Behruzjon Sherzod Ugli Okbutae v. Jeremy Casey, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Behruzjon Ugli Okbutaev filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his mandatory immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as an arriving alien. The court ordered the government to file a brief by February 27, 2026, stating whether it agrees the petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and intends to concede his right to a bond hearing.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Order requiring the government to file a brief stating whether it agrees the petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and intends to concede the petitioner's right to a bond hearing.“So, by Friday, February 27, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under that authority.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, noting that the petition is not 'clearly not cognizable' given the split in authority and the high rate of petitioner success in similar cases. Requiring the government to clarify its position is a reasonable procedural step to resolve the case efficiently, especially given the government's routine concessions in similar cases involving the Bond Eligible Class. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for summary dismissal and applies it to the facts, noting the split in circuit authority and the overwhelming trend in district court decisions favoring the petitioner. It also correctly notes the government's routine concessions in similar cases, making the order for a brief a logical and efficient next step. The reasoning is sound and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Behruzjon Sherzod UGLI OKBUTAEV, Case No.: 26-cv-1163-AGS-BLM 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 Jeremy CASEY, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 10 Petitioner Behruzjon Ugli Okbutaev seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2241 to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a 12 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing 13 Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary 14 dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner 15 is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 16 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules 17 permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 18 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any 19 potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 20 In “2023,” Ugli Okbutaev, an “Uzbekistan” “native,” “entered the United States.” 21 (ECF 1, at 2.) Years later, on “February 8, 2026,” he “was re-detained by Respondents.” 22 (Id.) He is still in custody and challenges the government’s decision to subject him to 23 “mandatory detention” under “8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)[]” as an “arriving alien.” (Id. at 11.) He 24 asserts that his case is instead governed by “[8 U.S.C.] § 1226”—which authorizes release 25 on bond or conditional parole. (Id. at 5.) 26 This challenge merits a response. The two Courts of Appeals to address this question 27 disagreed about how to interpret the issue. Compare Castañon-Nava v. United States Dep’t 28 of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding “on this | preliminary [motion-to-stay] record” that plaintiffs who are “unlawfully already in the 2 || United States” are not “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”’), with 3 || Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, — F.4th _, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 4 Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), petitioners who entered the 5 || United States “illegally many years ago” must “be detained” without a bond hearing). But 6 petitioners have nonetheless obtained habeas relief in functionally identical cases. 7 || See, e.g., Barco Mercado vy. Francis, ___F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 8 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” 9 || opinions to address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final 10 || basis,” and these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty 11 different courts”). And a district court recently “vacate[d]” the Board of Immigration 12 || Appeals decision that respondents have regularly relied on to mandatorily detain those in 13 |/petitioner’s position, holding that the BIA decision was “contrary to law” under the 14 || Administrative Procedure Act. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 15 F. Supp. 3d__, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). 16 In addition, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by 17 those—like petitioner—who seem to be members of the Bond Eligible Class certified in 18 ||that same case. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 19 ||3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). So, by Friday, February 27, 2026, the 20 || government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained 21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under 22 || that authority. 23 || Dated: February 25, 2026 25 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 27 28