People v. Medina CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Riverside County · No. RIF121073
- Trial judge
- Scott Williams
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Buchanan (author), Judith D. McConnell, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court resentenced the defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75, striking a prison prior and imposing an upper term for aggravated assault based on previously found aggravating circumstances. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, adopting the reasoning of People v. Brannon-Thompson and People v. Mathis to hold that the statutory exception in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permits the upper term when the original sentence included the same upper term.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of an upper term sentence for aggravated assault during resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 without new stipulation or jury finding of aggravating circumstances.“We find Brannon-Thompson and Mathis to be persuasive on this issue and adopt their holdings and reasoning as our own... We therefore find no error in the trial court’s imposition of the upper term on the aggravated assault.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The appellate court held that the trial court did not err because Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) explicitly allows the court to impose an upper term if the court originally imposed the upper term, thereby bypassing the general requirement in section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) for new stipulations or findings. The court resolved a split of authority by adopting the majority view (Brannon-Thompson and Mathis) that this statutory exception is valid and does not violate the Sixth Amendment. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455 — Holds that Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) creates an exception to the factfinding requirement for upper term sentences on resentencing if the original sentence included the upper term.
- relied: People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359 — Agrees with Brannon-Thompson and holds that the statutory exception does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
- relied: People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 — Disagrees with Brannon-Thompson, arguing the exception is invalid; the court declined to follow this authority.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly identifies the statutory text and the existing split of authority, then explicitly adopts the majority view pending Supreme Court guidance. However, it is a memorandum opinion that relies entirely on the reasoning of other unpublished or recently published cases without independent analysis of the constitutional implications beyond citing Mathis.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOn resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Riverside County Superior Court struck Medina's prison prior, reimposed life without parole for murder, and reimposed the same four-year upper term on the aggravated assault count without jury-found or stipulated aggravating facts, relying on the originally imposed upper term. The Court of Appeal affirmed, siding with Brannon-Thompson and Mathis (over Gonzalez) that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permits reimposition of an upper term the court originally imposed without new section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) factfinding, pending Supreme Court resolution of the split.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition on section 1172.75 resentencing of the upper term for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) without aggravating facts stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the exception in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) for cases where the court originally imposed the upper term“We find Brannon-Thompson and Mathis to be persuasive on this issue” | de novo | correct | unsure The court did not expressly state a standard, but the sole issue is the meaning of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), a pure question of statutory interpretation. The text ('Unless the court originally imposed the upper term') supports the court's reading, and the court candidly acknowledged the published split and pending Supreme Court review. However, the court adopted Brannon-Thompson and Mathis by reference without independently engaging Gonzalez's contrary arguments about the interplay of subdivisions (d)(2) and (d)(4) with current section 1170, subdivision (b), or independently analyzing the Sixth Amendment question, and the Supreme Court has granted review to resolve the conflict. The result is defensible but not certain. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455 — Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) permits a resentencing court to reimpose an upper term the court originally imposed without the aggravating-fact findings otherwise required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
- relied: People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359 — Agreeing with Brannon-Thompson and disagreeing with Gonzalez that subdivision (d)(4) exempts originally imposed upper terms from new factfinding, and holding that result does not violate the Sixth Amendment; review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion identifies the controlling statutory text, acknowledges the published split and pending Supreme Court review, and reaches a result consistent with the statute's plain language by adopting Brannon-Thompson and Mathis. It does not independently analyze Gonzalez's contrary reasoning or the Sixth Amendment argument, instead incorporating other courts' reasoning by reference, leaving a gap in its own explanation.
Opinion
Filed 5/15/26 P. v. Medina CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085330
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF121073)
BENJAMIN MATTHEW MEDINA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Scott Williams, Judge. Affirmed. Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Benjamin Matthew Medina appeals from a judgment imposed after a resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75 for a 2009 conviction of murder with a lying-in-wait special circumstance (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), and criminal threats (§ 422), with a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). After striking Medina’s prison prior as required under section 1172.75, the court resentenced Medina to the originally imposed term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder but reduced the determinate term for the other two counts by one year to reflect the striking of the prison prior. As a result, the new determinate term was four years eight months, rather than five years eight months. The determinate term included an upper term sentence of four years for the aggravated assault, which was the same upper term the court had imposed at the original sentencing in 2009. The sole issue Medina raises on appeal is that the resentencing court erred in imposing an upper term sentence on the aggravated assault because it relied on aggravating circumstances that were not “stipulated to by the defendant” or “found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The People respond that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) creates an exception to this factfinding requirement for upper term sentences imposed on resentencing when the trial court originally sentenced the defendant to the same upper term. Subdivision (d)(4) provides: “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the judge in a court trial.” (Italics added.) There is currently a split of authority in the Courts of Appeal on this issue, and the Supreme Court has granted review to resolve the conflict. (See People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466–467 (Brannon- Thompson) [agreeing with the People’s argument]; People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 327–332 (Gonzalez) [disagreeing with Brannon- Thompson]; People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 371–374 (Mathis) [agreeing with Brannon-Thompson and disagreeing with Gonzalez], review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628; People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903.) We find Brannon-Thompson and Mathis to be persuasive on this issue and adopt their holdings and reasoning as our own, including the reasoning of Matthis in finding that this result does not violate the Sixth Amendment. (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 373–374.) Accordingly, until we receive further guidance from our high court, we decline to follow Gonzalez and instead agree with Brannon-Thompson and Mathis. We therefore find no error in the trial court’s imposition of the upper term on the aggravated assault.
3 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.