John Doe v. County of San Diego, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Defendant Ashley Leblanc filed an unopposed motion to confirm that her settlement with Plaintiff John Doe was reached in good faith under California law. The court granted the motion, deeming the settlement in good faith and barring any pending or future claims against Leblanc based on implied equitable indemnity, contribution, or comparative fault.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant Defendant Ashley Leblanc’s unopposed motion to confirm good-faith settlement“So, the Court GRANTS the unopposed motion. The settlement was made in good faith.” | agree with court The court correctly applied California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(a)(2), which permits approval of a good-faith settlement without applying the Tech-Bilt factors if no nonsettling party objects within the statutory timeframe. The order recites that no one objected and that the motion included a declaration with a brief background and good-faith grounds, satisfying the 'barebones' standard cited in City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court. The decision follows from the law and the record recited in the order. |
Bar any pending or future claims from any joint tortfeasor against Defendant Ashley Leblanc based upon implied equitable indemnity, contribution, or comparative fault“Any pending or future claims from any joint tortfeasor against this defendant based upon implied equitable indemnity, contribution or comparative fault are barred.” | agree with court This relief is a standard consequence of a good-faith settlement under California law (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(c)), which protects the settling defendant from contribution or indemnity claims by non-settling joint tortfeasors. Since the court found the settlement was in good faith, barring these claims is the correct legal application. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the applicable statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(2)) and the relevant case law (City of Grand Terrace) that relaxes the evidentiary burden for good-faith settlements when unopposed. The court explicitly notes the lack of objection and the sufficiency of the declaration, leading directly to the grant of the motion and the standard statutory relief barring contribution/indemnity claims. There are no gaps in the reasoning provided for this specific procedural posture.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 John DOE, Case No.: 23-cv-0251-AGS-KSC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 5 v. ASHLEY LEBLANC’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO CONFIRM GOOD- 6 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., FAITH SETTLEMENT (ECF 89) 7 Defendants.
9 Defendant Ashley Leblanc seeks an order deeming that her settlement with plaintiff 10 John Doe was reached in good faith. 11 When evaluating a settlement’s “good faith,” courts usually must consider the 12 “factors” set forth in Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 167 (1985). 13 But if, as here, “none of the nonsettling parties files a motion” “to contest the good faith of 14 the settlement” “within 25 days of mailing of the notice, application, and proposed order, 15 or within 20 days of personal service, the court may approve the settlement.” Cal. Civ. 16 Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(2). “That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which 17 sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief 18 background of the case is sufficient” for the good-faith showing. City of Grand Terrace v. 19 Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261 (1987); see also Xtermite, Inc. v. Chargualaf, 20 No. 24-cv-2317-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3531558, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (“[B]ecause 21 no party has objected to the instant motion for determination of good faith settlement, the 22 Court need not apply the Tech-Bilt factors.”). 23 Leblanc’s good-faith-settlement request more than meets this low standard. She filed 24 a declaration giving a brief case background, and her motion sets forth the settlement’s 25 good-faith grounds—that she paid plaintiff a “fair and reasonable amount” “within the 26 available insurance policy limit” to avoid “the escalating costs associated with defending 27 this lawsuit.” (ECF 89, at 6, 8–9.) No one objected to that assertion nor to her request for 28 an “order barring any pending or future claims from any joint tortfeasor against [Ashley] 1 |}Leblanc based upon implied equitable indemnity, contribution or comparative fault.” 2 || (See id. at 10.) 3 So, the Court GRANTS the unopposed motion. The settlement was made in good 4 || faith. Any pending or future claims from any joint tortfeasor against this defendant based 5 upon implied equitable indemnity, contribution or comparative fault are barred. 6 Dated: February 24, 2026 8 Hon. rew G. Schopler 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Cites, in this corpus
- City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court E003709 · 1987-06-23
- Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates L.A. 31826 · 1985-05-02