gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-00429 · 2026-02-23 · Unknown

Sandeep Rai v. Headlight Health, Inc.; Sokyahealth Medical Group, P.C.; and Does 1 through 20

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Dana M. Sabraw (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:40Z · confidence high

The court considered Plaintiff's motion to remand a state court employment discrimination case to San Diego County Superior Court and a request for attorneys' fees. The court granted the motion to remand due to a lack of complete diversity jurisdiction and denied the request for attorneys' fees.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Remand Granted
“Accordingly, the Court finds that SokyaHealth is domiciled in California. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity between all parties. The court found that the defendant SokyaHealth Medical Group, P.C. was a California corporation (or had its principal place of business in California), and the plaintiff was a citizen of Virginia or Nevada. Because the defendant was a citizen of California, complete diversity was destroyed. The court also correctly applied the 'fraudulent joinder' doctrine, finding that the plaintiff had a reasonable basis to sue the California entity, thus preventing the court from disregarding the non-diverse defendant to establish jurisdiction. The decision follows from the law and the record recited in the order.
Request for Attorneys' Fees Denied
“The Court does not find that Defendant lacked an “objectively reasonable basis” for seeking removal. Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees is therefore DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard from Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., which holds that attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) are only awarded where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. The court found that because there were two similarly named entities and some evidence suggesting the Oregon entity was the employer, the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal, even if they ultimately failed to prove jurisdiction. This is a defensible application of the law.
Hearing Vacated
“Because the matter is suitable for resolution without oral argument, the Court vacates the hearing.”
agree with court
The court exercised its discretion to resolve the motion on the papers, which is a standard procedural action.

The order itself: sound — The order is well-reasoned and applies the correct legal standards for diversity jurisdiction, fraudulent joinder, and attorney's fees. It correctly identifies the lack of complete diversity as the basis for remand and provides a detailed analysis of why the fraudulent joinder doctrine did not apply. The denial of fees is also supported by the finding that the removal was objectively reasonable given the existence of two similarly named entities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26-cv-00429-DMS-BJW SANDEEP RAI, an individual, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING ORAL 13 v. ARGUMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 14 HEADLIGHT HEALTH, INC., a REMAND; and DENYING Delaware corporation; SOKYAHEALTH 15 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR MEDICAL GROUP, P.C., a California ATTORNEYS’ FEES 16 corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, 17 Defendants. [ECF No. 5]

19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case to San Diego 20 County Superior Court (“State Court”) and request for attorneys’ fees. (Mot., ECF No. 5.) 21 Defendants Headlight Health, Inc. (“Headlight”) and SokyaHealth Medical Group, P.C. 22 (“SokyaHealth”) filed a response in opposition, (Opp’n, ECF No. 8), and Plaintiff filed a 23 reply. (Reply, ECF No. 10.) The matter is currently scheduled to be heard on Friday, 24 February 27, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. Because the matter is suitable for resolution without oral 25 argument, the Court vacates the hearing. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following 26 reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to remand and denies Plaintiff’s request for 27 attorneys’ fees. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff originally filed this action in State Court on December 22, 2025, (Notice of 3 Removal, ECF No. 1, at 1), alleging sex discrimination, interference with pregnancy 4 disability leave, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, 5 retaliation, violations of the California Family Rights Act, failure to prevent discrimination, 6 and whistleblower retaliation. (Compl., ECF No. 1-7, at 1.) On January 23, 2026, 7 Defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 8 1446.1 (Notice of Removal 1.) Plaintiff now moves to remand to State Court and requests 9 attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of her motion. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 12 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A suit filed in state court may be removed 14 to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit, based 15 on federal question or diversity of citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy 16 that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a), 1441(a). “[I]t is to be presumed 17 that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of 18 establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hunter v. Phillip 19 Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation modified) (citation omitted). 20 “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has 21 the burden of establishing that removal is proper, and that the district court resolves all 22 ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Id. (citation modified) (citation omitted). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 26 1 Because Defendants were served on December 22, 2025, (Notice of Removal ¶ 32), the removal deadline 27 was January 22, 2026. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendants contend that they experienced technical difficulties when filing the removal papers on January 22, 2026, causing them to file one day late. Under 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Defendants assert that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter. (Notice 3 of Removal ¶ 34.) A state-court action can be removed on diversity grounds only where 4 there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds 5 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). Courts evaluate diversity jurisdiction at the time 6 of removal. Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 7 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “A court must assume that the allegations of the complaint are true 8 and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the 9 complaint.” Id. at 1001 (citation modified) (citation omitted). A civil action removable 10 solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction “may not be removed if any of the parties in 11 interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such 12 action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 13 A. Amount in Controversy 14 There is no dispute as to the amount in controversy. “When the plaintiff’s complaint 15 does not state the amount in controversy, the defendant’s notice of removal may do so.” 16 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84 (2014). “[W]hen a 17 defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in-controversy 18 allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the 19 court.” Lindsey v. WC Logistics, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting 20 Dart Cherokee Basin, 574 U.S. at 87). The Complaint is silent as to the amount in 21 controversy. Defendants contend the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, (Notice of 22 Removal ¶¶ 19–28), which Plaintiff does not contest. Thus, the Court finds the amount in 23 controversy requirement is met. 24 B. Diversity 25 To have complete diversity, Plaintiff cannot be domiciled in the same state as either 26 Defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “To be a citizen of a state, a natural person must first be a 27 citizen of the United States.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 28 2001) (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989)). “The 1 natural person’s state citizenship is then determined by her state of domicile,” which is “her 2 permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to 3 return.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 4 omitted). Plaintiff is a citizen of Virginia and worked in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Notice of 5 Removal ¶ 12.) Neither party contends that Plaintiff is domiciled in Delaware, California, 6 Oregon, or Utah. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff is either domiciled in Virginia or 7 Nevada.2 8 For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is a citizen of “every State . . . by 9 which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of 10 business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “By the plain wording of the statute, a corporation can have 11 only one principle place of business, though it could have multiple places of 12 incorporation.” Kazemy v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 3:13-CV-02050-AC, 2014 WL 13 3667217, at *3 (D. Or. July 17, 2014) (citation omitted). A corporation’s “principal place 14 of business,” also called a corporation’s “nerve center,” refers to the “place where the 15 corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 16 activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). “[I]n practice it should 17 normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the 18 headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination.” Id. at 93. 19 Both parties agree that Headlight is incorporated in Delaware. (Compl. ¶ 5; Notice 20 of Removal ¶ 14; Mot. 3.) Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Headlight is 21 headquartered in California. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Defendant contends that Headlight is 22 headquartered in Utah, not California, and therefore, is not a citizen of California. (Notice 23 of Removal 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ contention or otherwise argue that 24 25 26 27 2 This Court’s ruling is unchanged regardless of whether Plaintiff’s domicile is Virginia or Nevada. Thus, 28 1 Headlight is headquartered in California. For these reasons, the Court finds that complete 2 diversity exists between Plaintiff and Headlight.3 3 However, the parties disagree whether SokyaHealth is domiciled in California. It 4 appears two companies named SokyaHealth Medical Group, P.C. exist—one incorporated 5 in Oregon, and one in California. (Opp’n 3; id., Ex. C (depicting business entity data from 6 the Oregon Secretary of State); Mot., Ex. A (depicting business entity data from the 7 California Secretary of State).) Plaintiff argues that she sued the California corporation. 8 (Mot. 3.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff “misrepresented” SokyaHealth’s citizenship in 9 the Complaint (which describes SokyaHealth as a “California corporation”). (Notice of 10 Removal ¶ 16.) Defendants also argue that the Oregon corporation was Plaintiff’s true and 11 sole employer and, therefore, the California corporation was “incorrectly named” as a 12 Defendant. (Opp’n 1, 3.) Defendant argues that because the California corporation is an 13 improper party, the California corporation should be dismissed. (Id. at 3.) Defendants 14 request that this Court use its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to “sever” 15 any claims against the California corporation, (Id. at 4), or, alternatively, remove the 16 California corporation under the “fraudulent joinder” rule. (Id.) The Court refuses to take 17 such action based on the current record. 18 A non-diverse defendant may be disregarded if that defendant has been “fraudulently 19 joined.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). “There are 20 two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: ‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional 21 facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse 22 party in state court.’” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 23 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044). If there exists even a “possibility that a 24 state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 25 defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to 26 27 3 The Court does not determine whether Headlight is also domiciled in Utah because such a finding is not 28 1 the state court.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). “A defendant 2 invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a 3 ‘heavy burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.’” 4 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). Neither circumstance exists here. 5 Plaintiff alleged that SokyaHealth is incorporated in California, (Compl. ¶ 6), and there is 6 indeed a SokyaHealth incorporated in California. (Mot., Decl. of Calvin Chang in Supp. 7 of Pl.’s Mot. (“Chang Decl.”), Exs. A, C.) Defendants have not shown actual fraud in the 8 pleading of jurisdictional facts. 9 Additionally, assuming the two SokyaHealth Medical Group, P.C. entities are 10 separate and distinct corporations, Defendants have failed to sufficiently prove that the 11 Oregon corporation is Plaintiff’s true and sole employer (and, thus, there is no possibility 12 a cause of action can be asserted against the California corporation). The employment 13 agreement names Plaintiff’s employer as “SokyaHealth Medical Group, P.C.” with the 14 address of 5060 Shoreham Place Suite 100, San Diego, California 92122, (Id., Decl. of 15 Sandeep Rai in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Rai Decl.”), Ex. A, at 1)—the same address listed on 16 the California’s Secretary of State website and the California company’s Statement of 17 Incorporation. (Id., Chang Decl., Exs. A, C.) Plaintiff’s primary work location was San 18 Diego, California. (Id., Rai Decl., Ex. A, at 12.) Additionally, the two entities share 19 corporate officers. For example, Dr. Shashita Inamdar is listed as the Oregon corporation’s 20 president and secretary, (Opp’n, Ex. C), as well as the California corporation’s Chief 21 Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and secretary. (Mot., Chang Decl., Ex. C.) 22 Emily Hawk, the recipient of the Internal Revenue Service’s letter assigning the Oregon 23 corporation its federal tax ID number, (Opp’n, Ex. D), is also the officer who signed 24 Plaintiff’s employment agreement. (Mot., Rai Decl., Ex. A, at 11.) Plaintiff also contends 25 that the employer address listed on her wage statements is SokyaHealth’s San Diego 26 address, (Id., Rai Decl., ¶ 3), and under California Labor Code section 226, an employee’s 27 wage statement must include “the name and address of the legal entity that is the 28 employer.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). 1 To prove that the Oregon corporation was Plaintiff’s true and sole employer, 2 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s W-2 bears the federal tax ID number given to the Oregon 3 corporation. (Opp’n 2; id., Exs. A, B.) Defendant also argues that the address on Plaintiff’s 4 W-2 is “Salt Lake City, Utah, which is the headquarters of Headlight, who provides payroll 5 services for” the Oregon corporation. (Id. at 2.) This evidence does not satisfy Defendant’s 6 heavy burden, especially in light of Plaintiff’s contrary evidence. Thus, the Court declines 7 to disregard the California corporation as “fraudulent joinder.” The Court also declines to 8 invoke its discretion to sever the California corporation under Rule 21. See Cnty. of Mono 9 v. Liberty Utils. (Calpeco Elec., LLC), No. 221CV00834, 2022 WL 3368440, at *1 (E.D. 10 Cal. Aug. 16, 2022) (describing various reasons a court may sever claims under Rule 21). 11 Because the SokyaHealth entity that was sued is incorporated in California, complete 12 diversity does not exist and this action cannot be removed to the Southern District of 13 California. 14 Further, even if Plaintiff intended to sue the Oregon corporation, the Court finds that 15 the Oregon corporation’s principal place of business is in California. The Oregon 16 corporation lists a San Diego address as its principal place of business and mailing address. 17 (Opp’n, Ex. C.) Dr. Inamdar, the Oregon corporation’s incorporator, president, and 18 secretary, uses a San Diego post office box has her mailing address. (Id.) Further, in the 19 California company’s Statement of Information, Dr. Inamdar lists her address in San 20 Diego. (Mot., Chang Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiff, who worked under the company’s 21 executives, asserts that the majority of SokyaHealth’s executives live and work in 22 California and the company’s executive and administrative functions are performed in 23 California. (Id., Rai Decl., ¶ 6.) 24 Accordingly, the Court finds that SokyaHealth is domiciled in California. The Court 25 therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 26 C. Request for Attorneys’ Fees 27 “An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual 28 expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 1 ||“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only 2 || where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 3 || Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Plaintiff argues that “Defendants 4 ||lacked any objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” because “[a]t the time of 5 ||removal, Defendants knew or should have known that [SokyaHealth] was a California 6 corporation that had already been properly served.” (Mot. 7.) Thus, Plaintiff requests 7 $3,000 in attorneys’ fees for the amount incurred preparing her motion to remand and the 8 ||reply brief. (Reply 4-5.) Although the Court finds Defendants did not meet their burden, 9 || Defendants provided some evidence that there are two SokyaHealth entities incorporated 10 |/in separate states and that the Oregon corporation is Plaintiff's employer. The Court does 11 |/not find that Defendant lacked an “objectively reasonable basis” for seeking removal. 12 || Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees is therefore DENIED. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand and 15 || REMANDS this action to the State Court and VACATES the February 27, 2026 hearing. 16 || The Court also DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees. 17 || Dated: February 23, 2026 18 rn Yn « L4\ 19 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28