Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TAMMY G., Case No.: 24-cv-01214-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 14 FRANK J. BISIGNANO, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 15 [ECF No. 22] Defendant. 16 17 18 Before the Court is a Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) filed 19 by Laura E. Krank, counsel for Plaintiff Tammy G. (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No. 22.) The 20 Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) takes no position on the motion. 21 (ECF No. 24.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Commissioner seeking 24 judicial review of the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. (ECF 25 26 27 1 Frank J. Bisignano, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security as of May 6, 2025, is hereby substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal Rule 28 1 No. 1.) The Commissioner filed the Administrative Record on September 13, 2024. (ECF 2 No. 8.) 3 The parties filed a joint motion for voluntary remand to agency pursuant to sentence 4 four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 24, 2025. (ECF No. 17.) On January 27, 2025, the 5 Court granted the joint motion and remanded the matter to the Social Security 6 Administration for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 7 U.S.C. § 405(g) and directed the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 8 (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) 9 On March 6, 2025, the parties filed a joint motion for the award and payment of 10 attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 11 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (ECF No. 20.) The Court 12 granted the motion in part and awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $6,469.74 13 for work done in this matter, and $405 in costs. (ECF No. 21.) 14 On remand, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) issued a fully favorable 15 decision to Plaintiff on July 30, 2025, finding that Plaintiff has been disabled under the 16 Social Security Act since March 5, 2019. (ECF No. 22-2.) On October 13, 2025, Plaintiff 17 was awarded $92,213.00 in past due benefits. (ECF No. 22-3 at 6.) The SSA withheld 18 $23,053.25 from Plaintiff’s past due benefits in case they needed it to pay Plaintiff’s 19 representative. (Id.) 20 In the instant motion, Plaintiff’s counsel requests that the Court order the payment 21 of attorney’s fees in the amount of $23,000.00, payable to Law Offices of Lawrence D. 22 Rohlfing, Inc., CPC, and order reimbursement to Plaintiff in the amount of $6,469.74, 23 which is the amount of EAJA fees previously awarded to Plaintiff and assigned to counsel. 24 (ECF No. 22 at 15.)2 25 /// 26 27 2 Plaintiff’s counsel does not seek reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a). 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) provides in relevant part as follows: 3 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 4 subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 5 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits 6 to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . 7 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 8 The statute does not instruct the district court as to how counsel’s fees should be 9 calculated. See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). With 10 respect to Section 406(b), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, 11 [m]ost plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee 12 agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully 13 representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that 14 they yield reasonable results in particular cases. Congress has provided one 15 boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past due benefits. Within the 25 percent 16 boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee 17 sought is reasonable for the services rendered. 18 Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (footnotes and citations omitted). Thus, 19 in cases in which a contingency fee agreement exists, a district court should first look to 20 the contingency fee agreement and then test it for reasonableness. Id. at 808. 21 The Supreme Court has instructed that a reduction of the fee award may be 22 appropriate “based on the character of the representation and the results the representative 23 achieved.” Id. The Ninth Circuit subsequently explained that when analyzing the 24 reasonableness of a fee award, a court “may properly reduce the fee for substandard 25 performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 26 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). To this end, the Supreme 27 Court has explicitly provided: 28 /// 1 [T]he court may require the claimant’s attorney to submit, not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the court’s assessment of the reasonableness 2 of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record of the hours spent 3 representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases. 4 5 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. Thus, in awarding fees, 6 a district court may “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing the 7 reasonableness of the fee.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis in original). 8 “[T]he Commissioner of Social Security . . . has no direct financial stake in the 9 answer to the § 406(b) question; instead, she plays a part in the fee determination 10 resembling that of a trustee for the claimants.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. “Because 11 the SSA has no direct interest in how much of the award goes to counsel and how much to 12 the disabled person, the district court has an affirmative duty to assure that the 13 reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149. “The attorney bears 14 the burden of establishing that the fee sought is reasonable.” Id. at 1148 (citation omitted). 15 The EAJA also permits an attorney to receive fees for successful Social Security 16 representations. See Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1216–17 (9th 17 Cir. 2012). Fees awarded pursuant to the EAJA are paid by the government rather than the 18 claimant. Id. at 1218. Accordingly, while “[f]ee awards may be made under both 19 prescriptions, . . . the claimant’s attorney must ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the 20 smaller fee.’” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (second alteration in original) (quoting Act of 21 Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186); see also Parrish, 698 F.3d at 1218 22 (“[I]n order to maximize the award of past-due benefits to claimants and to avoid giving 23 double compensation to attorneys, the savings provision requires a lawyer to offset any 24 fees received under § 406(b) with any award that the attorney receives under [28 U.S.C.] 25 § 2412 if the two were for the ‘same work.’”). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Pursuant to Gisbrecht, the Court must first look to see if a contingency fee agreement 28 exists in this case. 535 U.S. at 808. Plaintiff’s representation agreement with counsel 1 provides that “the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is 25% of the past due 2 benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the 3 court.” (ECF No. 22-1 (emphasis removed).) Counsel now seeks $23,000.00, or slightly 4 less than 25% of the amount awarded to Plaintiff in past-due benefits. (See ECF No. 22-3 5 at 6.) 6 In support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel attaches the ALJ’s decision on remand, 7 the SSA’s notice of award of past due benefits, her contingency fee agreement with 8 Plaintiff, her resume, and an itemized list of the hours she spent representing Plaintiff in 9 this matter. (ECF Nos. 22-2, 22-3, 22-1, 22-4, 22-6.) Counsel also attaches a Social 10 Security Report to Congress in March 2024 regarding the Limitation on Administrative 11 Expenses, and pages of the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 12 2017–2018, the USAO Fitzpatrick Matrix, and the 2025 Laffey Matrix. (ECF Nos. 22-5, 13 22-7, 22-7.) 14 Upon review, the Court finds that the amount sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is 15 reasonable. First, the results obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel were excellent, as the case was 16 jointly remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings after the filing of Plaintiff’s 17 merits brief, which ultimately resulted in the award of $92,213.00 in past due benefits to 18 Plaintiff. Second, the Court finds that there was no undue delay or substandard 19 performance that would warrant a downward adjustment. 20 Third, the amount sought is consistent with the 25% cap set by Congress and is not 21 disproportionate to the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel in this action. Plaintiff’s counsel 22 spent 24.1 hours representing Plaintiff between June 2024 and February 2025. (ECF No. 23 22-4.) Between June 2024 and February 2025, a paralegal with counsel’s firm spent an 24 additional 2.8 hours on this case. (Id.) The effective hourly attorney rate of $954.36 (or 25 combined hourly rate of $855.02), considering counsel’s experience and results, is not out 26 of line with hourly rates approved by courts in this District. See, e.g., Eldridge v. O’Malley, 27 No. 20-cv-01135-CAB-RBM, 2024 WL 1744079, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2024) 28 (approving a $20,462 fee award with a de facto hourly attorney rate of $1,015.98 for 20 1 ||hours and 8 minutes of work); Desiree D. v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-01522-RBM, 2021 WL 2 || 1564331, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021) (approving a $16,363 fee award with a de facto 3 ||hourly attorney rate of $1,494.34 for 10.95 hours of work); Martinez v. Saul, No. 15-CV- 4 || 1994-BTM-BGS, 2019 WL 3322481, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2019) (approving a $30,000 5 || fee award with an effective blended attorney/paralegal hourly rate of $1,488.83 for 20.15 6 ||hours of work); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (Clifton, J., concurring in part and 7 || dissenting in part) (noting that majority ordered payments in underlying cases that equated 8 $519, $875, and $902 hourly rates for the time of both attorneys and paralegals). 9 Accordingly, the Court finds an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $23,000.00 10 ||to be reasonable. In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee 11 |/nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under 12 |} such terms. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's counsel’s Motion for 15 || Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Accordingly, the Court hereby awards to 16 Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Inc., CPC attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17 ||406(b) in the amount of $23,000.00. The fees must be paid out of Plaintiff's past-due 18 || benefits in accordance with SSA policy. The Court further orders Law Offices of Lawrence 19 ||D. Rohlfing, Inc., CPC to reimburse Plaintiff the amount of $6,469.74 for EAJA fees. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: March 2, 2026 - 22 Balladt n. Jill L. Burkhardt 23 ited States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28