Jugraj Bir Singh v. Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Jugraj Singh filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his case. The court denied summary dismissal and ordered the government to file a return to the petition.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of summary dismissal of the habeas petition“This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, which requires that the petition be plainly without merit. The court cited Ninth Circuit authority (Neiss v. Bludworth) establishing that a petition with 'any potential merit' cannot be summarily dismissed. The court noted that while the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the petitioner's specific statutory argument in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, a significant number of district courts across the country have found in favor of petitioners on similar claims. Given this split in district court authority and the existence of a plausible legal argument, the court's decision to require a response rather than dismiss the petition is consistent with the law and the record recited. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions and applies it to the facts. It acknowledges the contrary Fifth Circuit precedent but balances it against the overwhelming number of district court decisions supporting the petitioner's position. This demonstrates a careful consideration of the legal landscape and justifies the decision to proceed to a response rather than dismissing the petition. The reasoning is sound and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Jugraj Bir SINGH, Case No.: 26-cv-0799-AGS-VET 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 WARDEN OF THE IMPERIAL 7 REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY, et 8 al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 Petitioner Jugraj Singh seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 12 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is 13 sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 14 the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly 15 appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 16 relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to 17 any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 18 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 19 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is 20 not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 21 On “April 27, 2016,” Singh, an “Indian citizen,” entered the United States and “was 22 released on an immigration bond.” (ECF 1, at 3.) Years later, on “December 16, 2025,” he 23 was apprehended at a traffic checkpoint and has since been in immigration detention 24 “without a bond hearing.” (Id.) Singh is now challenging the government’s decision to 25 subject him to mandatory detention under “8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (Id.) He asserts that his 26 case is instead governed by “§ 1226(a)”—which authorizes release on bond or conditional 27 parole. (Id.) Since he has not received a bond hearing or other process under § 1226(a), he 28 claims that his detention is “in violation of the law.” (Id. at 13.) l This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Although the only 2 ||Court of Appeals to address this question has rejected Singh’s position, see Buenrostro- 3 || Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, — F.4th _, 2026 WL 323330, at *4 (Sth Cir. Feb. 6, 4 2026), functionally identical cases across the country have succeeded in great number, see, 5 Barco Mercado v. Francis, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 6 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to 7 ||address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and 8 ||these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different 9 || courts”); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 10 }|(C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims 11 because section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez 12 ||v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 13 |}2025) (same); Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 14 || (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the 15 ||INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency 16 || practice.”). 17 So, by February 17, 2026, the government is ordered to file a return to Kumar’s 18 || petition. Kumar must file any traverse by February 24, 2026. The Court will hold oral 19 arguments on March 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. 20 || Dated: February 10, 2026 2 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28