Igor Popov v. Warden of Imperial Detention Facility; Current or Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Current or Acting Field Office Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Current or Acting Secretary, Unites
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Igor Popov, an immigration detainee, filed a motion to appoint counsel in his habeas corpus petition challenging the length of his detention. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that Popov did not demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required for appointment and appeared capable of litigating his claims pro se.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to appoint counsel denied without prejudice“Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's standard for appointing counsel in civil cases, which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' based on the likelihood of success and the petitioner's ability to articulate claims. The order notes that Popov's petition contains a description of facts and legal bases, suggesting he can represent himself, and that it is too early to assess merit. Denying without prejudice is appropriate given the early stage of the litigation. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard from binding Ninth Circuit precedent. It applies the two-part test (likelihood of success and ability to litigate pro se) and concludes that the petitioner has not met the burden of showing exceptional circumstances. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a procedural motion at the early stage of litigation.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IGOR POPOV, Case No.: 26-cv-1174-JES-BLM 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. APPOINT COUNSEL 14 WARDEN OF IMPERIAL DETENTION FACILITY; CURRENT OR ACTING [ECF No. 2] 15 FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, San Diego 16 Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; CURRENT 17 OR ACTING FIELD OFFICE 18 DIRECTOR, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; CURRENT 19 OR ACTING SECRETARY, Unites 20 States Department of Homeland Security; and CURRENT OR ACTING UNITED 21 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 22 Respondents. 23 24 25 Before the Court is Petitioner Igor Popov’s (“Petitioner”) motion to appoint counsel. 26 ECF No. 2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 27 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the motion to appoint counsel. 28 1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 3 challenging his immigration detention as unduly prolonged. See generally ECF No. 1. The 4 Petition contains a description of the facts of Petitioner’s immigration custody and the legal 5 basis he states for relief. Id. On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff also filed a motion to appoint 6 counsel. ECF No. 2. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case unless 9 an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dep’t 10 Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 11 While 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(1) gives district courts discretion to “request” that an 12 attorney represent indigent civil litigants, it may only be exercised upon a showing of 13 “exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Carr Corp. Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 14 2004); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). When assessing whether 15 exceptional circumstances exist, the Court must undergo “an evaluation of both ‘the 16 likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims 17 pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 18 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 19 1983)). Courts must review both factors before deciding whether to appoint counsel, and 20 neither factor is individually dispositive. Id. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that 21 exceptional circumstances exist. See Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The Petition states a description of the present stage of Petitioner’s ongoing asylum 24 claim, his prior immigration and criminal legal cases, his current detention and its 25 conditions, and the legal bases he alleges warrant release or a bond hearing in his case. See 26 generally ECF No. 1. Petitioner appears able to adequately represent and litigate his claims 27 for relief. While it is too early for the Court to determine Plaintiff’s likelihood of success 28 on the merits, he fails to establish the requisite “exceptional circumstances” that would 1 warrant appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 2 || PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the 5 motion to appoint counsel. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: March 2, 2026 10 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. il United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28