gno.law

People v. Cole CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D062648 · 2013-10-16 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD210516
Trial judge
Kenneth K. So
Outcome
reversed in part — Reversed in part, affirmed in part.
Area
criminal
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Cynthia Aaron, Patricia D. Benke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:49Z · confidence high

The trial court ordered defendant Cole to pay $400 in restitution to the San Diego Police Department for his own forensic examination and $850 for the victim's forensic examination as conditions of probation. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the $400 award as unauthorized but affirmed the $850 award, finding the issue forfeited and supported by an implied finding of ability to pay.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Award of $400 restitution to SDPD for defendant's forensic examination under Penal Code section 1202.4
“Thus, the $400 restitution award was not authorized.”
de novoerroragree with court
agree with court
Award of $850 restitution to SDPD for victim's forensic examination under Penal Code section 1203.1h, subdivision (b)
“we reject his contention that the [restitution award] must be reversed because the court did not make a finding of [his] ability to pay [it]”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384 — Expenses incurred by a governmental entity for the investigation or prosecution of a crime do not render the government a direct victim of the crime.
  • relied: People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1 — Governmental entities are not direct victims of a crime solely due to costs of investigation or prosecution.
  • relied: People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849 — Only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.
  • relied: People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107 — A narrow exception to the general forfeiture rule applies to obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings.
  • relied: People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466 — A defendant should not be permitted to contest for the first time on appeal the sufficiency of the record to support his ability to pay the fine.
  • relied: People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066 — A defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal of restitution fines imposed without findings or evidence of ability to pay.
  • relied: People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368 — A defendant who does not raise the issue in the trial court cannot contend on appeal that the restitution award must be reversed for lack of an ability-to-pay finding.
  • relied: People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 — A defendant cannot challenge for the first time on appeal an award of a booking fee for lack of substantial evidence of the defendant's ability to pay.
  • relied: People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62 — An implied finding of a defendant's ability to pay attorney fees and costs of probation is supported by substantial evidence.
  • relied: People v. Staley (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 782 — Statutes with similar ability-to-pay language do not require an express finding; ability to pay can be implied.
  • relied: People v. Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830 — An express finding of ability to pay restitution is not required; an implied finding is sufficient if supported by the record.
  • relied: People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1 — Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a trier of fact reasonably could make a finding.
  • relied: People v. Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369 — A probation report may constitute substantial evidence of a defendant's ability to pay restitution.
  • relied: People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126 — A probation report may constitute substantial evidence of a defendant's ability to pay restitution.
  • relied: People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360 — Reversal is required when there is no evidence of the amount law enforcement incurred and the record does not support an inference of a determination on the defendant's ability to pay.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the direct victim requirement of section 1202.4 to reverse the unauthorized restitution award for the defendant's own examination. It also correctly applied the forfeiture rule and the substantial evidence standard to affirm the victim's examination fee, relying on binding Supreme Court precedent (McCullough) and distinguishing prior case law (Wardlow) based on the presence of financial evidence in the record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court, upon granting probation after Cole's negotiated plea to assault with intent to commit sexual penetration and aggravated assault, ordered him to pay $400 restitution to the San Diego Police Department for his own forensic examination under Penal Code section 1202.4 and $850 for the victim's forensic examination under section 1203.1h, subdivision (b), and later executed a suspended five-year prison term after a second probation violation. The Court of Appeal reversed the $400 award on the People's concession that the police department was not a direct victim, and affirmed the $850 award on the grounds that Cole forfeited his ability-to-pay objection and that an implied finding of ability to pay was supported by substantial evidence in the probation report.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Award of $400 restitution to SDPD under section 1202.4 for the cost of Cole's own forensic examination
“Here, the SDPD was not a direct victim of the crime; instead, the costs incurred were for the investigation of a crime. Thus, the $400 restitution award was not authorized.”
unclearerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
Section 1202.4, subdivision (k)(2) limits governmental 'victims' to direct victims, and Martinez and Torres hold that investigative or prosecutorial expenses do not make a government agency a direct victim. The cost of examining the defendant is an investigative expense, so the award was unauthorized; the People's concession was properly accepted.
Award of $850 restitution to SDPD under section 1203.1h, subdivision (b) for the victim's forensic examination — forfeiture of ability-to-pay objection
“Accordingly, Cole, like the defendant in McCullough, forfeited his right to raise the ability-to-pay issue on appeal.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
McCullough squarely held that a defendant who fails to object forfeits an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of evidence of ability to pay a fee under a statute with 'if the person has the ability to pay' language; section 1203.1h(b) is materially identical. Cole also expressly accepted the probation terms, which included the fee. The court's forfeiture analysis is consistent with binding Supreme Court authority.
Implied finding that Cole had the ability to pay the $850 restitution for the victim's forensic examination
“Thus, we conclude the court's implied finding of Cole's ability to pay the award is supported by substantial evidence.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
Phillips, Staley and Hennessey permit an implied ability-to-pay finding where the record supports it, and a probation report can supply that evidence. The report showed a ten-year Navy career, E-6 rank, $2,600 monthly income against $2,000 expenses, savings and real property, and Cole described his finances as 'good'; the court stated it read and considered the report. That is substantial evidence for an $850 obligation, and Wardlow was reasonably distinguished because there the record lacked both the cost of the exam and any basis for an implied finding.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384 — A government agency's expenses incurred in investigating or prosecuting a crime do not make it a direct victim entitled to restitution under section 1202.4.
  • relied: People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1 — Law enforcement investigative costs are not recoverable as victim restitution because the agency is not a direct victim.
  • relied: People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849 — Only claims properly raised and preserved in the trial court are reviewable on appeal.
  • relied: People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107 — The narrow exception to forfeiture applies only to obvious legal sentencing errors correctable without reference to factual findings or remand.
  • relied: People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466 — A defendant may not contest for the first time on appeal the sufficiency of the record to support ability to pay a restitution fine.
  • relied: People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066 — A defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal of fines imposed without findings or evidence of ability to pay.
  • relied: People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368 — Failure to raise ability to pay in the trial court forfeits the claim that a fee must be reversed for lack of an ability-to-pay finding.
  • relied: People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 — A defendant who does not object at sentencing forfeits an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of ability to pay a booking fee under a statute conditioning the fee on ability to pay.
  • relied: People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62 — An implied finding of ability to pay attorney fees and probation costs may be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
  • relied: People v. Staley (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 782 — A statute conditioning a fee on ability to pay does not require an express finding; the finding may be implied from the record, including the probation report.
  • relied: People v. Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830 — An express finding of ability to pay a restitution fine is not required; an implied finding suffices if supported by the record.
  • relied: People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1 — Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the finding.
  • relied: People v. Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369 — A probation report may constitute substantial evidence of a defendant's ability to pay restitution.
  • relied: People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126 — Information in a probation report can support a finding of ability to pay.
  • relied: People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360 — A section 1203.1h reimbursement order must be supported by evidence of the examination cost and some basis for an ability-to-pay determination; distinguished here because the record contained both.
  • missed: People v. Ramirez (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412 — A defendant who did not appeal from the original order granting probation generally cannot challenge the conditions imposed in that order on a later appeal following revocation; the court did not address whether the restitution conditions imposed at the original grant were properly before it.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies section 1202.4(k)(2), Martinez and Torres to strike the unauthorized $400 award, and its forfeiture and implied-finding analysis of the $850 award is squarely supported by McCullough and the cited Court of Appeal decisions, with Wardlow fairly distinguished. It does not address whether a challenge to restitution conditions imposed at the original 2008 grant of probation was timely on an appeal taken after execution of the suspended sentence, an appealability question that a reviewing court ordinarily resolves first, though the result would likely be the same.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 10/16/13 P. v. Cole CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D062648

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD210516)

ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER COLE II,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kenneth K. So, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part.

Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Da Silva and Quisteen S.

Shum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Alexander Christopher Cole II entered a negotiated guilty plea to assault with intent to commit sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a))1 and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court placed Cole on probation for five years with 365 days of jail custody to be served in work furlough.

Eleven months after sentencing, Cole violated his probation by leaving the country without permission. The court revoked probation and sentenced Cole to prison for five years, but suspended execution of the sentence and reinstated probation with an additional 365 days of jail custody. Eighteen months later, Cole violated probation a second time by failing to complete sex offender training. The court revoked probation and executed the previously suspended five-year prison sentence.

Cole appeals, contending the court's award of victim restitution to the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) under section 1202.4, for the cost of Cole's forensic examination, is not permitted. He further contends the award of restitution to the SDPD under section 1203.1h, subdivision (b), for the cost of the victim's forensic examination, is not permitted because the court did not consider Cole's ability to pay.2 We reverse the order requiring Cole to pay $400 in restitution for his forensic examination, and affirm the order requiring him to pay $850 in restitution for the victim's examination.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 In his opening brief, Cole also claimed that in pronouncing his sentence the trial court never awarded victim restitution, and the award for restitution reflected in the minutes and abstract of judgment was a clerical error. However, when the People pointed out in their brief that the court had in fact ordered victim restitution as a condition of granting probation at the sentencing hearing, Cole withdrew that claim. 2 I

FACTS

On December 3, 2007, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Cole sexually assaulted "Jane Doe" outside her home in Pacific Beach. The assault was interrupted when Isaac Mendez came out of a nearby home, after hearing screams, to see what was happening. Cole pushed Mendez and began swinging a motorcycle helmet at him. Mendez tried to run, but Cole chased him and struck him with the helmet.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Restitution for Cole's Forensic Examination Cole contends that the court's $400 restitution award to the SDPD for the cost of his forensic examination was not authorized because the SDPD was not a direct victim of the crime and the restitution award was not otherwise authorized. The People concede the point. We accept the concession.

The statute under which the court awarded the SDPD restitution for the cost of Cole's forensic examination provides in relevant part: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) For purposes of this statute, "victim"

includes "[a] corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other 3 legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(2), italics added.) Expenses incurred by a governmental entity for the investigation or prosecution of a crime do not render the government a direct victim of the crime. (People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384, 393; People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1, 4-5.) Here, the SDPD was not a direct victim of the crime; instead, the costs incurred were for the investigation of a crime. Thus, the $400 restitution award was not authorized.

B. Restitution for Jane Doe's Forensic Examination Cole contends the $850 restitution award to the SDPD for the cost of the forensic examination of Jane Doe was improper because the court never considered his ability to pay, as required by statute. We disagree, for two reasons.

1. Forfeiture of Objection to Ability to Pay Restitution The People argue that Cole forfeited the right to challenge his ability to pay the $850 restitution award by failing to object in the trial court. Cole counters that his failure to object at sentencing does not preclude him from raising the issue on appeal because the plain language of the statute makes a finding of ability to pay a condition precedent to reimbursement. We agree with the People.

We begin by setting out the operative portion of section 1203.1h:

"If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay all or part of the cost of the medical examination, the court may set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay that sum to the law enforcement agency, county, or local governmental agency, in the manner in which the court believes reasonable and compatible with the defendant's financial ability." (§ 1203.1h, subd. (b), italics added.)

4 Cole is thus correct that the statute requires a trial court to determine a defendant's ability to pay before awarding restitution for a victim's forensic examination fee. That does not mean, however, that the issue of the ability to pay need not be raised in the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal.

"As a general rule, only 'claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.' " (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) A narrow exception to the general forfeiture rule applies to " 'obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings.' " (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1113.) The "appropriateness of a restitution fine is fact specific," however, and "as a matter of fairness to the People, a defendant should not be permitted to contest for the first time on appeal the sufficiency of the record to support his ability to pay the fine." (People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468.) Thus, a defendant "cannot complain for the first time on appeal of restitution fines imposed without findings or evidence of ability to pay" them.

(People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1072.) "Since [Cole] did not raise the issue in the trial court, we reject his contention that the [restitution award] must be reversed because the court did not make a finding of [his] ability to pay [it], and nothing in the record shows he had the ability to pay." (People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368, 371.)

Moreover, our Supreme Court recently rejected an argument similar to Cole's in People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, where it held that a defendant cannot challenge for the first time on appeal an award of a booking fee for lack of substantial 5 evidence of the defendant's ability to pay. The statute at issue in McCullough "provide[d]

that '[i]f the person has the ability to pay, a judgment of conviction shall contain an order for payment of ' the booking fee." (Id. at p. 592, quoting Gov. Code, § 29550.2, subd. (a).) The statute at issue here has substantially similar language: "If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay all or part of the cost of the medical examination, the court may set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay that sum . . . ." (§ 1203.1h, subd. (b).) Also here, as in McCullough, the trial court did not make an express determination of the defendant's ability to pay, and the defendant failed to object at the time the court imposed the fee. (McCullough, at p. 591.)

Accordingly, Cole, like the defendant in McCullough, forfeited his right to raise the ability-to-pay issue on appeal. (Id. at pp. 591, 599.)

Furthermore, not only did Cole fail to raise the issue below, he affirmatively accepted probation on the terms of the order granting probation, which included the condition that he pay restitution for the forensic examination. Both the proposed order granting probation and the probation report, which were provided to Cole before sentencing, included the restitution fee as a condition of probation. The court gave Cole ample opportunity to raise the issue of his ability to pay when it asked if he accepted probation on the terms provided. If Cole was unable to pay the restitution fee, he should have said so when he was granted probation and not waited to raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

6 2. Implied Finding of Ability to Pay Supported by Substantial Evidence The People argue that even if Cole's objection was properly preserved for appeal, the trial court need not have made an express finding of his ability to pay the $850 restitution award because the court implicitly found Cole had the ability to pay, and this finding is supported by substantial evidence. Cole counters the award "should be stricken for lack of a finding of [his] ability to pay." Again, we agree with the People.

As noted earlier, the plain language of section 1203.1h, subdivision (b), required the court determine the defendant's ability to pay before awarding restitution for a victim's examination fee. Where a statute requires a finding of ability to pay, we may imply such a finding as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 71, 76 [implied finding of defendant's ability to pay attorney fees and costs of probation supported by substantial evidence]; People v. Staley (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 782, 785-786 [Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a), which has similar ability-to-pay language, does not require an express finding of ability to pay;

ability to pay can be implied]; People v. Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1836- 1837 [express finding of ability to pay restitution fine not required; implied finding sufficient if supported by record].) Substantial evidence is "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value" from which a trier of fact reasonably could make a finding.

(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) A probation report may constitute substantial evidence of a defendant's ability to pay restitution. (See, e.g., People v. Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1377; Staley, at p. 786; People v. Hartley (1984)

163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130 & fn. 3.)

7 Here, the record contains substantial evidence to support an implied finding of an ability to pay. The probation report stated Cole was a recruiter in the Navy, where he had worked for about 10 years, and earned the rank of E-6. His monthly income was $2,600, and his monthly expenses were $2,000. He owed $12,000 on his motorcycle and car, had some money saved in the bank, and owned a property in Texas with his siblings. Further, Cole described his financial situation to the probation officer as "good." The trial court signed the probation report, stating that it read and considered the report. During sentencing, the court stated that it had considered Cole's job, status, and rank in the Navy.

Cole did not assert he was unable to pay the $850 restitution award — in fact, he accepted the terms of probation, which included the condition that he pay the award — and nothing in the record indicates he does not have the ability to pay it. Thus, we conclude the court's implied finding of Cole's ability to pay the award is supported by substantial evidence.

Cole contends this court's prior decision in People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360 requires reversal of the order that he pay $850 in restitution for Jane Doe's examination. We disagree. Wardlow is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence of the amount that law enforcement incurred in performing the examination, and the record did not support an inference the trial court had made a determination, express or implied, on the defendant's ability to pay. (Id. at pp. 371-372 & fn. 7.) Here, by contrast, the record contains evidence of the cost of the examination, and it supports the trial court's implied finding of Cole's ability to pay.

8 DISPOSITION

The order requiring Cole to pay $400 in restitution for his forensic examination is reversed. The order requiring Cole to pay $850 in restitution for the victim's forensic examination is affirmed. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment eliminating the $400 restitution award, and shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus