gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-02748 · 2026-03-02 · Unknown

Raymonda Singleton v. Justice System

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:39Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se civil complaint filed in forma pauperis against 'Justice System' alleging unspecified environmental and personal injuries. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for being frivolous and failing to state a claim, denied the pending motions as moot, and certified that an appeal would be frivolous.

What the court decidedThe model
Dismissal of the civil action as frivolous and for failing to state a claim
“The Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend;”
agree with court
The order recites that the complaint consists of incoherent narrative, fails to identify specific laws violated, and names a non-legal entity ('the System') as the defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 8, a complaint that is unintelligible and fails to provide fair notice of the claim is subject to dismissal. The court's reliance on the plaintiff's history of similar dismissed filings supports the denial of leave to amend.
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Motion to Set a Trial Date
“Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed IFP, [Doc. No. 2], and Set a Trial Date, [Doc. No. 3], are DENIED AS MOOT;”
agree with court
Because the underlying complaint was dismissed, the motions to proceed and set a trial date are no longer relevant to the case. Denying them as moot is the standard procedural consequence of a dismissal.
Certification that an IFP appeal would be frivolous
“The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this order would be frivolous and therefore would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);”
agree with court
The court is authorized to certify that an appeal is not taken in good faith if it is frivolous. Given the dismissal for failure to state a claim and the lack of arguable legal basis in the complaint, this certification follows from the court's findings.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the mandatory screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It identifies specific deficiencies in the complaint (incoherence, lack of legal basis, improper defendant) and cites appropriate Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority for the proposition that such complaints must be dismissed. The denial of leave to amend is supported by the plaintiff's history of similar filings.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 RAYMONDA SINGLETON, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2748-CAB-JLB 9 Plaintiff, ORDER: 10 v. 1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING 11 JUSTICE SYSTEM, TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 12 Defendant. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii);

13 AND 14 2) DENYING MOTION TO 15 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 16 and MOTION TO SET A TRIAL DATE AS MOOT [Doc. Nos. 2, 3] 17 18 19 20 Plaintiff Raymonda Singleton has filed this civil action against “the Justice System” 21 seemingly in relation to her various past cases, including in this District, that sought 22 compensation and relocation due to alleged injuries from “energy sources” in her apartment 23 complex. [Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”) (referring to Case No. 3:21-cv-01594-CAB-LL, Case 24 No. 3:24-cv-2278-DMS-MSB, and 9th Circuit Appeal No. 21-56108).] Plaintiff did not 25 prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, 26 she has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(a), [Doc. No. 2], and a Motion to Set a Trial Date within 120 Days. [Doc. No. 3.] 28 1 For the reasons stated below, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with prejudice and 2 DENIES the pending motions as moot. 3 I. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 4 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it “is frivolous or malicious[,] fails to state a 6 claim upon which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 7 is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 8 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 9 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 10 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 11 complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167– 12 68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal 13 comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a 14 litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, 15 lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive 16 lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 17 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 18 Complaints must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires 19 that each pleading include a “short and plain statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P. 20 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1); 21 see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). In addition to the grounds for sua 22 sponte dismissal set out in § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court may also dismiss a complaint 23 for failure to comply with Rule 8 if it fails to provide the defendant fair notice of the wrongs 24 allegedly committed. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 25 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were 26 “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” 27 and comprised of “incomprehensible rambling”). 28 Here, the Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and fails to state a claim upon which 1 relief can be granted. Like Plaintiff’s previous complaints, this Complaint consists of 2 incoherent and rambling narrative alleging that “[t]he Justice System may and will and has 3 to be held liable for Environmental Community Injustices . . . due to the imminent danger 4 the Justice System has left me for DEAD[.]” [Complaint at 5.] But it remains unclear what 5 laws or rights Plaintiff claims were violated or infringed; the Complaint alludes to issues 6 ranging from “assault, attempted mannslaughter [sic] and attempted murder” to 7 “Environmental: Laws and Protection Agencies Vetoed.” [Id. at 14–15 (capitalization 8 removed).] Moreover, the reference to a monetary request is aimed at San Diego Gas and 9 Electric, not the judiciary. [Id. at 16.] The Complaint is therefore frivolous and fails to 10 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 11 Accordingly, even if Plaintiff is entitled to proceed IFP, the Complaint must be 12 dismissed. Anderson v. Sy, 486 Fed. Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court 13 properly dismissed [the lawsuit] as frivolous because the complaint contains 14 indecipherable facts and unsupported legal assertions.”); Adams v. FBI San Francisco 15 Field Off. Supervisor & Agents, No. 19-CV-02977-YGR (PR), 2019 WL 5626261, at *1 16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (“A claim that is totally incomprehensible may be dismissed as 17 frivolous as it is without an arguable basis in law.”). Moreover, “[w]hen a case may be 18 classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action 19 and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128, n.8. This is 20 particularly true here, where Plaintiff has had at least prior two civil cases with similar 21 complaints dismissed, one of which Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth 22 Circuit dismissed as frivolous. 23 24 25 1 In addition, even if the Court generously interprets Plaintiff’s named defendant (“Justice System”) as 26 individual judges involved with Plaintiff’s previous cases, “[j]udges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” 27 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); see also In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2022). 28 1 Il. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 3 1. The Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend; 4 2. Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed IFP, [Doc. No. 2], and Set a Trial Date, [Doc. No. 5 3], are DENIED AS MOOT; 6 3. The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this order would be frivolous 7 and therefore would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(a)(3); and 9 4. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case. 10 Itis SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: March 2, 2026 (GB 12 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28