Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEIVIS DAVID TERAN HURTADO, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00977-BTM-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 15 WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center, [ECF NO. 1] KRISTI NOEM,1 Secretary, U.S. 16 Department of Homeland Security, and 17 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 18 Respondents. 19 20 21 Deivis David Teran Hurtado has petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus 22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. After reviewing the petition, the Court concludes that it 23 must be dismissed. 24 “A habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same screening 25 requirements that apply to those brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Lainez Flores v. 26 27 1 The petitioner named Alejandro Mayorkas, the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as a Respondent. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Secretary, Kristi 28 1 Warden, 2026 WL 213516, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (citing Rules Governing Section 2 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts R. 1(b) (2019) [hereinafter Habeas Rules]). 3 Under these screening requirements, a habeas petition must: 4 (1) specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; 5 (3) state the relief requested; 6 (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person 7 authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2242. 8 9 Habeas Rules 2(c). A petition from a litigant representing himself is held to “less stringent 10 standards” than a petition drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 11 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But pro se litigants still “must follow 12 the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants,” such as satisfying the habeas 13 screening requirements. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on 14 other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). If it “plainly 15 appears from the petition” that the requirements were not met, the Court “must dismiss the 16 petition.” Habeas Rules 4. The dismissal does not bar the petitioner from seeking habeas 17 relief in the future. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (“The inapplicability of 18 res judicata to habeas . . . is inherent in the very role and function of the writ.”). 19 Here, Teran Hurtado does not allege facts that support grounds for relief. His 20 petition states that he was detained on January 10, 2026. (ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”), at 1.) He 21 argues that his detention “violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 22 United States Constitution.” (Id.) Yet Teran Hurtado does not provide facts regarding his 23 immigration status, how long he has resided in the country, when and where he entered the 24 United States, whether he has granted parole which was revoked—and if so, whether he 25 was given a reason for the revocation and an opportunity to rebut the reason for 26 revocation—or whether he is subject to mandatory detention by the Respondents. (See 27 generally Pet.) Without this information, the Court cannot determine whether Teran 28 Hurtado is entitled to habeas relief. 1 Because Teran Hurtado’s petition has not met the screening requirements for a 2 || habeas petition, his petition is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court grants Teran 3 || Hurtado leave to amend his petition within forty-five (45) days. If Teran Hurtado fails to 4 ||amend his petition by April 10, 2026, a final judgment of dismissal will be entered. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: February 25, 2026 Til ‘ Honordt i Barry Ted Ah wir 8 United States District Judge 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 □