Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MAHMOOD AHSAN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1315-RBM-MSB Booking No. 24733372, 11 ORDER: Plaintiff, 12 vs. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OFFICE OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL, et al, 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) Defendants. [Doc. 2]; AND 15 16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 17 PURSUANT TO 18 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) [Doc. 1] 19 20 21 Plaintiff Mahmood Ahsan (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego Central Jail 22 (“SDCJ”) and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 23 (“Complaint”) (Doc. 1), along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP 24 Motion”) (Doc. 2). Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his due process rights by 25 interfering with his legal mail, denying his “legitimate legal requests,” and subjecting him 26 to “inhumane” living conditions. (Doc. 1 at 2‒4.) For the reasons discussed below, the 27 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and DISMISSES his Complaint without prejudice. 28 1 I. IFP MOTION 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the 5 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. See 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit 8 regarding their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 9 Cir. 2015). Prisoners must also submit a “certified copy of the [prisoner’s] trust fund 10 account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately 11 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust 12 account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of: (a) the average monthly 13 deposits in the account for the past six months; or (b) the average monthly balance in the 14 account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 15 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (4). Prisoners who proceed IFP must repay the entire fee in 16 installments regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See § 1915(b)(2); 17 Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). 18 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff provided a copy of his SDCJ trust account 19 activity. (Doc. 2.) During the six months prior to filing suit, Plaintiff had a total of $946.27 20 deposited to his account, but only $0.24 remained in his account at the time of filing. (See 21 id. at 4.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. However, because the 22 initial partial filing fee assessed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) would exceed 23 Plaintiff’s available funds, the Court will collect no initial payment and instead DIRECTS 24 25 1 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. 26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply 27 to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id. 28 1 the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, and any correctional agency later having 2 custody, to garnish the full $350 filing fee owed in this case from Plaintiff’s trust account 3 pursuant to the installment payment provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). See 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 5 bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 6 the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”); 7 Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 8 acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on 9 “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 10 The Court therefore ORDERS the SDCJ, or any agency later having custody, to collect 11 the full balance of the $350 filing fee owed in this case and forward payments to the Clerk 12 of Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 13 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(B) 14 A. Legal Standards 15 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court must screen a 16 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, 17 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 18 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 19 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has 20 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the 21 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 22 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rules”) 8(a) and 12(b)(6) together require that a complaint “contain sufficient factual 24 matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 25 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are 26 not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 27 conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of 28 1 misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short 2 of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 3 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 4 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 5 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 6 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 8 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains two sorts of claims seemingly against two separate 9 groups of Defendants. First, Plaintiff claims his “due process” rights were violated by the 10 Office of Assigned Counsel (“OAC”), its Director F. Michael Garcia, Jackie Braden, a 11 “legal support supervisor” at OAC, and William G. Trainor, an OAC “staff attorney.” 12 (Doc. 1 at 1‒3.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims the OAC “reads legal documents without 13 permission,” “possibly tampers with legal mail,” and has “denie[d] [him] legitimate 14 ancillary services without grounds or justification.” (Id. at 3.) Second, Plaintiff claims the 15 County of San Diego, San Diego County Sheriff Kelly Martinez, and unnamed members 16 of Sheriff’s Department “staff” “act[] unprofessionally,” are “negligent,” and engage in 17 unspecified acts of “misconduct,” verbal abuse, and unreasonable force. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 18 contends he has been “den[ied] meals due to mismanagement,” and has been exposed to 19 unsanitary conditions. (Id.)2 20 21 2 Plaintiff also alleges the “San Diego Central Court” “hinders due process” and is 22 “possibly corrupt,” but does not name the Superior Court as Defendant. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) Even if he had, “[Section] 1983 actions do not lie against a State.” Arizonans for Off. Eng. 23 v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (citation omitted). Superior courts in California are 24 entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as arms or agencies of the state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). “Read 25 together, §§ 1915A(a) and (b) allow a court to dismiss sua sponte a prisoner complaint that 26 ‘seeks redress from [a government entity or officer or] employee of a governmental entity’ on the grounds of immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) 27 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)), as amended on reh’g (Apr. 15, 2016)). 28 1 Plaintiff seeks more than $10 million in general and punitive damages as well as 2 injunctive relief in the form of preventing Defendants from “hurting people by using 3 corrupt procedures.” (Id. at 7.) 4 C. Conditions of Confinement 5 “[L]iability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the 6 defendant.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, 7 “[l]iability . . . arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant” in 8 the deprivation alleged. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fayle 9 v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)); see King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th 10 Cir. 1987) (noting that “state officials are not subject to suit under § 1983 unless they play 11 an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights”). “A plaintiff must 12 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show an individual was personally involved in 13 the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. A person deprives another 14 “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 15 participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 16 required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff] complains].” Johnson v. 17 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Alternatively, liability also may be imposed under § 1983 if the defendant sets into 19 “motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or reasonably should know 20 would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 21 Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371 22 (9th Cir. 1987)). Section 1983, however, does not impose liability upon state or local 23 officials for the acts of their subordinates under a respondent superior theory of liability. 24 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or 25 her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Rather, a 26 “supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor 27 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to prevent 28 1 them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Similarly, “a municipality cannot be held liable under 2 § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 3 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). 4 With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to “inhumane living conditions” at the SDCJ 5 (see Doc 1 at 4), he fails to allege any of the individual Defendant’s personal involvement. 6 See Conley v. Nielsen, 706 Fed. App’x 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming sua sponte 7 dismissal of claims raised against “all medical staff” at the county jail because the plaintiff 8 failed to identify any of the individuals involved and the “specific conduct attributable to 9 them.”). Rather, Plaintiff simply lists these parties as Defendants in the caption of the 10 Complaint and attributes the general “mismanagement” and unsanitary conditions of the 11 SDCJ and the “unprofessional[ism]” and “incompeten[ce]” of the Sheriff’s “staff” as a 12 group. (See Doc. 1 at 4.) Critically, Plaintiff fails to point to any discrete or identifiable 13 act of misconduct on any specific occasion involving any individual Defendant. See 14 Williams v. Cnty. of Los Angeles Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., Case No. CV 14-7625 JVS 15 (JC), 2016 WL 8730914, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2016), report and recommendation 16 adopted, No. CV 14-7625 JVS (JC), 2016 WL 8737230 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2016) 17 (“Conclusory allegations that an indistinguishable group of defendants essentially engaged 18 in identical misconduct . . . are insufficient to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief from 19 any individual defendant.”). Nor does Plaintiff allege facts sufficient to plausibly show 20 how Defendants’ alleged misconduct caused him constitutional injury or actual harm. See 21 Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 22 (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”). 23 “[U]nadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation[s],” like those 24 alleged in support of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, without more, are 25 insufficient to provide Defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them and 26 must be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting a pleading that simply “offers labels 27 and conclusions . . . will not do.”). Thus, insofar as Plaintiff alleges broadly that he has 28 1 been subject to “inhumane living conditions” (see Doc. 1 at 4) but does not identify the 2 individuals responsible or claim any actual harm as a result, he fails to state any plausible 3 claims for relief under § 1983. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179‒80 (9th Cir. 4 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint which failed to “say which wrongs were 5 committed by which defendants”). 6 Plaintiff also fails to allege municipal liability against the County of San Diego and 7 the Sheriff’s Department, as well as individual liability against Sheriff Kelly Martinez. 8 Supervisory officials, like Sheriff Kelly Martinez, may only be held liable under § 1983 if 9 Plaintiff alleges their “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or . . . a 10 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 11 constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242‒43 (9th Cir. 2018); see 12 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against such 13 municipal and supervisory Defendants must also be dismissed. 14 The Court therefore finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the County of San 15 Diego, the Sheriff’s Department, or Sheriff Kelly Martinez. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 16 conditions of confinement claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 17 and 1915A(b). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633–34 (9th Cir. 18 1988) (stating the focus for § 1983 claims must be on the “individual defendant,” and his 19 or her individual “duties [and] discretion”). 20 D. Legal Support Claims 21 Plaintiff alleges the OAC, its Director, an OAC legal support supervisor, and an 22 OAC staff attorney violated his right to “due process” by “acting like a judge,” “possibly 23 tamper[ing] with legal mail,” and/or failing to provide him with unspecified legal support 24 services while housed in the SDCJ. (Doc. 1 at 2‒3.) While he does not identify the nature 25 of the criminal proceedings he presumedly had pending at the time, Plaintiff attaches 26 exhibits referring to San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD304569 (see Doc. 1-2, Ex. 27 A; Doc. 1-5, Ex. B) and admits the OAC “was appointed as [his] legal runner.” (Doc. 1 at 28 1 3.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to plausible suggest that any individual with the 2 OAC acted on behalf of the state to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 3 “When attorneys act in the role of advocate, they do not act under color of state law 4 for purposes of § 1983.” Rodriguez v. Gore, Case No.: 3:15-cv-02248-GPC-WVG, 2015 5 WL 9413136, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (citations omitted); see Szijarto v. Legeman, 6 466 F.2d 864, 864 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[A]n attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not 7 act ‘under color of’ state law.”); see also Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th 8 Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding a public defender was not a state actor under § 1983 because 9 a traditional role of an attorney for a client, no matter how ineffective, is “to represent h[er] 10 client, not the interests of the state or county.”). Indeed, a court-appointed official’s role 11 in representing a client “is essentially a private function . . . for which state office and 12 authority are not needed.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also 13 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (“[A] public defender is not amenable to 14 administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State” and the State 15 has a “constitutional obligation [to] respect the professional independence of the public 16 defenders whom it engages.”). Even if the OAC is assisting Plaintiff in an “ancillary” 17 capacity, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a reasonable inference that their actions were 18 taken under the color of state law. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 317–18 (“[A] person acts under 19 color of state law only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made 20 possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”) (quoting 21 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see, e.g., Rodriguez, 2015 WL 22 9413136, at *4 (finding prisoner’s § 1983 claims against OAC subject to sua sponte 23 dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because OAC attorneys 24 appointed to assist during criminal proceedings in an “ancillary” capacity were not alleged 25 to have acted “under color of state law.”). 26 Thus, to the extent Defendants OAC, F. Michael Garcia, Jackie Braden, or William 27 G. Trainor are alleged to have been “appointed … by the local courts” to either represent 28 1 Plaintiff or to provide ancillary legal support services for him during ongoing state criminal 2 proceedings, Plaintiff’s claims against such Defendants are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failing to state a viable § 1983 claim for relief. 4 E. Leave to Amend 5 Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court GRANTS him leave to amend his 6 Complaint, as detailed below. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 7 (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant 8 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 9 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 10 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 13 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 14 2. The Court ORDERS the Facility Commander of the San Diego Central Jail, 15 his designee, and any correctional or detention agency later having custody, to garnish from 16 Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 filing fee owed for this case, and to forward monthly 17 payments to the Clerk of the Court in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 18 preceding month’s income each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 20 3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order on the 21 Facility Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California 22 92101. 23 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety without prejudice for 24 failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). 25 5. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint on or 26 before March 9, 2026 which cures the deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order. 27 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 28 1 || Complaint. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 2 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (‘[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 3 || original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 4 dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 5 || “considered waived if not repled.”). 6 If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint on or before March 9, 2026, the 7 Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state 8 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 9 || 1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 10 |}amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Ifa plaintiff does 11 take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 12 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || DATE: February 19, 2026 FRA Bieri Mang D_ 16 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 .. 1912 DD □□□□