gno.law

Marriage of Skinner CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D062018 · 2013-10-29 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from orders
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. ED47922
Trial judge
Darlene A. White (commissioner)
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
family
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Gilbert Nares, Patricia D. Benke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:57Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Skinner's request to have his son testify, awarded McSherry sole legal custody, and made a domestic violence restraining order permanent. The Court of Appeal affirmed the orders, holding that Skinner forfeited his claims of error by failing to provide cogent legal argument or record citations in his brief.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of Skinner's request to allow his son to testify at the evidentiary hearing.
“The court denied the request on the ground it would not be in the son's best interests to testify at the hearing. (Fam. Code, § 3042; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.250.)”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of this ruling because it deemed Skinner's challenge forfeited due to the lack of legal argument and record citations in his brief.
Award of sole legal custody to McSherry and specific visitation schedule for Skinner.
“Skinner also asks that he be given joint legal custody of the minor children, that visitation with his son be scheduled in accordance with the son's wishes... We decline these requests.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of the custody and visitation orders because it found Skinner's arguments on these issues were conclusory and lacked necessary legal authority and record support.
Making the domestic violence restraining order permanent.
“Skinner further requests dismissal of the restraining order obtained by McSherry. We decline these requests.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of the restraining order because Skinner failed to provide a cogent legal argument supported by authority to challenge the trial court's decision.

Authorities

  • relied: Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 — A judgment or order is presumed correct on appeal, and the party challenging it must affirmatively show error by an adequate record.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 — The party challenging a judgment must affirmatively show error by an adequate record.
  • relied: Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 — A judgment or order is presumed correct on appeal, and the party challenging it must affirmatively show error by an adequate record.
  • relied: Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059 — To discharge the burden of showing error, an appellant must make an argument in support of the claims of error that includes citation of legal authority and facts of record.
  • relied: Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000 — An appellant must make an argument in support of the claims of error that includes citation of legal authority and facts of record.
  • relied: Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113 — An appellant must make an argument in support of the claims of error that includes citation of legal authority and facts of record.
  • relied: Strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866 — An appellate court is not required to consider alleged errors where the appellant merely complains of them without pertinent argument.
  • relied: Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344 — One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814 — The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows the court to treat the contentions as waived.
  • relied: Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428 — Conclusory claims of error will fail.
  • relied: Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379 — The court need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished.
  • relied: Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539 — The court is not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for an appellant's contentions.
  • relied: Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647 — Contentions without citation to legal authority are deemed forfeited.
  • relied: Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 — Mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment; rules of civil procedure apply equally to self-represented parties.
  • relied: Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113 — A litigant appearing in propria persona is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.
  • relied: County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434 — A litigant appearing in propria persona is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.
  • relied: Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 — A litigant appearing in propria persona is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.
  • relied: People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 — Judicial notice is proper only if the material to be noticed is relevant to a claim of error and helpful to its resolution.
  • relied: Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717 — Judicial notice is proper only if the material to be noticed is relevant to a claim of error and helpful to its resolution.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound because it correctly applies the well-established principle that an appellant must provide cogent legal argument and record citations to preserve issues for review, and that self-representation does not excuse this duty. The court properly denied the request for judicial notice because no valid claim of error was articulated to which the documents could be relevant.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

After an April 2012 evidentiary hearing in a long-running dissolution case, the San Diego family court denied the father's request that his 14-year-old son testify, gave the mother sole legal custody, set visitation, ordered shared therapy and minors' counsel costs, barred either parent from filing an order to show cause or setting mediation without court permission, and made permanent the mother's domestic violence restraining order. On the father's third pro per appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed without reaching the merits, holding that his brief contained no cogent legal argument, record citations, or authority and that his claims were therefore forfeited; it also denied his request for judicial notice as irrelevant absent any articulated claim of error.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of father's request that his 14-year-old son testify at the custody hearing (Fam. Code, § 3042; rule 5.250)
“The court denied the request on the ground it would not be in the son's best interests to testify at the hearing.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not evaluate this ruling on the merits; it treated the claim as forfeited for lack of argument, record citations, or authority. Section 3042 requires the court to permit a child 14 or older to address the court unless it finds it not in the child's best interest and states its reasons, so the ruling would ordinarily be reviewed for abuse of discretion, but nothing in the opinion reveals whether reasons were stated. Forfeiture under Rappleyea and Falcone & Fyke is a well-settled basis to decline review, and the opinion's description of the brief supports it.
Award of sole legal custody of the minor children to McSherry
“(1) McSherry was given sole legal custody of the minor children;”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Custody modifications are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the court applied no standard because the appellant's brief offered only accusations against the mother and the court without legal argument or record support. The presumption of correctness and forfeiture doctrine cited (Denham, Ketchum, Mansell) justify affirmance without merits review.
Visitation schedule for the son (two evenings a week and three weekends a month) and therapy order with shared costs for the daughter
“(3) Skinner was granted visitation of his son two evenings a week and three weekends a month;”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Appellant asked that visitation follow the son's wishes and that the mother bear all therapy costs, but cited no authority or record facts. The court properly treated the contentions as forfeited; the opinion gives no basis to question the underlying orders.
Order prohibiting either parent from filing an order to show cause or setting family court services mediation without court permission or a motion by minors' counsel
“ordered not to file an order to show cause or set a family court services mediation date without the court's permission or a motion by the minor children's counsel”
unclearnot reachedunsure
A prefiling restriction of this kind raises potential access-to-court concerns ordinarily governed by the vexatious litigant statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 391 et seq.), and it is not clear from the opinion that those procedures were followed. The appellate court nonetheless declined to reach it because appellant presented no argument; forfeiture is a legitimate basis, and the court could but was not required to exercise discretion to reach the issue. Without the record or any argument, I cannot say the result was wrong.
Order requiring the parents to share equally the fees and costs of minors' counsel
“(5) Skinner and McSherry were ordered to share equally the fees and costs of the minor children's counsel.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Allocation of minors' counsel fees is a discretionary determination; appellant sought to shift all fees to the mother but offered no legal argument. The court's forfeiture ruling is supported by the cited authorities.
Order making permanent the domestic violence restraining order against Skinner
“The court also made permanent the domestic violence restraining order McSherry previously had obtained against Skinner.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Appellant complained the hearing took seconds and subpoenaed witnesses did not testify, but provided no record citations or authority. The opinion's description that several witnesses testified and documents were received at the April 2012 hearing undercuts the complaint, and the forfeiture ruling is consistent with Multani, Keyes, and Falcone & Fyke.

Authorities

  • relied: Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 — A judgment or order is presumed correct and the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error on an adequate record.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 — Presumption of correctness on appeal; appellant bears the burden of showing error.
  • relied: Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 — All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment; error must be affirmatively shown.
  • relied: Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 — Self-represented litigants are held to the same procedural rules as parties represented by counsel.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814 — Absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority permits the appellate court to treat contentions as waived.
  • relied: Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428 — Conclusory claims of error unsupported by argument or authority fail.
  • relied: Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344 — An appellant cannot simply assert error and leave it to the appellate court to figure out why.
  • relied: Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539 — The appellate court is not required to search the record for support for an appellant's factual contentions.
  • relied: Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113 — A pro per litigant is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and is held to the same procedural rules.
  • relied: Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647 — Contentions unsupported by legal authority are forfeited.
  • relied: People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 — Judicial notice is appropriate only for material relevant and helpful to resolving an issue on appeal.
  • relied: Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717 — Judicial notice is denied where the material is not relevant to a claim of error.
  • relied: Strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866 — An appellate court need not consider alleged errors merely complained of without pertinent argument.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied settled forfeiture and presumption-of-correctness principles to a brief that, by the court's description, contained no legal argument, record citations, or authority, and it properly held a self-represented appellant to the same standards under Rappleyea. The disposition is defensible even though it leaves unreviewed potentially substantive issues such as the section 3042 denial of the son's testimony and the prefiling restriction on orders to show cause, which the court had discretion but no obligation to reach.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 10/29/13 Marriage of Skinner CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of KIMBERLY M. and RICHARD R. SKINNER. D062018 KIMBERLY M. MCSHERRY, Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. ED47922)

v. RICHARD R. SKINNER, Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Darlene A.

White, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Richard R. Skinner, in propria persona, for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

This is the third appeal by Richard R. Skinner, proceeding in propria persona, in this marital dissolution action. This time, he challenges orders modifying custody and visitation of his two minor children and making permanent a domestic violence restraining order obtained by his former wife, Kimberly M. McSherry. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Skinner and McSherry divorced in 2000. Since that time, their many disputes over the custody, visitation, and support of their two minor children have necessitated family court intervention. McSherry has also obtained domestic violence restraining orders against Skinner.

In April 2012, the family court held an evidentiary hearing on Skinner's request that the custody and visitation orders be modified and McSherry's request that the restraining order against Skinner be made permanent. Skinner requested his son, then 14 years old, testify at the hearing about spending more time with Skinner. The court denied the request on the ground it would not be in the son's best interests to testify at the hearing. (Fam. Code, § 3042; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.250.) Several witnesses testified at the hearing, and reports and other documents were introduced.

After receiving the evidence and hearing arguments from the parties and counsel appointed for the minor children, the court entered a comprehensive order regarding custody, visitation, and related matters. As pertinent to this appeal, the court made the following rulings: (1) McSherry was given sole legal custody of the minor children;

(2) Skinner and his daughter were ordered to participate in therapy regarding their relationship, with the costs of the daughter's therapy not covered by insurance to be shared equally by Skinner and McSherry; (3) Skinner was granted visitation of his son two evenings a week and three weekends a month; (4) Skinner and McSherry were 2 ordered not to file an order to show cause or set a family court services mediation date without the court's permission or a motion by the minor children's counsel; and (5) Skinner and McSherry were ordered to share equally the fees and costs of the minor children's counsel. The court also made permanent the domestic violence restraining order McSherry previously had obtained against Skinner.

DISCUSSION

Skinner requests changes to several aspects of the family court's orders. He asks us to reverse the order refusing to allow his son to testify. Skinner also asks that he be given joint legal custody of the minor children, that visitation with his son be scheduled in accordance with the son's wishes, that McSherry pay all costs and fees of the family therapist and minor's counsel, that "support should be cut as an incentive to [McSherry]

to do what is in [their] daughter's best interests," and that the prohibition on filing an order to show cause or setting a mediation date without court permission or a motion by minor's counsel be deleted. Skinner further requests dismissal of the restraining order obtained by McSherry. We decline these requests.

Skinner's appeal fails on fundamental principles of appellate review. One such principle is that a judgment or an order is presumed to be correct on appeal, and the party challenging the judgment or the order must affirmatively show error by an adequate record. (E.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To discharge this burden, the appellant must make an argument in support of the claims of error that includes citation of legal authority and facts of record. (Cal. Rules of 3 Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081; Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 & fn. 2; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.) "An appellate court is not required to consider alleged errors where the appellant merely complains of them without pertinent argument." (Strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866, 873.) "One cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why." (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) "We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived." (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457 (Multani) [" 'conclusory claims of error will fail' "]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 ["We need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished."].)

Skinner's brief contains nothing recognizable as a legal argument. His brief clearly expresses his unhappiness with the current custody and visitation arrangement and his frustration with the participants in the events and legal process that led up to it. For example, Skinner (1) rails against McSherry, whom he accuses of perjury and describes as "a treacherous manipulator"; (2) complains that McSherry's current husband has a "nasty demeanor" and is "critical and abusive" of Skinner's son; and (3) disparages the family court as "a Kangaroo-Court" for ignoring McSherry's "pattern of false allegations," "conduct[ing] business as usual" in disregard of the law, making permanent the restraining order after a "hearing [that took] seconds without subpoenaed witnesses 4 testifying," and "not being diligent in determining the facts." Skinner does not provide record citations for his many factual allegations, however, and "[w]e are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [his] contentions." (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.) Nor does Skinner cite any statutes, cases, or other legal authorities in support of his contentions, which we therefore deem forfeited. (Multani, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457; Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Rather, Skinner "yields to [us] to properly apply the laws," and asks us to help him in his "battle" for "the children and justice." Such emotional pleas, no matter how sincerely or strongly urged, are no substitute for the persuasive legal argument we require before we will modify or reverse the orders challenged on appeal.

In rejecting his challenges to the family court's orders, we are mindful that Skinner represents himself. Self-representation, however, does not allow an appellant to avoid the obligation to make an affirmative showing of error. Our Supreme Court has "ma[d]e clear that mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.

Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation."

(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) This court has similarly held:

" 'When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. . . . Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.' "

(Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126; accord, 5 County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444; Nwosu v. Uba (2004)

122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) Thus, since Skinner did not comply with the rules requiring all appellants to state a cogent legal argument supported by authority, he has forfeited his claims of error.

Finally, we must dispose of Skinner's request for judicial notice of correspondence, a hearing transcript, and various documents filed in the action. Judicial notice is proper only if the material to be noticed is relevant to a claim of error and helpful to its resolution. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2; Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 737.) That is not the case here. Because Skinner has not articulated a legal argument that would support reversal or modification of the family court's orders, there is no claim of error to which the documents of which he requests judicial notice would be relevant.

Accordingly, we deny the request.

6 DISPOSITION

The order regarding custody and visitation filed April 19, 2012, and the domestic violence restraining order filed April 9, 2012, are affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

NARES, J.

Cites, in this corpus