Melchor Karl T. Limpin v. Ascendiun, Inc., et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed Plaintiff's motion to remand based on the argument that Defendant's removal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after service of the initial pleading. The court granted the motion to remand the case to state court but denied Plaintiff's request for Rule 11 sanctions and costs.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Remand Granted“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. (ECF No. 2.)” | agree with court The court correctly applied the strict construction standard for removal statutes. The record established that the defendant was served with the full complaint on August 1, 2025, which triggered the 30-day removal clock under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The defendant filed the notice of removal on September 25, 2025, which is 55 days after service, making the removal untimely. The defendant's attempt to argue that service was not complete until August 27 was contradicted by their own supplemental declaration admitting receipt of the full complaint on August 1. Therefore, the remand was the only legally available outcome. |
Request for Sanctions and Costs Denied“Finding no bad faith, the Court DENIES the request for sanctions.” | agree with court The court denied sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) based on a finding of 'no bad faith.' While the defendant's initial declaration contained a factual error regarding the service date, the court likely determined that this was not a violation of Rule 11 or an abuse of process warranting sanctions, as the defendant eventually corrected the record. The standard for sanctions is high, and the court's discretion in denying them based on the absence of bad faith is generally respected. |
The order itself: sound — The court's reasoning is sound. It correctly identified the legal standard for timely removal, applied the facts admitted by the defendant (service on August 1, 2025) to that standard, and concluded that the removal was untimely. The court also appropriately exercised its discretion in denying sanctions, noting the lack of bad faith. The order is concise and directly addresses the issues raised in the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 MELCHOR KARL T. LIMPIN, Case No. 25-cv-2598-BAS-JLB 14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 15 v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND (ECF No. 2) 16 ASCENDIUN, INC., et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Melchor Karl T. Limpin’s motion to remand. 20 (ECF No. 2.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s motion suitable for determination on the papers 21 submitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the 22 Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff filed a complaint and first amended complaint in state court. (ECF No. 1- 25 2.) Plaintiff brought several California state law claims and sued multiple defendants. (Id.) 26 Defendant SCAN Health Plan then filed a notice of removal, claiming federal question and 27 federal officer removal. (ECF No. 1); 28 U.S.C. § 1441; 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Defendant filed 28 the notice on September 25, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) 1 As relevant here, the notice of removal stated that Defendant was served with a 2 complaint on August 1, 2025. (Id. ¶ 1.) The notice further stated that Defendant received a 3 first amended complaint on August 27, 2025. (Id. ¶ 2.) 4 In response to the notice of removal, Plaintiff files a motion to remand. (ECF No. 5 2.) Part of Plaintiff’s motion argues that Defendant untimely removed. (Id.) Plaintiff 6 maintains that the thirty-day clock started to tick on August 1, 2025, establishing a deadline 7 of August 31, 2025. (Id.) Defendant’s brief, however, discusses only the date of August 8 27, 2025, making the deadline September 26, 2025, so that Defendant timely filed the 9 notice. (Opp’n 5:26, ECF No. 21.) Moreover, Defendant’s counsel submitted a declaration 10 in support of the opposition to remand, suggesting that Defendant was only served on 11 August 27, 2025, and the sheriff department’s documentation contained a mistake. (ECF 12 No. 21-1.) 13 To resolve this dispute, the Court ordered Defendant to show cause. (ECF No. 25.) 14 Specifically, the Court asked Defendant to resolve the discrepancy between the admitted 15 August 1 service date in the notice of removal and the August 27 service date in the 16 briefing. (Id.) The Court stated: “Defendants can show cause by submitting a declaration, 17 on penalty of perjury, regarding whether […] SCAN Health Plan received service of 18 process of the original complaint on August 1, 2025 and explaining why, if not, their notice 19 of remand lists a service date of August 1, 2025.” (Id.) 20 Defendant’s counsel responded to the Court’s Order through a declaration, stating: 21 “Defendant SCAN Health Plan (‘SCAN’) acknowledges that, on August 1, 2025, it 22 received limited documents purporting to relate to this action. However, the materials that 23 it received on that date did not include a full copy of the Complaint sufficient to constitute 24 service of the ‘initial pleading’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) or to allow 25 me, as SCAN’s legal counsel, to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the information 26 that was received included the Summons, the cover page of the Complaint filed on 27 December 16, 2024, and a Notice of Case Assignment and Case Management Conference.” 28 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff objected. (ECF No. 27.) 1 Then, a couple weeks later, Defendant filed a supplemental declaration. (ECF No. 2 28.) Defendant’s attorney undertook an additional internal review of the materials in the 3 firm’s possession. (Id.) This supplemental declaration stated: “After conducting a further 4 investigation with SCAN, and reviewing archived service records and internal document 5 repositories, we were able to confirm that SCAN did, in fact, receive a full copy of the 6 Complaint on or about August 1, 2025.” (Id. ¶ 6.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Ordinarily, “[r]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed, and any doubts as to the 9 right of removal must be resolved in favor of remanding to state court.” Durham v. 10 Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). 11 “The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days 12 after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 13 pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based. . 14 . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1442 federal officer removal, a “federal 15 officer defendant’s thirty days to remove commence when the plaintiff discloses sufficient 16 facts for federal officer removal.” Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253. 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 Here, the supplemental declaration admits that Defendant was served with the 19 complaint on August 1, 2025. Defendant’s supplemental declaration further concedes that 20 the complaint provided sufficient notice. In other words, Defendant does not contest that 21 the complaint had sufficient information regarding the grounds for federal question and 22 federal officer removal. Given that Defendant’s counsel concedes service, the complaint 23 served on August 1, 2025, constitutes the initial pleading. Starting the clock on August 1, 24 2025, Defendant’s deadline to file a notice of removal was August 31, 2025. Thus, when 25 Defendant filed the notice on September 25, 2025, it was several weeks late. Seeing no 26 other argument from Defendant and according to the statutory requirements, the Court must 27 find the removal untimely. 28 1 Finally, Plaintiff seeks sanctions for costs and actual expenses under Rule 11(c) and 2 ||28 U.S.C. 1447(c). (ECF No. 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for expenses 3 ||incurred by himself and the sheriffs. (/d.) Finding no bad faith, the Court DENIES the 4 request for sanctions. 5 |}IV. CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. (ECF No. 2.) But the Court 7 || DENIES sanctions or costs. (/d.) The Court remands the case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ~ 10 || DATED: January 30, 2026 (yi. Duhark 1 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4A.