Shunsen LIANG v. Jeremy CASEY, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Shunsen Liang filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention, arguing he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than being subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). The court ordered the government to file a brief by March 4, 2026, stating whether it agrees the petitioner is detained under § 1226 and intends to concede his right to a bond hearing, or to answer the petition by March 6, 2026.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Order requiring the government to file a brief stating whether it concedes the petitioner's right to a bond hearing or to answer the petition“So, by Wednesday, March 4, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under that authority. If respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by March 6, 2026.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 4, as applied to § 2241 petitions via Rule 1(b). The court found that the petition was not 'clearly not cognizable' because there is a split in authority regarding the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) for individuals who entered the U.S. without inspection but are no longer at the border, and because a significant majority of district courts have granted relief in similar cases. Requiring the government to respond or concede is a procedurally appropriate next step given the potential merit of the claim. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the procedural standard for summary dismissal in habeas cases, acknowledges the circuit split and the overwhelming district court consensus favoring the petitioner's position, and notes the government's practice of conceding similar claims. The resulting order to require a response or concession is a logical and efficient procedural step that avoids unnecessary litigation on a claim with high potential merit.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Shunsen LIANG, Case No.: 26-cv-1224-AGS-SBC 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 Jeremy CASEY, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 10 Petitioner Shunsen Liang seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to 11 free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is 12 sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 2254 13 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it 14 plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled 15 to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 16 to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 17 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 18 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is 19 not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 20 On “December 3, 2023,” Liang, a “native and citizen of the People’s Republic of 21 China,” “entered the U.S. without inspection.” (ECF 1, at 2, 4.) The next day, he was 22 “released from ICE custody pursuant to an Order of Release on Recognizance.” (Id. at 4.) 23 Over two years later, on “December 15, 2025,” Liang “passed through a checkpoint,” 24 “voluntarily presented his driver’s license,” and was “taken into custody.” (id. at 5.) He 25 asserts that he is being detained unlawfully because respondents have “fail[ed] to provide 26 Petitioner with a bond hearing under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a)” and are instead improperly 27 “treating him as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (Id. at 9.) 28 This challenge merits a response. The two Courts of Appeals to address this question 1 || disagreed about how to interpret the issue. Compare Castanon-Nava v. United States Dep’t 2 ||of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding “on this 3 || preliminary [motion-to-stay] record” that plaintiffs who are “unlawfully already in the 4 || United States” are not “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”), with 5 || Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, — F.4th —_, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 6 || (Sth Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), petitioners who entered the 7 || United States “illegally many years ago” must “be detained” without a bond hearing). But 8 ||most petitioners have nonetheless obtained habeas relief in functionally identical cases. 9 || See, e.g., Barco Mercado vy. Francis, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 10 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” 11 |/opinions to address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final 12 ||basis,” and these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty 13 || different courts’’). 14 In addition, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by 15 those—like petitioner—who seem to be members of the Bond Eligible Class certified in 16 || Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2025 WL 17 ||3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). So, by Wednesday, March 4, 2026, the government 18 |/is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. 19 || § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under that authority. 20 || If respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by March 6, 2026. 21 Dated: February 27, 2026 23 Hon. rew G. Schopler A United States District Judge 25 26 27 28