Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASON THOR LEONARD, Case No.: 25cv0842-BTM (DEB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 13 vs. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT FURTHER LEAVE TO 14 AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO and 15 A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. UNKNOWN DEPUTIES, § 1915(e)(2) 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Thor Leonard, a pretrial detainee at the San Diego 20 Central Jail at the time of the events but released from custody prior to initiating this action, 21 proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) 22 Plaintiff claimed that the conditions during his four-day confinement at the San Diego 23 Central Jail in April of 2023 constituted cruel and unusual punishment arising from 24 deliberate indifference to his health, and that he was retaliated against for complaining. 25 (See id. at 3-5.) On July 24, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 26 pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires 27 sua sponte dismissal of a complaint brought by a person proceeding in forma pauperis 28 which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 1 are immune. (ECF No. 3.) The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend for failure 2 to state a claim after Plaintiff was notified of its pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 3-8.) Plaintiff 3 thereafter filed a First Amended Complaint which repeated the conditions of confinement 4 claim but dropped the retaliation claim. (ECF No. 4.) 5 On November 10, 2025, the Court screened the First Amended Complaint and 6 dismissed it for failure to state a conditions of confinement claim for the same reasons the 7 original Complaint failed to state such a claim. (ECF No. 5 at 5-6.) Although it appeared 8 unlikely Plaintiff would be able to cure the defects of pleading to plausibly state a claim 9 for relief, he was granted one final opportunity to amend. (Id. at 6.) On January 2, 2026, 10 Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 6.) The Court finds, for 11 the following reasons, that the SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 12 for the same reasons the prior versions of the complaint failed to state a claim, and that it 13 is now clear Plaintiff is unable to further amend his pleading to plausibly state a 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983 claim for relief. Thus, the Court dismisses the SAC without further leave to amend. 15 I. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 16 A. Standard of Review 17 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-Answer screening 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss a complaint, or 19 any portion of it, brought by a person proceeding in forma pauperis which is frivolous, 20 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez 21 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), citing Barron v. Harrington, 22 152 F.3d 1193, 1994 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The statutory authority is clear: ‘the court shall 23 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to 24 state a claim on which relief may be granted.’”), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 25 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 26 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 27 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 28 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 1 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 2 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To 3 establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by 4 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed 5 by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 6 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 8 Plaintiff alleges that from April 8-11, 2023, he was “confined continuously in a 9 holding tank at the San Diego Central Jail. The holding tank was not designed or intended 10 for overnight or multi-day housing, but rather for short-term processing, consistent with 11 widely recognized correctional standards.” (ECF No. 6 at 3.) “Plaintiff was provided no 12 mattress, no bedding, no blanket, and no insulated sleeping surface. Plaintiff was forced 13 to sleep either directly on cold concrete flooring or on a hard bench, despite repeatedly 14 requesting basic bedding.” (Id. at 4.) He alleges the holding tank was cold and he 15 experienced prolonged exposure to low temperatures. (Id.) In response to his requests for 16 bedding or a blanket, “Defendant Deputies mocked Plaintiff and told him to ‘masturbate 17 to keep warm,’ rather than providing any measure to abate the cold.” (Id.) Plaintiff also 18 alleges he was “denied access to showers, soap or basic hygiene supplies, including after 19 using the toilet. This occurred during a period in which Covid-19 remained a known and 20 ongoing infectious risk in custodial facilities.” (Id. at 5.) 21 Plaintiff alleges in claim one that the individual Defendants, San Diego Sheriff’s 22 deputies whose names are unknown to him, violated his Fourteenth Amendment due 23 process right as a pre-trial detainee to be free from punishment by being exposed to “a 24 substantial risk of harm, including hypothermia, musculoskeletal injury, sleep deprivation, 25 and infection.” (Id. at 8-9.) He alleges in claim two that Defendant San Diego County is 26 liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because it 27 maintained policies, customs or practices which were the moving force behind the 28 constitutional violation, including a practice of using holding tanks for prolonged detention 1 due to overcrowding, a custom of denying bedding and hygiene items in holding areas for 2 extended periods, and a failure to train its deputies regarding housing conditions of pretrial 3 detainees outside regular housing units. (Id. at 10-11.) 4 C. Analysis 5 “Due process [under the Fourteenth Amendment] requires that a pretrial detainee not 6 be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that 7 punishment may not be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.” Bell v. 8 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. 9 Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that “due process rights” of a person who has 10 not been convicted “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to 11 a convicted prisoner.”) To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement 12 against an individual defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pre-trial detainee must 13 plausibly allege: “(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 14 conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at 15 substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable 16 available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 17 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved - making the consequences of the 18 defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 19 plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 In order to state a claim for municipal liability against the County of San Diego under 21 Monell, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the 22 County has a policy, custom or practice which amounted to deliberate indifference to that 23 constitutional right; and (3) the policy, custom or practice was the moving force behind the 24 constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 25 2011), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“We conclude, therefore, that a local government 26 may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 27 Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 28 lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 1 inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”) Municipal 2 liability may be shown when an employee who committed the constitutional violation was 3 “acting pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, longstanding practice or custom, 4 or as a final policymaker.” Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 5 2014), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 6 The Court informed Plaintiff in the prior screening orders that he had not identified 7 a custom, policy or practice by the County of San Diego allegedly adhered to with 8 deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, but had merely alleged in a conclusory 9 manner that the conditions of his confinement during his four days at the jail were the result 10 of such policies. (ECF No. 3 at 4-5; ECF No. 5 at 4-5.) He was instructed that such 11 allegations fail to plausibly allege municipal liability because “proof of a single incident of 12 unconstitutional activity,” or even a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents” will not give 13 rise to § 1983 municipal liability, and that liability based on custom, practice or policy 14 “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices 15 of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional 16 method of carrying out policy.” Grant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th 17 Cir. 2014), Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (for an unwritten policy or custom to form the basis of 18 a claim, it must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well 19 settled” practice) and Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).) Plaintiff was 20 twice instructed that factual allegations regarding the specific nature of the policy, custom 21 or practice are required. (ECF No. 3 at 5; ECF No. 5 at 5, both citing Hernandez v. County 22 of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (a complaint with bare allegations of a 23 municipal policy fails to state a claim where it does not “put forth additional facts regarding 24 the specific nature of this alleged policy, custom or practice.”)) He was also twice 25 instructed that his allegation that the conditions of his confinement were caused by a failure 26 to train jail staff failed to allege the County “was deliberately indifferent to the need to train 27 subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation 28 of rights,” and that to do so he must allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations, 1 because isolated incidents are insufficient to allege that the County was put on “notice that 2 a course of training is deficient in a particular respect” and that “the absence of such a 3 course will cause violations of constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 3 at 5-6; ECF No. 5 at 5- 4 6, both citing Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), 5 Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that short 6 term or temporary deprivations of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and sanitation 7 do not plausibly allege a constitutional violation), Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (applying 8 Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a 9 complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if it does not “contain sufficient 10 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) 11 (internal quote marks omitted).) 12 Plaintiff has once again failed to cure any of those pleading defects with respect to 13 a claim against the County of San Diego. He has once again failed to set forth factual as 14 opposed to conclusory allegations identifying a San Diego County custom, policy or 15 practice, or plausibly allege a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and 16 the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Collins v. County of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 17 123 (1992); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (in order to impose liability on 18 a local government under § 1983 a plaintiff must plead and prove that an “action pursuant 19 to official municipal policy” caused their injury). Rather, he continues to rely on the 20 conditions of his confinement for the four-day period he was incarcerated at the jail to 21 support his conclusion and supposition that they were the result of a custom, policy or 22 practice of San Diego County regarding the manner in which he was confined. 23 Even if Plaintiff could satisfy the custom, policy or practice pleading standard as to 24 a claim against the County, he has also once again failed to set forth factual allegations 25 identifying a constitutional violation or an injury necessary to state a claim against the 26 County or the individual Defendants, and it is now clear he is unable to do so. “[E]xtreme 27 deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine 28 discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 1 society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities 2 are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v. 3 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quote marks and citation omitted); see also 4 Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that short 5 term or temporary deprivations of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and sanitation 6 do not plausibly allege a constitutional violation); Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (a plaintiff 7 must plausibly allege he was confined under conditions which put him at a substantial risk 8 of suffering serious harm, that a defendant did not take reasonable available measures to 9 abate that risk, and “by not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff’s 10 injuries.”) Plaintiff’s allegations of a four-day uncomfortable stay at the jail without 11 bedding or showers which exposed him to, but did not result in, injury are not sufficient to 12 plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; Anderson, 45 13 F.3d at 1312-13; Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; see also e.g. North v. Salazar, No. 25cv1750- 14 WQH (LR), 2025 WL 3208842, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (collecting cases and 15 noting that the Ninth Circuit and district courts have found deprivation of bedding and 16 showers for four, seven and nine days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Demery v. 17 Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that to constitute punishment under 18 the Fourteenth Amendment, the governmental action must cause harm that “either 19 significantly exceeded, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.”), 20 citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (holding that for a governmental action to constitute 21 punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment the action must cause the pre-trial detainee 22 to suffer some harm). 23 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 25 Because it is now clear Plaintiff cannot state a claim, the dismissal is without further leave 26 to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court 27 should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear 28 that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”), quoting Akhtar 1 ||v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States ex rel. Insoon Lee v. 2 || SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Futility of amendment 3 || can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.”) 4 | TI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 5 The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for failure to state 6 claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) without 7 || further leave to amend. The Clerk of Court will enter a final judgment accordingly. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: March 2, 2026 Til 10 Honore Barry Ted sh pat 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 ee