Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYLER MAGHONEY, individually and Case No.: 24-cv-2394-AJB-BJW on behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 13 Plaintiff, 14 (Doc. No. 21) v. 15 DOTDASH MEREDITH, INC., 16 Defendant. 17 18 Before the Court is Defendant Dotdash Meredith, Inc.’s (“Dotdash”) Motion to 19 Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (the “Motion”).1 (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiff 20 Tyler Maghoney (“Plaintiff”) opposed the Motion (Doc. No. 23) and Dotdash replied. 21 (Doc. No. 24). Subsequently, Dotdash filed three notices of supplemental authority in 22 support of its Motion. (Doc. Nos. 29; 31; 33.) Plaintiff also filed a notice of supplemental 23 24 25 26 1 Plaintiff and Defendant both recognize that Plaintiff initially named Dotdash Media, Inc. as Defendant in this action, but Dotdash Media, Inc. was renamed Dotdash Meredith, Inc. in March 2024. (Doc. Nos. 27 17 at 3 n.1; 21-1 at 11 n.1.) For continuity, and without making any legal finding, the Court refers to 28 Defendant as Dotdash Meredith, Inc. 1 authority in support of his opposition to the Motion. (Doc. No. 30.) For the reasons stated 2 herein, the Court GRANTS Dotdash’s Motion. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 A. Procedural Background 5 Plaintiff filed his initial class action complaint on December 19, 2024, and filed the 6 operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 26, 2025. (See Doc. Nos. 1; 17.) 7 The FAC alleges the following nine causes of action against Dotdash: (1) Violation of the 8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); (2) Violation of 9 the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 631; (3) Violation 10 of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”), Cal. Civ. Code 11 § 56.10; (4) Invasion of Privacy under California’s Constitution; (5) Violation of the 12 California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”); (6) Violation of California 13 Penal Code § 502 for use of a pen register or trap and trace device, Cal. Penal Code 14 § 638.51; (7) Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. 15 § 1030; (8) Violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710; and 16 (9) Violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. (See Doc. No. 17.) Dotdash 17 moves to dismiss the FAC in its entirety under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 18 and 12(b)(6). 19 B. Factual Background 20 Plaintiff brings this invasion of privacy class action lawsuit against Dotdash on 21 behalf of all California residents who accessed Dotdash’s website, 22 www.verywellhealth.com (the “Website”). (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that the 23 Website covers “more than 500 medical topics” and “boasts 320 million visitors each 24 year.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends Dotdash uses tracking technologies to intercept and 25 monetize sensitive user data, including the users’ health-related searches typed into the 26 Website. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 19, 27–28.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims Dotdash used tracking 27 technologies that collected Plaintiff’s confidential information and transmitted it to third 28 parties without his consent. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 49, 51, 59–71, 92–95.) 1 Plaintiff visited the Website on or about December 6, 2024, and December 13, 2024. 2 (Id. ¶ 28.) During those visits, Plaintiff typed specific search terms into the search bar 3 related to symptoms, contraction, and the treatment of chlamydia. (Id. ¶¶ 27–30). Plaintiff 4 also performed searches related to genital warts and the treatment of Sexually Transmitted 5 Infections. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he did not receive any disclosures about the collection of 6 his data and reasonably expected his searches to remain private. (Id. ¶¶ 32–33.) 7 Plaintiff claims Dotdash systematically intercepted, recorded, and disclosed 8 Plaintiff’s private information to third-parties. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 31.) This private information 9 included Plaintiff’s search queries related to his sensitive health information, page 10 navigation history, and metadata associated with his site visit, including his Internet 11 Protocol (“IP”) address and device identifiers. (Id.) According to the FAC, Plaintiff’s 12 personally identifiable search terms, and activity regarding his personal sexual health, were 13 transmitted to Google Analytics, DoubleClick, and other third-party advertisers. (Id. ¶ 25.) 14 Those entities then profiled Plaintiff’s health-related interests for targeted advertising and 15 monetization. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff alleges that Dotdash uses a proprietary advertising platform, D/Cipher, 17 which intercepts search terms, page navigation history, and metadata including IP 18 addresses and device identifiers, then transmits that information to third-party entities 19 without users’ consent. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 51.) Plaintiff claims that D/Cipher is an advanced 20 fingerprinting and profiling mechanism designed to circumvent browser privacy 21 protections and track users across sessions and properties. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 51, 65–83.) 22 The FAC alleges Dotdash violates privacy laws and engages in unlawful conduct 23 that exposes Plaintiff and potential class members to risks of identity theft and digital 24 profiling. (Id. ¶¶ 33–36.) Plaintiff further contends that Dotdash failed to disclose its data 25 collection and sharing practice, violating Plaintiff’s right of privacy related to his sensitive 26 health related information. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 241, 299, 317, 385.) Plaintiff claims that visiting 27 Dotdash’s website caused him “emotional distress and anxiety over how his sensitive 28 medical-related searches have been exploited for commercial gain.” (Id. ¶¶ 25, 37.) 1 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 3 Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits federal courts to hearing “actual cases 4 or controversies.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016). This limitation means 5 the plaintiff must have standing to sue. Id. at 338. To establish standing, a plaintiff must 6 demonstrate the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of: (1) an injury-in-fact via “an 7 invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 8 actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) causation—that the injury is 9 “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) redressability—that it 10 is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 11 decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and 12 quotations omitted). “Each element of standing ‘must be supported . . . with the manner 13 and degree of evidence required at the successive stage of litigation.’” Maya v. Centex 14 Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 15 A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 16 Procedure 12(b)(1). See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 17 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[b]ecause standing and ripeness pertain to federal courts’ 18 subject matter jurisdiction, they are properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss”). 19 Such a motion can be facial or factual in nature. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th 20 Cir. 2013). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a 21 complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for 22 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court “resolves a facial attack 23 as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations 24 as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines 25 whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” 26 Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 27 “[I]n a factual attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 28 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 1 F.3d at 1039. In resolving such an attack, unlike a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 2 a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to 3 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the court “need not presume 4 the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. Once the defendant has moved to dismiss 5 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of 6 establishing the court’s jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 7 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). However, in the absence of a full-fledged evidentiary 8 hearing, disputes in the facts pertinent to subject matter jurisdiction are viewed in the light 9 most favorable to the opposing party. Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 10 1996). The disputed facts related to subject matter jurisdiction should be treated in the same 11 way as one would adjudicate a motion for summary judgment. Id. 12 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 13 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 14 sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal 15 is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. 16 Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. 17 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim 18 on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed 19 where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that 20 theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 21 allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 22 the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 23 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 24 of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 25 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The 26 court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of 27 factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, 28 1 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a 2 motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant 4 leave to amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments. 5 United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, leave to 6 amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation 7 of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 C. Motion to Stike 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to strike from any pleading 10 “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed R. Civ. P. 12(f). 11 “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money 12 that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to 13 trial[.]” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, 14 “Rule 12(f) is neither an authorized nor a proper way to procure the dismissal of all or a 15 part of a complaint.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 16 2010) (quoting Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977)). The 17 “‘immaterial’ [i]s that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for 18 relief or the defenses being plead.” Petrie v. Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 967 (9th 19 Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Impertinent’ matter consists 20 of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Quintara 21 Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc., 149 F.4th 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation 22 omitted). “Motions to strike are ‘generally disfavored because they are often used as 23 delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.’” 24 Corbett v. Pharmacare U.S., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting 25 Cortina v. Goya Foods, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2015)). 26 27 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 3 Dotdash moves to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) arguing Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring 5 any of his nine causes of action. (Doc. No. 21-1 at 15.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion arguing 6 he has “allege[d] concrete and particularized injuries sufficient to establish Article III 7 standing.” (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) 8 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a 9 sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of (i.e., 10 traceability), and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 11 (i.e., redressability). Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing 12 separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 13 Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). This is true “whether it be 14 injunctive relief, damages or civil penalties.” Bates v. UPS, 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 15 2007). In the absence of standing, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. See Bender v. 16 Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546–47 (1986) (citing Mansfield C. & L.M.R. 17 Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 18 Dotdash argues that the FAC “fails to identify any cognizable harm” (Doc. No. 21-1 19 at 15.) Plaintiff counters that he has alleged concrete and particularized injuries because he 20 has adequately alleged “[t]he unauthorized interception and disclosure of Plaintiff’s highly 21 sensitive health-related search activity.” (Doc. No. 23 at 11.) Plaintiff contends such an 22 allegation “constitutes disclosure of private information and intrusion upon seclusion, 23 traditional harms long recognized at common law.” (Id.) The FAC alleges Plaintiff suffered 24 four categories of purported injury: (1) invasion of privacy (Doc. No. 17 at ¶ 142), 25 (2) increased risk of identity theft and digital profiling (id. at ¶ 35), (3) information injury 26 through deprivation of control over the dissemination of private online activities (id. at ¶ 27 36), and (4) emotional distress and anxiety (id. at ¶ 37). 28 1 Bare statutory violations are insufficient to establish injury in fact, but lawmakers 2 may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that 3 were previously inadequate” to confer standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. By enacting CIPA, 4 the California legislature “codif[ied] a substantive right to privacy, the violation of which 5 gives rise to a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet 6 Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a) 7 (providing a private right of action for individuals “who [have] been injured” by a CIPA 8 violation). But the codification of this right “does not relieve courts of their responsibility 9 to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm . . . .” TransUnion 10 LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426 (2021); id. at 427 (“Only those plaintiffs who have 11 been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant 12 over that violation in federal court.”); Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341 (“Article III standing 13 requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”). 14 1. Invasion of Privacy 15 Dotdash’s motion to dismiss argues Plaintiff fails to plead the “threshold issues” for 16 California’s common law on invasion of privacy—i.e., “a legally protected privacy interest, 17 reasonable expectation of privacy, and serious invasion of privacy.” (Doc. No. 21-1 at 16.) 18 Disclosure of private information is a concrete injury. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425; 19 Phillips v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 74 F.4th 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that 20 invasion of privacy is “an injury identified by the Supreme Court as concrete”). However, 21 to say that a privacy injury can be concrete is not to say that the alleged privacy injury here 22 is concrete. Rather, courts “make their decisions regarding whether a plaintiff has stated a 23 legally protectable privacy interest based on the nature of the information at issue.” 24 Mikulsky v. Noom, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting In re Yahoo 25 Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, 26 a plaintiff must identify the ‘specific personal information she disclosed that implicates a 27 protectable privacy interest.’” Mikulsky, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 864 (quoting Byars v. Sterling 28 1 Jewelers, Inc., No. 22-cv-01456-SB-SP, 2023 WL 2996686, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2 2023)). 3 Courts have held that there is no legally protected privacy interest in an IP address. 4 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Internet users have no 5 expectation of privacy in . . . the IP addresses of the websites they visit . . . .”); see also 6 Khamooshi v. Politico LLC, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2025); I.C. v. Zynga, Inc., 7 600 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2022); Rodriguez v. Culligan Int’l Co., No. 25-cv-00225- 8 AJB-KSC, 2025 WL 3064113 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025). And a person generally “has no 9 legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 10 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 307 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 11 735, 743–44 (1979)). That remains true “even if the information is revealed on the 12 assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose . . . .” United States v. Miller, 425 13 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). When internet users visit a website, their devices automatically send 14 their IP addresses to the website’s server as part of the communication process. See 15 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. Therefore, “IP addresses are . . . voluntarily turned over in order 16 to direct the third party’s servers.” Id. Accordingly, no reasonable expectation of privacy 17 attaches to IP addresses. Id. 18 Here, Plaintiff alleges that his personal health-related search queries were 19 intercepted and shared with third-party advertisers. (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 25.) However, it is 20 unclear how Plaintiff became aware of the sharing of this information. Plaintiff does not 21 allege anyone directly contacted him related to his searches. Or that his searches were made 22 publicly visible. Plaintiff does not allege that his name, postal address, email address, 23 telephone number, or any other personal identifiers were collected. And Plaintiff does not 24 allege any of his searches were directly linked to his name or other personally identifiable 25 information. At most, the data was associated with an IP address and other metadata (id. 26 ¶ 31), which does not automatically qualify as personally identifiable information. See In 27 re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding 28 1 “Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any Defendant linked the gathered information to a 2 particular user”). 3 Moreover, Plaintiff merely searched sensitive health related terms. As Dotdash 4 argues, “[a]nyone from a schoolteacher writing a lesson plan for a sex-ed class or a 5 researcher looking to analyze potential findings could enter these searches into an 6 informational health website.” (Doc. No. 21-1 at 23.) The Court agrees. Dotdash’s website 7 is not a patient portal. See Smith v. Facebook, Inc., 745 F. App’x 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2018) 8 (“Information available on publicly accessible websites stands in stark contrast to the 9 personally identifiable patient records and medical histories protected by these statutes— 10 information that unequivocally provides a window into an individual’s personal medical 11 history.”) And nothing about Plaintiff’s searches indicates those searches were tied to his 12 personal medical history. See id. (“The data show only that Plaintiffs searched and viewed 13 publicly available health information that cannot, in and of itself, reveal details of an 14 individual’s health status or medical history.”). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of harm 15 are far from the “highly offensive” interferences or disclosures that were actionable at 16 common law. See Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2025). 17 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s searches on the Website do not constitute a legally protectable 18 privacy interest, and the alleged dissemination of that search history cannot establish the 19 concrete injury required for Article III standing. See id. 20 2. Future Harm 21 Plaintiff contends that there is a “increased risk of identity theft and digital profiling 22 where third parties now associate Plaintiff’s identity with highly sensitive health-related 23 searches.” (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 35). Dotdash avers that the alleged increased risk of identity theft 24 is speculative. (Doc. No. 21-1 at 24–25.) 25 A mere risk of future harm is not sufficient for Article III standing. TransUnion, 594 26 U.S. at 437–38 (holding that “the risk of future harm” is “too speculative to support Article 27 III standing”). The future harm must be certainly impending; an allegation of future risk 28 will not suffice as a concrete injury. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 1 (2013) (“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be 2 stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative 3 for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.”) 4 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was the victim of identity theft. Plaintiff merely 5 alleges a speculative future risk of identity theft and digital profiling. (See Doc. No. 17 ¶ 35 6 (“As a result of this unlawful conduct Plaintiff has been subject to increased risk of identity 7 theft and digital profiling.”). The Supreme Court has made clear that such allegations are 8 insufficient to establish an injury in fact. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 437–38. Accordingly, 9 Plaintiff cannot rely on the risk of future harm as a basis for establishing a concrete injury 10 under Article III. 11 3. Informational Injury 12 Plaintiff alleges he suffered informational injury because he was “deprived control 13 over the dissemination of his private online activities.” (Doc No. 17 ¶ 36.) However, 14 Plaintiff does not cite any cases which have recognized such an “informational harm.” 15 In opposition, Dotdash argues Plaintiff’s alleged informational injury does not have 16 any common law analogue, nor is it recognized as a cognizable injury. (Doc. No. 21-1 at 17 25.) The Court agrees. 18 In Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit 19 recognized an informational injury when a plaintiff was deprived of information it was 20 entitled. The Wilderness court went on to discuss the history of informational injury: 21 The notion of an informational injury serving as an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing can be traced to Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 22 U.S. 11 (1998). In that case, a group of voters challenged the Federal Election 23 Commission’s refusal to treat the American Israel Public Affairs Committee as a “political committee,” thus requiring disclosure of certain information 24 about campaign-related activities under the Federal Election Campaign Act. 25 Akins, 524 U.S. at 15–16. The Court held that the voters had suffered an injury sufficiently concrete and particularized to give them standing in that they were 26 denied information that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 required 27 be made public. Id. at 21. 28 Id. at 1258. 1 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that failure to provide statutorily 2 required information can give rise to Article III injury on the part of private plaintiffs.” 3 Inland Empire Waterkeeper v. Corona Clay Co., 17 F.4th 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2021). When 4 a statute provides a right to information, the deprivation of which “result[s] in an 5 informational harm,” violation of the statute gives rise to a cognizable “informational” 6 injury. Wilderness, at 1260; see Southcentral Found. v. Alaska Native Tribal Health 7 Consortium, 983 F.3d 411, 419–420 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding informational injury when a 8 tribal health foundation challenged amendments to a tribal health consortium’s amendment 9 to its code of conduct); Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 971 (9th Cir. 10 2018) (recognizing informational injury in a suit alleging false product labeling). 11 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s alleged informational injury does 12 not have a “close relationship” to a harm “traditionally” recognized as providing a basis 13 for a lawsuit in American courts. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. Thus, this harm does not 14 constitute a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. 15 4. Emotional Distress 16 Finally, Plaintiff claims he suffered “concrete emotional distress, including anxiety.” 17 (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 37). Dotdash contends “that Plaintiff’s unadorned allegation of ‘anxiety’ 18 fails to include the necessary detail or specificity that can suffice as injury-in-fact.” (Doc. 19 No. 21-1 at 26.) 20 Plaintiff’s emotional distress allegations fall short of showing “an injury in fact that 21 is concrete, particularized, and actual.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. Although “many 22 courts have found that emotional distress may constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of 23 standing,” Davis v. Astrue, 874 F. Supp. 2d 856, 863 (N.D. Cal. 2012), the allegations in 24 the FAC are conclusory at best, failing to set forth any information or detail regarding 25 Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress. See, e.g., Campbell v. Anniemac Home Mortg., 26 No. cv-1608795-ABA-JWX, 2017 WL 8180578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017) (finding 27 plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of “emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment” 28 insufficient to show genuine injury); Burnthorne-Martinez v. Sephora USA, Inc., No. 1 16-cv-02843-YGR, 2016 WL 6892721, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2016) (dismissing 2 negligent violation claim when allegations of emotional distress damages were general and 3 conclusory); Dewi v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV-12-2891-ABC-SHX, 2012 WL 4 10423239, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (“[A] plaintiff ‘must support her claim for pain 5 and suffering with something more than her own conclusory allegations, such as specific 6 claims of genuine injury.’”). Accordingly, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege emotional 7 distress as a concrete injury. 8 For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has not met his burden in showing that he has 9 suffered an injury-in-fact, thus, he lacks standing to bring this action. See Loritz v. U.S. 10 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 382 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff 11 filing an action in federal court has the burden of alleging specific facts sufficient to satisfy 12 the standing elements.”). Dotdash’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is 13 GRANTED. (Doc. No. 21.) 14 B. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 15 Because Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue his claims, this Court lacks 16 subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Accordingly, the Court is without jurisdiction 17 to consider Dotdash’s 12(b)(6) motion. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 18 574, 577 (1999) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter is 19 inflexible and without exception, for jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and without 20 jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”) (cleaned up). 21 C. Motions to Strike 22 1. Dotdash’s Request to Strike Portions of the FAC 23 Dotdash seeks to strike paragraphs 89–101 of the FAC, titled “Objection to the 24 Declaration of James Vint,” arguing the allegations are “impermissibly immaterial, 25 irrelevant, and do not belong in Plaintiff’s operative pleading.” (Doc. No. 21-1 at 41–42.) 26 The Court agrees. 27 Paragraphs 89–101 are dedicated solely to Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration 28 of James Vint in Support of Dotdash’s originally filed motion to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 17 1 ¶¶ 89–101.) Dotdash filed its initial motion to dismiss on March 12, 2025. (Doc. No. 15.) 2 The declaration of James Vint was attached to that motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 15-3, Vint 3 Declaration.) Platiniff subsequently filed the FAC, thereby mooting the motion to dismiss. 4 (Doc. Nos. 17; 18.) Paragraphs 89–91 of the FAC are not factual allegations regarding 5 Plaintiff’s experience with the Website, injuries, or claims, but rather seems to be a 6 peremptory objection to a moot pleading. However, because the FAC is dismissed for the 7 reasons discussed above, Dotdash’s request to strike these paragraphs is DENIED AS 8 MOOT. 9 2. Plaintiff’s Request to Strike Dotdash Declarations 10 In Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, he seeks to strike the three 11 declarations Dotdash filed in support of its motion. (Doc. No. 23 at 33.) Plaintiff argues 12 that it is improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to introduce matters 13 outside of the pleadings. While that is true, Dotdash also moves to dismiss the FAC under 14 12(b)(1), which permits the filing of extrinsic evidence when there is a factual attack. See 15 Safe Air For Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (“In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the 16 district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to 17 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”). Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 18 request to strike the declarations. However, the Court only relies on the declarations to the 19 extent they are relevant to the analysis under Rule 12(b)(1). 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons the Court ORDERS as follows: 22 1. Dotdash’s Motion to Dismiss Motion under Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED. The 23 Court dismisses the First Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 24 2. Dotdash’s request to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint is 25 DENIED AS MOOT. 26 3. Plaintiff’s request to strike the declarations attached to Dotdash’s motion to 27 dismiss is DENIED. 28 1 4. Should Plaintiff choose to do so, he may file a Second Amended Complaint 2 || curing the deficiencies noted herein no later than March 9, 2026. Pursuant to Local Civil 3 ||Rule 15.1.c, any amended pleading filed after a motion to dismiss is granted, □□□□□ be 4 ||accompanied by a version of that pleading that shows—through redlining, underlining, 5 || strikeouts, or other similarly effective typographic methods—how that pleading differs 6 || from the previously dismissed pleading.” 7 5. Dotdash must file a responsive pleading no later than March 30, 2026. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: February 23, 2026 © 10 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15