Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Ramandeep SINGH, Case No.: 26-cv-1017-AGS-DDL 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 Jeremy CASEY, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 10 Petitioner Ramandeep Singh seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 11 to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that 12 is sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 13 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if 14 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 15 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 16 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit 17 “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 18 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any 19 potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 20 In “2014,” Singh, a “citizen of India,” “entered the United States.” (ECF 1, at 1.) 21 More than a decade later, on “January 7, 2026,” he “was detained by [the Department of 22 Homeland Security].” (Id.) He is still in custody and challenges the government’s decision 23 to subject him to “mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)” as an “arriving alien[].” 24 (Id. at 2, 9.) He asserts that his case is instead governed by “8 U.S.C. § 1226”—which 25 authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. (Id. at 1.) 26 This challenge merits a response. The two Courts of Appeals to address this question 27 disagreed about how to interpret the issue. Compare Castañon-Nava v. United States Dep’t 28 of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding “on this | preliminary [motion-to-stay] record” that plaintiffs who are “unlawfully already in the 2 || United States” are not “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”’), with 3 || Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, — F.4th _, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 4 Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), petitioners who entered the 5 || United States “illegally many years ago” must “be detained” without a bond hearing). But 6 petitioners have nonetheless obtained habeas relief in functionally identical cases. 7 || See, e.g., Barco Mercado vy. Francis, ___F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 8 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” 9 || opinions to address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final 10 || basis,” and these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty 11 different courts”). And a district court recently “vacate[d]” the Board of Immigration 12 || Appeals decision that respondents have regularly relied on to mandatorily detain those in 13 ||Singh’s position, holding that the BIA decision was “contrary to law” under the 14 || Administrative Procedure Act. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 15 F. Supp. 3d__, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). 16 In addition, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by 17 those—like petitioner—who seem to be members of the Bond Eligible Class certified in 18 ||that same case. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 19 ||3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). So, by Monday, February 23, 2026, the 20 || government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained 21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under 22 || that authority. respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by February 26, 23 ||2026. 24 || Dated: February 19, 2026 26 Hon. rew G. Schopler 07 United States District Judge 28