatized 25 children.” (Id. at ¶ 76.) Plaintiff alleges that the independent-study placement left her with 26 “no one overseeing or teaching” her coursework and exacerbated symptoms including 27 “PTSD anxiety, depression, insomnia, social anxiety . . . and migraines.” (Id. at ¶¶ 82, 89.) 28 The complaint describes an academic and emotional decline from a weighted 4.4 GPA to 1 withdrawal from traditional schooling, attributed to “the stress and anxiety from the 2 homicidal threat and hostility from the [School District],” ultimately requiring private 3 instruction and redoing her eleventh-grade year. (Id. at ¶¶ 82–88.) 4 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A. Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously 7 Parties may proceed under pseudonyms in the “unusual case” where concealing a 8 litigant’s identity “is necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or 9 personal embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 10 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 11 1981)). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, parties may proceed pseudonymously only when 12 the need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and “the public’s interest 13 in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068. Assessment of prejudice includes considering 14 whether the opposing party already knows the litigant’s identity, because such knowledge 15 “lessens [a party’s] claims to be prejudiced by the use of pseudonyms.” Id. at 1069 n.11. 16 With respect to the public interest analysis, non-disclosure does not necessarily “obstruct 17 public scrutiny of the important issues,” and the public possesses an interest in allowing 18 meritorious claims to proceed without chilling effects. Id. at 1072–73. 19 The Ninth Circuit has stated that courts should determine the need for anonymity 20 according to the following three factors: (i) the severity of the harm with which disclosure 21 threatens the party; (ii) the reasonableness of the party’s fears of that harm; and (iii) the 22 party’s vulnerability to reprisal. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068. Matters 23 involving “human sexuality” may fall within the category of “sensitive and highly 24 personal” subjects supporting anonymity. Roes 1–2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 25 990, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that courts have permitted anonymity in cases involving 26 abortion, sexual orientation, transgender identity, and sexual abuse allegations). 27 In John Doe 140 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, the court allowed a survivor 28 of clergy sexual abuse to proceed anonymously where the allegations involved repeated 1 sexual abuse during private confession visits. 249 F.R.D. 358, 360. Applying the Advanced 2 Textile balancing test, the court emphasized that the plaintiff “would face a very real risk 3 of harassment, ridicule, and personal embarrassment,” and recognized that “[t]he 4 experience of sexual abuse can be deeply psychologically traumatic, and public knowledge 5 of such abuse can trigger new trauma even years after the fact.” Id. at 361. Therefore, risk 6 of retraumatization, harassment, or personal embarrassment weighs in favor of anonymity 7 where disclosure would expose a plaintiff to additional psychological harm and little 8 prejudice results from nondisclosure. 9 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Although Plaintiff is no longer a minor, Ninth Circuit precedent recognizes that the 12 perceived need for anonymity persists after a plaintiff “ages out” of minority. See 13 Kamehameha Schs., 625 F.3d at 1195. Accordingly, this Court will evaluate pseudonymity 14 based on the nature of the allegations and the interests at stake, rather than placing weight 15 on Plaintiff’s current age.1 16 The allegations in the complaint present the type of “unusual case” where it is 17 appropriate to protect a plaintiff from “injury, ridicule, or personal embarrassment.” See 18 Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1067–68. Plaintiff alleges sustained and severe sexual 19 harassment—including being forced to watch pornography and subjected to comments 20 about sexual violence. This purported conduct is particularly troubling given that she was 21 a minor in a school setting. 22 Furthermore, the prejudice to Defendant is minimal. As the record reflects, 23 Defendant already knows Plaintiff’s identity, and Plaintiff has offered to exchange 24 25 26 1 At this stage, and as requested (See Def’s Resp. at 3), this Court considers the allegations in the complaint solely for purposes of the anonymity analysis and makes no factual findings as to their truth. 27 Defendant’s non-opposition will also not be interpreted as admission of any fact alleged, and Defendant retains all rights to contest and challenge Plaintiff’s allegations and claims in full. 28 1 identifying information subject to confidentiality assurances. (Pl’s Mot. at 9.) In addition, 2 Defendant “does not oppose” Plaintiff proceeding as Jane Doe. (Def’s Resp. at 1.) The 3 central issues in this case relate to the alleged misconduct of Defendant and named officials 4 in permitting Diego Ramirez’s conduct to continue, and Plaintiff’s identity is not necessary 5 to adjudicate those claims. Where anonymity does not “obstruct public scrutiny of the 6 important issues,” disclosure is not necessary. See Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 7 1072-73. 8 Moreover, courts within this Circuit have recognized issues involving “human 9 sexuality,” including sexual abuse and harassment, as clear examples of “sensitive and 10 highly personal” subjects. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 994. The allegations in 11 this case fall squarely within that ambit. Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment, homicidal 12 threats, and resulting trauma and mental-health struggles that interfered with her ability to 13 remain at school and perform academically at the same level. (Compl. at ¶¶ 99–108.) Taken 14 for the purpose of the pseudonymity analysis, these claims describe deeply personal 15 experiences involving a minor contending she “suffered both physical and psychological 16 bullying,” including PTSD, anxiety, and depression. (Id. at ¶ 76.) 17 In John Doe 140 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, the court recognized that a 18 plaintiff may face a “very real risk of harassment, ridicule, and personal embarrassment,” 19 and that public disclosure of sexual-abuse allegations can “trigger new trauma even years 20 after the fact.” 249 F.R.D. at 361. Plaintiff here alleges substantial ongoing trauma, and 21 this Court sees no reason to risk exacerbating that harm by requiring disclosure of her 22 identity at this stage. Moreover, as was the case in John Doe, Defendant already knows 23 Plaintiff’s identity, minimizing prejudice and allowing the claim to proceed 24 pseudonymously does not undermine, but may advance, the public’s interest in 25 adjudicating important questions regarding how schools purportedly respond to alleged 26 student harassment and safety threats. See id. Under these circumstances, permitting Jane 27 Doe to proceed pseudonymously balances privacy, fairness, and public access. 28 | |TV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 2 In balancing the nature of the allegations, the minimal prejudice to Defendant, and 3 || the public’s continued ability to scrutinize the issues presented, this matter falls within the 4 ||limited class of “unusual cases” warranting pseudonymous treatment. See Advanced 5 || Textile Corp., at 1067-68. Accordingly, the motion to proceed pseudonymously is 6 || therefore GRANTED [Doc. 3]. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: March 5, 2026 \ 10 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 11 Unted States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28