Rosa Adrianer Pineda-Aguila v. The President of the United States of America and United States Military
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and her complaint against the President and the U.S. Military. The court denied the IFP motion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, and denied the motion for appointment of counsel as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis“Accordingly, the Court DENIES her IFP motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the requirement that a plaintiff must allege poverty with particularity. The order recites that the application was 'almost entirely blank' and lacked statements of income or expenses, which is sufficient to deny the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). |
Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice“Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with prejudice.” | agree with court The court dismissed the complaint as 'frivolous' and 'wholly incoherent.' While the order does not detail the specific allegations, the characterization of the complaint as lacking factual allegations and being incoherent supports a dismissal for failure to state a claim or frivolousness under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The dismissal with prejudice is appropriate for a frivolous complaint. |
Denial of Motion for Appointment of Counsel“With Plaintiffs complaint dismissed, the Court DENIES her motion for appointment of counsel as moot.” | agree with court Once the underlying complaint is dismissed, there is no pending action for which counsel can be appointed. Denying the motion as moot is procedurally correct. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory basis for the IFP motion and the screening requirement. It cites appropriate Ninth Circuit authority for the standard of IFP review and the scope of § 1915(e)(2)(B). The reasoning is concise but sufficient: the IFP motion was denied due to lack of particularity (blank form), and the complaint was dismissed as frivolous/incoherent. The dismissal with prejudice is consistent with the finding of frivolousness.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSA ADRIANER PINEDA-AGUILA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03321-CAB-SBC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS & STATES OF AMERICA, and UNITED 15 DISMISSING COMPLAINT; STATES MILITARY 16 Defendants. (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 17 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 18 On November 26, 2025, Plaintiff Rosa Adrianer Pineda-Aguila, proceeding pro se, 19 filed a complaint against Defendants “United States Presidential” [sic] and “United States 20 Military.” [Doc. No. 1 at 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 21 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, she filed a motion to proceed in forma 22 pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] Plaintiff also filed a 23 motion for appointment of counsel. [Doc. No. 3.] For the reasons below, the Court 24 DENIES the IFP motion, DISMISSES the complaint, and DENIES the motion for 25 appointment of counsel as moot. 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 2 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this Court must pay a filing fee. See 3 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court may 4 authorize any suit’s commencement, prosecution, or defense without payment of fees if the 5 plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing he or 6 she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege 7 poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 8 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court finds 9 Plaintiff’s IFP motion is insufficient as she does not state on her application whether she 10 has any income or expenses. [Doc. No. 2.] Indeed, her IFP application is almost entirely 11 blank. [Id.] Accordingly, the Court DENIES her IFP motion. Venable v. Meyers, 500 12 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that granting or denying leave to proceed IFP in 13 civil cases is within the district court’s sound discretion). 14 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 15 A plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua 16 sponte dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which 17 relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 18 such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 19 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); 20 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 21 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 22 state a claim.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and 23 court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing 24 frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) 25 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 The complaint lacks factual allegations and is wholly incoherent and frivolous. 2 || Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with prejudice. With Plaintiffs 3 || complaint dismissed, the Court DENIES her motion for appointment of counsel as moot. 4 It is SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: February 17, 2026 ( GE— 6 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28