Roger Frye Largo v. John Doe, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas corpus petition filed by an unrepresented immigration detainee seeking release from custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court ordered the respondents to file a return by February 23, 2026, determining that the petition was not frivolous and warranted a response.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Order requiring respondents to file a return to the petition“Thus, the government must answer. By February 23, 2026, respondents must file their return.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (applied by analogy to § 2241 cases). The court found that while the petition lacked detail, it was not 'clearly not cognizable' because it alleged prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or post-removal detention under Zadvydas. Citing Neiss v. Bludworth, the court correctly noted that if a petition has 'any potential merit,' it should not be summarily dismissed. The court’s reliance on Kydyrali v. Wolf and Zadvydas v. Davis to establish potential merit is legally sound for the purpose of requiring a response. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally correct. It accurately identifies the low threshold for surviving summary dismissal in a habeas context. It correctly applies the Ninth Circuit precedent (Neiss) to determine that the petition, despite being thin on details, alleges a cognizable claim (prolonged detention) that requires the government to respond. The court does not need to decide the merits at this stage, only whether the claim is sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Roger FRYE LARGO, Case No.: 26-cv-0887-AGS-BLM 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 John DOE, WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Unrepresented petitioner Roger Frye Largo seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 10 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to free him from immigration detention. (See ECF 1.) At this stage, he 11 need only make out a claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules 12 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing 13 summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that 14 the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules 15 Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the 16 relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” 17 Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a 18 petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary 19 dismissal[.]” Id. 20 Frye Largo’s petition is thin on details. He claims to have been in “immigration 21 custody” since “June” “2025.” (ECF 1, at 1.) But he doesn’t explain the circumstances or 22 basis for that custody. (See generally id.) Instead, he alleges constitutional injury because 23 his “detention is arbitrary and prolonged” and “violating due process” “[u]nder Zadvydas 24 v. Davis.” (Id. at 1.) 25 Despite the lack of detail, this claim is not frivolous. If his immigration-court 26 proceedings are ongoing, then his case warrants an answer because some courts have 27 concluded that prolonged detention can violate due process even for those subject to 28 1 ||mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See, e.g., Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 2 || 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in 3 || concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an 4 || individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). And if he has a final order of removal, 5 ||then his roughly eight months of detention could warrant release. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 6 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (establishing a procedure for challenging the constitutionality of 7 || post-removal-order detention that lasts beyond a “presumptively reasonable period” of “six 8 months”). 9 Thus, the government must answer. By February 23, 2026, respondents must file 10 || their return. Petitioner may file any reply by March 2, 2026. 11 ||Dated: February 14, 2026 13 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28