gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-00605 · 2026-02-18 · Unknown

Mary Maireña Tinoco v. Christopher Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Patrick Divver, Field Office Director, San Diego Office, U.S.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — On December 16, 2021, Department of Homeland Security 6 granted Petitioner release on her own recognizance, subject t
Area
civil
Panel
James E. Simmons (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:40Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an immigration detainee who argued that her detention was illegal because she had not received an individualized custody hearing after her underlying criminal charges were dropped. The court granted the petition, ordering the government to provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days.

What the court decidedThe model
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted as to the requested remedy of a bond hearing.
“Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as to the requested remedy of a bond hearing.”
agree with court
The court relied on the government's concession that the petitioner was no longer subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) following the declination of her criminal charges. This concession aligns with the legal principle that mandatory detention provisions tied to criminal charges cease to apply when those charges are resolved without conviction. The court cited recent district court decisions interpreting the Laken Riley Act to support this view. Given the concession and the cited authorities, the decision to grant the writ for a bond hearing follows logically from the record.
Petitioner's remaining claims denied as moot.
“Petitioner’s remaining claims are DENIED as moot.”
agree with court
Since the primary relief sought (a bond hearing) was granted, the other claims regarding the legality of the detention itself became moot. This is a standard procedural disposition when the primary remedy is awarded.
Respondents ordered to provide a bond determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days.
“The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days of this Order.”
agree with court
The order specifies the statutory basis for the hearing (§ 1226(a)) and the timeline. It also requires the hearing to be 'constitutionally adequate and individualized,' which is consistent with due process requirements for immigration detention hearings.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and relies on the government's concession, which is a valid basis for granting relief. It cites relevant Supreme Court precedent for jurisdiction and recent district court cases for the specific statutory interpretation of the Laken Riley Act. The reasoning directly addresses the motion and the changed circumstances (dropped charges).

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARY MAIRENA TINOCO, Case No.: 26-cv-0605-JES-SBC 12 Petitioner, JUDGMENT AND ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; 15 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. [ECF No. 1] 16 Department of Homeland Security; TODD LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. 17 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 18 PATRICK DIVVER, Field Office Director, San Diego Office, U.S. 19 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 20 and PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, 21 Respondents. 22 23 Before the Court is Petitioner Mary Mairena Tinoco’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 24 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on January 30, 2026. ECF No. 1 25 (“Pet.”). Respondents missed their deadline to respond to the Petition, and Petitioner filed 26 a Traverse asking for relief on that basis. ECF No. 3. Respondents then filed a return to the 27 Petition. ECF No. 5 (“Return”). The Court granted Petitioner leave to file an additional 28 Traverse addressing the issues raised in the Return, which Petitioner did file on February 1 10, 2026. ECF Nos. 6, 7. The Court ordered a hearing on the remaining issues in the 2 Petition, which occurred on February 18, 2026. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner is a Nicaraguan national who entered the United States without inspection 5 in December of 2021. Pet. ¶ 25. On December 16, 2021, Department of Homeland Security 6 granted Petitioner release on her own recognizance, subject to an Order of Release on 7 Recognizance Form I-220(A). Id. ¶ 26. 8 Petitioner has resided in the U.S. ever since. Id. She is married to a U.S. Citizen, 9 who has filed a Form I-130 immigration petition on her behalf. Id. ¶ 28. That petition is 10 currently pending. Id. 11 Petitioner was recently arrested and charged with petty theft in Florida. Id. ¶ 26; 12 Return at 3. She was subsequently arrested and taken into custody by officers of U.S. 13 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and placed in removal proceedings. Pet. 14 ¶¶ 29-30; Return at 2. Petitioner states, and Respondents do not contest, that she has not 15 received any individualized custody hearing. Pet. ¶ 39. 16 On February 17, 2025, the State of Florida entered a disposition of Nolle Pros in 17 Petitioner’s petty theft case, reflecting its declination to prosecute the charge. ECF No. 9 18 at 1. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 23 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 24 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 25 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 26 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 27 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 28 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 1 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 2 of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 3 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 In her petition, Petitioner argues that the lack of individualized custody 6 determination in her case violates the due process clause and the Immigration and 7 Nationality Act (INA) considering her prior Order of Release on Recognizance. Pet. ¶¶ 48. 8 Respondents argued that Petitioner was not entitled to release or a bond hearing because 9 she was subject to the mandatory detention provision of 1226(c) as amended by the Laken 10 Riley Act following her arrest for theft. Return at 2. Shortly after the briefing in this matter, 11 Petitioner’s counsel submitted a status update relating that the State of Florida had declined 12 to prosecute Petitioner’s criminal case. ECF No. 9. 13 At the hearing in this matter, Respondents represented that they now concede 14 Petitioner is entitled to an order from this Court ordering a bond hearing due to the 15 disposition of her criminal case. Petitioner’s counsel stated that the parties were in 16 agreement regarding a bond hearing, and that a bond hearing was the only remedy sought 17 by Petitioner at this time. The parties’ agreement that Petitioner is no longer subject to 18 mandatory detention under 1226(c) after Florida has declined to prosecute her case is in 19 keeping with the findings of other courts facing as-applied challenges to the Laken-Riley 20 Act’s arrest-only provision. See Brandon Y. M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01962-SKO 21 (HC), 2026 WL 125234, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (“The Court further finds serious 22 constitutional concerns would be presented if the LRA encompassed Petitioner's arrest and 23 subsequent release without the filing of a formal accusatory pleading.”); Hairo v. 24 Crawford, No. 2:25CV704, 2026 WL 286176, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2026) (holding that 25 the Act’s arrest-only provision ceased to apply when underlying charges are dropped as a 26 matter of statutory interpretation). 27 28 1 Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as to 2 ||the requested remedy of a bond hearing. Petitioner’s remaining claims are DENIED as 3 || moot. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the petition, and ORDERS as follows: 6 (1)The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond 7 determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days of this Order. At 8 the hearing, Respondents must provide Petitioner with a constitutionally 9 adequate and individualized bond hearing consistent with this order and 10 Respondent’s concession that 1226(c) does not govern; and 11 (2) Respondents are ORDERED to File a Notice of Compliance within five days of 12 providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing, including apprising the 13 Court of the results of the hearing and providing a copy of the bond order. 14 The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: February 18, 2026 18 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ‘A