Neutralsovereignties Corp., et al. v. Zions Bancorporation, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se complaint filed by a corporation and an individual seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) regarding a denied loan application. The court granted the individual's IFP motion, dismissed the corporation for lack of counsel, and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting McNeely's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis“The Court GRANTS McNeely’s motion to proceed IFP.” | agree with court The order recites that McNeely provided an affidavit showing income of $520/month and expenses of $1,042/month, which meets the statutory requirement of demonstrating inability to pay fees while affording necessities of life. The court correctly applied the standard from Escobedo v. Applebees. |
Dismissing Plaintiff Neutralsovereignties Corp.“Given that no licensed counsel appears for them, the Court DISMISSES Neutralsovereignties from this action.” | agree with court The order correctly identifies that corporations cannot appear pro se in federal court and must be represented by licensed counsel. Since McNeely is not an attorney, he cannot represent the corporate plaintiff. This is a well-established procedural requirement. |
Dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend“Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES complaint with leave to amend by March 3, 2026.” | agree with court The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to the IFP screening. It found the ADA and ECOA claims conclusory because they lacked specific facts regarding the disability or the prohibited basis for discrimination. The court correctly noted that the specific reasons given for loan denial (lack of history, insufficient info, etc.) undermined the conclusory allegation of discrimination. Dismissing with leave to amend is appropriate for a pro se plaintiff who has not yet had the opportunity to plead specific facts. |
Declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims“With his federal claims dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law causes of action.” | agree with court Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. This is a standard discretionary decision. |
Dismissing Motion to Compel Ruling“The Court also DISMISSES McNeely’s “Motion to Compel Ruling on IFP Motion” as improperly filed.” | unsure The order states the motion was 'improperly filed' but does not elaborate on the specific procedural defect (e.g., lack of local rule citation, improper format, or mootness since the IFP motion was ruled on in the same order). However, dismissing a motion that seeks to compel a ruling on a motion that is being ruled on simultaneously is procedurally sound. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the legal standards for IFP motions, corporate representation, and IFP screening. It properly cites binding authority for each step. The analysis of the complaint's failure to state a claim is supported by the specific facts recited in the order (conclusory allegations vs. specific reasons for denial). The decision to dismiss with leave to amend is appropriate for a pro se litigant.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NEUTRALSOVEREIGNTIES CORP., et Case No.: 3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG al., 12 ORDER: Plaintiffs, 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; ZIONS BANCORPORATION, et al., 15 Defendants. (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT; 16 17 (3) DISMISSING MOTION TO COMPEL RULING 18 19 [Doc. Nos. 1–3]
20 On December 11, 2025, Plaintiffs Neutralsovereignties Corp. 21 (“Neutralsovereignties”) and Manuel Ernest McNeely (“McNeely”), proceeding pro se, 22 filed a Complaint against Defendants Zions Bancorporation, California Bank and Trust, 23 Eric Ellingsen, Paul Burdiss, and Bryan Hane. [Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”).] Plaintiffs 24 bring eight federal and state causes of action based on Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ 25 loan application. Plaintiffs did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 26 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, they filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis 27 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] For the reasons outlined below, 28 1 the Court GRANTS the IFP motion as to Plaintiff McNeely, DISMISSES Plaintiff 2 Neutralsovereignties from this case, and DISMISSES the Complaint. 3 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 4 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 5 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may authorize 6 any suit’s commencement, prosecution, or defense without payment of fees if the plaintiff 7 submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing he or she is 8 unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 9 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of 10 life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking 11 IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Granting or denying leave to proceed IFP in civil cases 13 is within the district court’s sound discretion. Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 14 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 15 McNeely states his income is $520 per month in public assistance benefits with 16 $1,042 in monthly expenses. [See generally Doc. No. 2.] He lists his income and expenses 17 with sufficient particularity, which demonstrate he cannot pay court costs and still afford 18 life necessities. The Court GRANTS McNeely’s motion to proceed IFP. 19 II. McNeely Cannot Represent Neutralsovereignties 20 As to Neutralsovereignties, the Court notes that a corporation may appear in the 21 federal courts only through licensed counsel. See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 22 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993); see also In re America West Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058, 1059 23 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Corporations and other unincorporated associations must appear in court 24 through an attorney.”). It appears that McNeely, who is proceeding pro se and not an 25 attorney, is improperly seeking to represent Neutralsovereignties. Given that no licensed 26 counsel appears for them, the Court DISMISSES Neutralsovereignties from this action. 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 2 A. Legal Standard 3 A plaintiff proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte 4 dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief 5 may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 7 (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 8 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits 9 but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 10 claim.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court 11 costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing 12 frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) 13 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 14 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 15 which relief can be granted under 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 16 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 17 112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, 18 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 19 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court construes pro se 20 pleadings liberally. See Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 B. Discussion 22 McNeely alleges that Defendants (1) discriminated against him when he attempted 23 to “obtain a commercial loan in the amount of 14 Million Dollars[,]” and (2) discouraged, 24 misled, and prevented him from applying for the loan. [Doc. No. 1-2 at 4.] He brings 25 federal causes of action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 26 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), and various state causes of action. [Id. at 2.] 27 The Court finds that McNeely’s allegations are wholly conclusory. 28 1 As to his ADA claims, McNeely does not provide a single fact showing that 2 Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l 3 Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that courts need not accept as true 4 “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint or other “allegations that are merely 5 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”). Indeed, Plaintiff 6 merely claims that Defendant Hane “deni[ed] the loan for reasons that are inaccurate, 7 discriminatory, punitive, and deceptive.” [Doc. No. 1-2 at 5.] Undermining this 8 conclusion, Plaintiff states that Defendant Hane’s provided reasons for the $14 million loan 9 denial were that McNeely’s company had no operating history, McNeely provided 10 insufficient financial information, his application was incomplete, and the requested loan 11 was too large with no collateral. [Id. at 5.] Moreover, McNeely does not plead his 12 disability with any specificity. See Bresaz v. County of Santa Clara, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 13 1135–36 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Where . . . a party alleges that he . . . is disabled under the 14 ADA, courts have generally required the party to plead the disability with some factual 15 specificity.”). He merely states “Plaintiff is disabled.” [Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.] 16 McNeely’s ECOA claims are similarly conclusory. To plead an ECOA claim, a 17 plaintiff must sufficiently allege that a creditor discriminated against plaintiff with respect 18 to a credit transaction or discouraged plaintiff from applying for credit on the basis of race, 19 color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age, or because the applicant derives 20 income from a public assistance program. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 21 1002.4 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations which carry out the purposes 22 of 15 U.S.C. § 1691). There are no facts showing that any Defendant discriminated against 23 McNeely or discouraged/prevented him from applying for a loan on a prohibited basis. 24 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES McNeely’s federal claims. 25 McNeely filed his Complaint pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 1- 26 1 at 1.] With his federal claims dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 27 jurisdiction over the remaining state law causes of action. See United Mine Works v. Gibbs, 28 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES | complaint with leave to amend by March 3, 2026. The Court also DISMISSES 2 ||McNeely’s “Motion to Compel Ruling on IFP Motion” as improperly filed. [Doc. No. 3.] 3 Itis SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: February 3, 2026 □ Z 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28