People v. Segundo-Villa CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D086187 · 2026-05-08 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of Riverside County · No. SWF019391
Trial judge: Joshyn Pulliam
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: O'Rourke (author), Truc T. Do

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:24Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding he was the sole perpetrator and not liable based on the acts of others. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, determining that section 1172.6 is not the proper vehicle to challenge jury instructions in a case that is final on direct appeal.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 “The court found appellant was the sole perpetrator and there was no basis for resentencing under section 1172.6.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard of review for a prima facie denial, which is de novo. The trial court's finding that the defendant was the sole perpetrator is supported by the record, and the legal conclusion that section 1172.6 does not apply to challenges of jury instructions in final cases is consistent with the statute's purpose of addressing liability based on the acts of others.

Authorities

relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Appellate courts may exercise discretion to independently review the record for error in the same manner as required under People v. Wende when appointed counsel identifies no meritorious issues.
relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate counsel must independently review the record to identify potentially meritorious issues for reversal when the defendant is indigent and counsel finds no issues.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the limited scope of Penal Code section 1172.6 and applies the appropriate standard of review for a prima facie denial. It properly rejects the appellant's argument that the statute allows for a collateral attack on jury instructions in a final case.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The Riverside County Superior Court denied Carlos Segundo-Villa's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on three 2009 premeditated attempted murder convictions at the prima facie stage, finding from the record of conviction that he was the sole perpetrator and that no liability rested on the acts of others. On appeal, counsel filed a Delgadillo brief, appellant filed a supplemental brief arguing ineffective assistance regarding the "kill zone" instruction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed after exercising its discretion to review the record and finding no arguable issue.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that appellant was the sole perpetrator and his liability was not based on the acts of others “The court found appellant was the sole perpetrator and there was no basis for resentencing under section 1172.6.”	unclear	correct	agree with court Section 1172.6 relief for attempted murder is limited to convictions resting on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other imputed-malice theories; a sole, direct perpetrator is ineligible as a matter of law. The opinion does not state the standard of review or cite People v. Lewis, and it does not describe the jury instructions beyond the kill zone instruction, but nothing in the opinion suggests the record of conviction allowed any theory of imputed liability, so the result appears correct.
Rejection of appellant's supplemental-brief claim that counsel was ineffective for not arguing the "kill zone" instruction entitled him to section 1172.6 relief “a resentencing petition under section 1172.6 is not the vehicle to permit a challenge to jury instructions in a case which has long been final on direct appeal.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The kill zone theory is a theory of the direct perpetrator's own concurrent intent to kill, not a theory imputing another person's malice, so it falls outside section 1172.6, and the statute is not a mechanism to relitigate instructional error in a conviction final since 2012. Because the underlying argument lacked merit, counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise it.

Authorities

relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — In an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition, Wende procedures do not apply as a matter of right, but when counsel finds no arguable issues the court must allow the defendant to file a supplemental brief and may exercise discretion to independently review the record.
relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate court independently reviews the entire record for arguable issues when appointed counsel files a no-issue brief.
missed: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition the court may consult the record of conviction but must accept the petitioner's allegations as true and may deny relief only where the record establishes ineligibility as a matter of law without weighing evidence or making credibility determinations.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly explained that section 1172.6 addresses liability imputed from the acts of others and is not a vehicle to attack a kill zone instruction in a long-final conviction, which disposes of appellant's only argument. It did not, however, cite People v. Lewis or articulate the standard of review and legal-ineligibility standard governing prima facie denials, nor describe what in the record of conviction foreclosed any imputed-liability theory.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Segundo-Villa CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086187

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF019391)

CARLOS SEGUNDO-VILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Joshyn Pulliam, Judge. Affirmed. Carlos Segundo-Villa, in pro. per.; and Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. This appeal is from the denial of a petition for resentencing regarding 2009 convictions for three counts of attempted, premeditated murder. The petition was brought under the authority of Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The trial court reviewed the record of conviction and found no evidence of liability based on the acts of others as appellant was the sole 1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. perpetrator of the offense. The court dismissed the petition at the prima facie stage. In 2009, a jury found Carlos Segundo-Villa guilty of three counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and found the alleged firearm enhancements true. In January 2023, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court took judicial notice of the court file and held a hearing. The court found appellant was the sole perpetrator and there was no basis for resentencing under section 1172.6. Appointed counsel did not present any argument in support of the petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel has filed a brief on the authority of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 indicating counsel has not been able to identify any potentially meritorious issue for reversal on appeal. We advised appellant of his right to file his own brief on appeal. Appellant has responded with a supplemental brief. In his brief, appellant claims his counsel was ineffective for not presenting appellant’s view that he is entitled to resentencing because the jury was instructed on the so-called “kill zone” theory of liability for attempting to kill all the persons in that zone. Appellant argues his petition under section 1172.6 should allow him to claim the kill zone jury instruction renders the attempted murder convictions invalid. The difficulty with appellant’s argument is it does not address the purpose of that section. Section 1172.6 allows relief where the defendant’s liability is based on the actions of others. It is not a substitute for appeal on the merits of the conviction. Appellant’s conviction was final in 2012. While 2 there has been considerable litigation of the “kill zone” instruction, a resentencing petition under section 1172.6 is not the vehicle to permit a challenge to jury instructions in a case which has long been final on direct appeal. Appellant has not raised any potentially meritorious issues for reversal of the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing. DISCUSSION Appellate counsel recognizes Delgadillo allows appellate courts to exercise their discretion to independently review the record error in the same manner as required under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have exercised our discretion to review the record for error. We have not discovered any potentially meritorious issues for reversal of the trial court order denying the petition under section 1172.6. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.* WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 3

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Delgadillo S266305 · 2022-12-19
People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12