Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH DANG, Case No.: 19-cv-1519-LL-DDL 12 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. REOPEN DISCOVERY 14 DAVID PONTIER, [Dkt. No. 285] 15 Defendant/Counterplaintiff. 16 17 Before the Court is Defendant/Counterplaintiff David Pontier’s Motion to Reopen 18 Discovery. Dkt. No. 285. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Joseph Dang opposes the motion. 19 Dkt. No. 297. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED. 20 I. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Mr. Dang, who was formerly Mr. Pontier’s attorney, initially brought this matter 23 as an interpleader action to resolve conflicting claims over funds obtained through a 24 personal injury settlement. Dkt. No. 1. The only remaining causes of action are two 25 counterclaims brought by Mr. Pontier against Mr. Dang for medical fraud and breach of 26 contract. 27 Pursuant to the Court’s June 4, 2020 Scheduling Order, fact discovery ended on 28 November 3, 2020. Dkt. No 72 at 1. On January 26, 2026, the Court issued a Scheduling 1 Order setting the case towards a pretrial conference. Dkt. No. 267. Mr. Pontier filed his 2 motion on February 11, 2026. Dkt. No. 285. 3 Mr. Pontier argues that good cause to reopen discovery exists because “newly 4 discovered evidence reveals that Mr. Dang concealed a material familial relationship with 5 JP Morgan Chase Bank Manager Vuong Vo,” who allegedly accepted two insurance 6 checks from Mr. Dang without Mr. Pontier’s signature. Dkt. No. 285 at 2. Additionally, 7 Mr. Pontier states that discovery closed before Chase Bank complied with his subpoena. 8 Id. Finally, Mr. Pontier questions the authenticity of documents produced by Mr. Dang. 9 Id. He seeks to reopen discovery to enforce a previously served subpoena on Chase Bank, 10 to obtain the birth records of Vuong Vo and Mr. Dang’s wife, and to authenticate the 11 documents produced by Mr. Dang. Id. at 8. 12 Mr. Dang objects to reopening discovery. Dkt. No. 297. First, Mr. Dang denies 13 the existence of any familial relationship with Vuong Vo. Id. at 2. Additionally, Mr. 14 Dang points out that Mr. Pontier has asserted this theory since at least November 23, 15 2025, when he discussed it at length in a prior motion, and thereby has failed to exercise 16 the diligence required by Rule 16(b)(4). Id. at 3, see Dkt. No. 250 at 2. 17 II. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 Scheduling orders may be modified only “for good cause and with the judge’s 20 consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily 21 considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth 22 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether to modify 23 a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4) to reopen discovery, a court must consider the 24 following factors: 1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) 25 whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was 26 diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the 27 foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for 28 discovery by the district court, and 6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant 1 evidence. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017). 2 III. 3 DISCUSSION 4 The Court finds that Mr. Pontier has not established good cause to reopen 5 discovery. As an initial matter, Mr. Pontier has not been diligent in seeking the requested 6 relief. Fact discovery closed more than five years ago. As to the subpoena on Chase 7 Bank, Mr. Pontier served it on June 2, 2020, and Chase Bank responded with their 8 objections on June 5, 2020. Dkt. No. 285-1 at 2. Thereafter, Mr. Pontier did not seek to 9 enforce the subpoena, despite having five months to do so before the close of fact 10 discovery. To seek relief now, more than five years after receiving Chase Bank’s 11 objections, clearly fails to demonstrate the diligence required by Rule 16(b)(4). Similarly, 12 Mr. Pontier has failed to act diligently to complete discovery pertaining to his other two 13 requested subjects for reopened discovery, Mr. Dang’s relationship to Vuong Vo and the 14 authenticity of documents produced by Mr. Dang. Both requests arise from issues that 15 Mr. Pontier was aware of during the discovery period in 2020, and he provides no 16 justification for why he waited so long to seek this relief. 17 Additionally, the six-factor inquiry set forth above weighs against reopening 18 discovery. First, the case is nearing trial. The parties have exchanged pretrial disclosures 19 and are on the path to a pretrial conference. Second, Mr. Dang opposes the request. As 20 to the third factor, Mr. Dang does not address whether reopening discovery will result in 21 prejudice. However, the Court finds that Mr. Dang would suffer at least some prejudice 22 from the delay that would be caused by reopening discovery. Fourth, Mr. Pontier was not 23 diligent in completing discovery within the original time period, as described above. 24 Fifth, Mr. Pontier does not identify any unforeseeable event that justifies reopening 25 discovery. Finally, while there may be a chance that Mr. Pontier’s requested discovery 26 could lead to relevant evidence, that likelihood is not significant enough to outweigh the 27 other five factors, which all support not reopening discovery. 28 / / / I IV. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated about, Defendant/Counterplaintiff Pontier’s motion to 4 reopen discovery [Dkt. No. 285] is DENIED. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: March 4, 2026 _— 7 Tb! lho = □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28