People v. Eddington CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. CR130216
- Trial judge
- David J. Danielsen
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Julia C. Kelety (author), Truc T. Do, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court denied Eddington's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, subdivision (b), finding him statutorily ineligible due to his murder conviction, and refused to take action on his section 1172.1 request. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the section 1170.91 petition and dismissed the appeal of the section 1172.1 refusal as non-appealable.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, subdivision (b)“Because Eddington was convicted of murder, he is categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the statutory exclusion for 'super strike' offenses, which includes murder, to determine that Eddington was categorically ineligible for the specific relief sought under section 1170.91. |
Refusal to take action on resentencing request under Penal Code section 1172.1“the trial court’s refusal to take any action on Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request is not appealable.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court correctly identified that a trial court's decision not to act on a section 1172.1 request does not affect substantial rights and is therefore not appealable, leading to the dismissal of that portion of the appeal. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235 — Murder is included as a 'super strike' offense under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), rendering defendants ineligible for relief under section 1170.91.
- relied: People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040 — A trial court's decision not to act on a defendant's section 1172.1 request for recall and resentencing does not affect substantial rights and is not appealable.
- relied: People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 — A trial court's order declining a defendant's request for recall and resentencing is not appealable.
- relied: People v. Frederickson (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 910 — The case is inapposite because it involved the harmonization of section 1172.1 with a different statute not at issue in this appeal.
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Establishes the procedure for appellate counsel to file a brief identifying potential issues and inviting the court to review the record independently when no arguable issues are found.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to file a brief identifying any arguable issues and to request the court's independent review of the record.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the statutory ineligibility provision for murder convictions under section 1170.91 and correctly dismisses the section 1172.1 appeal based on established non-appealability precedent. The court adequately addresses the appellant's supplemental arguments by distinguishing inapposite authority and reaffirming the lack of substantial rights at stake.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Leonard Eddington's Penal Code section 1170.91, subdivision (b) petition for resentencing on the ground that his 1992 murder conviction (with a financial-gain special circumstance and an LWOP sentence) made him statutorily ineligible, and separately notified him that it would take no action on his section 1172.1 recall-and-resentencing request. On a Wende/Anders appeal with a supplemental pro per brief, the Court of Appeal affirmed the section 1170.91 denial because murder is a 'super strike' excluded by section 1170.91, subdivision (c), and dismissed the appeal from the court's refusal to act on the section 1172.1 request as taken from a non-appealable order.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1170.91, subdivision (b) resentencing petition for statutory ineligibility based on the murder conviction“Because Eddington was convicted of murder, he is categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The opinion does not expressly state a standard, but it resolves the question as one of pure statutory eligibility. Section 1170.91, subdivision (c) excludes persons convicted of offenses listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), and clause (iv)(IV) covers homicide offenses defined in sections 187 to 191.5, so a section 187 murder conviction is squarely excluded; Jefferson confirms murder is a super strike. The result is also independently supported because section 1170.91 relief is directed at determinate sentencing under section 1170 and Eddington is serving LWOP, though the court did not need to reach that ground. |
Trial court's refusal to take any action on the defendant-initiated section 1172.1 recall and resentencing request (appeal dismissed as non-appealable)“Regarding the second issue, the trial court’s refusal to take any action on Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request is not appealable.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court Appealability is a jurisdictional question the appellate court decides for itself. Section 1172.1 provides that a defendant is not entitled to file a petition and that the court is not required to respond to a defendant's request, so a court's decision not to act does not affect substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b); Hodge and Brinson so hold, and Brinson specifically rejects the argument that section 1171 changes this, which answers Eddington's supplemental-brief claim. The court's distinction of Frederickson (a section 1385.1 harmonization case) is accurate on the opinion's own description. Dismissal rather than affirmance was the proper disposition. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Procedure for appointed counsel who finds no arguable issues to request independent appellate review of the record.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel filing a no-issue brief should identify possible issues considered to assist the court's review.
- relied: People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235 — Murder is a 'super strike' within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).
- relied: People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040 — A trial court's decision not to act on a defendant's section 1172.1 request does not affect substantial rights and is not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b), even after section 1171 took effect.
- relied: People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 — An order declining a defendant's own request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 is not appealable.
- relied: People v. Frederickson (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 910 — Distinguished by the court: it addressed harmonizing section 1172.1 with section 1385.1 and does not bear on appealability of a refusal to act on a defendant-initiated request.
- missed: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Wende/Anders independent review is not constitutionally required in appeals from postconviction orders; the court must address issues raised in a defendant's supplemental brief and may, but need not, independently review the record. The opinion stated it reviewed the record 'as required by Wende and Anders' without acknowledging Delgadillo, though this did not affect the outcome.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied section 1170.91, subdivision (c)'s super-strike exclusion to a murder conviction and correctly dismissed the section 1172.1 portion under Hodge and Brinson, answering the supplemental-brief arguments about sections 1171 and Frederickson. It skipped the controlling Supreme Court framework in Delgadillo for postconviction Wende-type appeals and the alternative ineligibility ground that section 1170.91 does not reach indeterminate LWOP terms, but neither gap changes the result.
Opinion
Filed 7/1/26 P. v. Eddington CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086724
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR130216)
v. LEONARD E. EDDINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part. Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Leonard E. Eddington appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170.91, subdivision (b). He also appeals the trial court’s refusal to take action on his resentencing request under section 1172.1. His appointed appellate counsel filed a brief in 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. which he raised no claims of error and invited us to review the record independently for error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Eddington accepted the opportunity to file his own brief, which we address below. We affirm the trial court’s order denying his resentencing petition and dismiss his appeal of the trial court’s refusal to act on his resentencing request.
BACKGROUND2 In October 1992, a jury found Eddington guilty of murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a), with a special circumstances finding that he committed the murder for financial gain within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1). The jury also found that, in committing the murder, he personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus one year. In May 2025, Eddington filed a petition requesting recall of his sentence and resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600 and section 1172.1. He filed the same section 1172.1 resentencing request again later that month. In June 2025, Eddington filed a petition for resentencing “based on health conditions due to military service time listed in Penal Code Section 1170.91(b).” (Capitalization omitted.) Later that month, the trial court denied Eddington’s section 1170.91, subdivision (b) resentencing petition, finding that he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91 “in light of the nature of his 2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to any potential issues on this appeal. Accordingly, we will omit the traditional statement of facts.
2 conviction.” The court also issued a written notice to Eddington that stated: “The court is in receipt of and has reviewed your request for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1. This is to notify you that the court will not take any action on your request.” In July 2025, Eddington filed a timely notice of appeal. In December 2025, Eddington filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking resentencing relief under sections 1172.1 and 1170.91. DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review of the record, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel identified the following possible issues that were considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: 1) Whether the trial court erred by denying Eddington’s section 1170.91, subdivision (b) resentencing petition; and 2) Whether the trial court erred by refusing to take any action on Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request. Neither issue identified by counsel has arguable merit. As to the first, and as set out in our order denying Eddington’s writ petition,3 a current or former member of the military who has been convicted of a felony may petition for resentencing alleging they suffer from a mental health condition related to their military service, and that condition “was not considered as a factor in mitigation at the time of sentencing.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (b).) However, certain violent felony convictions, often called “super strikes,”
3 We take judicial notice of the order denying Eddington’s habeas petition in case No. D087325. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
3 render a defendant ineligible for relief. (§ 1170.91, subd. (c).) Murder is included as a super strike. (§ 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv); People. v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242.) Because Eddington was convicted of murder, he is categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. Regarding the second issue, the trial court’s refusal to take any action on Eddington’s section 1172.1 resentencing request is not appealable. (People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040 [“a trial court’s decision not to act on a defendant’s section 1172.1 request for recall and resentencing does not affect his or her substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).”]; People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999 [“a trial court’s order declining a defendant’s request for recall and resentencing is not appealable”].) Eddington raises these same two issues in his supplemental brief. He also argues there is a “statutory conflict between sections 1171 and 1172.1” that “would allow self-initiation if filed pursuant to section 1171.” We disagree. “[A] defendant who requests recall and resentencing under section 1172.1—even after section 1171 became effective—does not have a substantial right at stake, and the trial court’s decision on that request is not appealable.” (Brinson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049.) Eddington also relies on People v. Frederickson (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 910, but that case is inapposite as it involved harmonization of section 1172.1 with a statute that is not at issue here. (Id. at p. 915 [rejecting “the district attorney’s claim that section 1172.1 . . . effectuates an improper amendment of section 1385.1”].) On the record before us, the claims Eddington makes in his supplemental brief do not raise any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.
4 We have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende and Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Eddington on this appeal. DISPOSITION The trial court’s June 2025 order denying Eddington’s section 1170.91, subdivision (b) resentencing petition is affirmed. Eddington’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to act on his resentencing request under section 1172.1 is dismissed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Jefferson CA4/2 E063900 · 2016-07-07
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12