People v. Compre CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN365678
- Trial judge
- David G. Brown
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Laurence D. Rubin, Michele M. Castillo
Analysis
The trial court denied Compre's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, concluding his guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter established he was a direct perpetrator and thus ineligible for relief. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the plea did not conclusively establish ineligibility because it did not rule out conviction under the now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage“We review de novo the trial court’s resentencing denial at the prima facie stage. (Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211.)” | de novo | error | agree with court The trial court erred by concluding that the record of conviction conclusively established ineligibility for relief. The appellate court correctly applied the standard from People v. Gaillard, noting that a guilty plea to a lesser included offense does not automatically preclude a claim that the conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which is a specific theory of aiding and abetting. Because the plea's factual basis was generic and did not specify the theory of liability, the trial court was required to issue an order to show cause rather than deny the petition summarily. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — Establishes the prima facie standard for section 1172.6 petitions, requiring the court to accept the petitioner's factual allegations as true and deny the petition only if the record conclusively establishes ineligibility.
- relied: People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206 — Clarifies that section 1172.6 applies to those who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder, and that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is one theory of aiding and abetting that does not preclude relief if not conclusively ruled out by the record.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established legal standard from People v. Lewis and People v. Gaillard to the specific facts of the case. It accurately identifies that a generic plea to a lesser included offense does not conclusively establish the theory of liability, thereby requiring further proceedings.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court summarily denied Jose Domingo Compre's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference, that the peace-officer victim took him outside the amended felony-murder rule, and that he was convicted as a direct perpetrator or aider and abettor rather than under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Court of Appeal, accepting the Attorney General's concession of error, reviewed de novo, held the record of conviction (a generic plea to voluntary manslaughter admitting he aided and abetted a murder) did not conclusively foreclose a natural and probable consequences theory, reversed, and remanded with instructions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Summary denial of the section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that Compre's plea established conviction as a direct perpetrator or direct aider and abettor rather than under the natural and probable consequences doctrine“The court did not consider that the invalid natural and probable consequences theory could be subsumed in Compre’s plea.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Under Lewis the trial court at the prima facie stage must accept the petition's allegations as true and may deny only if the record of conviction conclusively establishes ineligibility as a matter of law. Compre pled to voluntary manslaughter after being charged with murder, and his admission that he 'aided and abetted' a murder is consistent with the natural and probable consequences theory, which Gaillard correctly describes as one theory of aiding and abetting. The complaint did not allege he was the shooter, so the record did not foreclose the invalid theory. The trial court also mischaracterized the conviction as attempted murder, which the opinion notes is undisputedly wrong. The one open question the opinion does not squarely address is whether the admitted personal discharge of a firearm (section 12022.5, subd. (a)) could show Compre was the actual killer; but with a separate assault-with-a-firearm count charged and a generic factual basis, that admission does not conclusively establish he fired the fatal shot, so the result is correct. |
Alternative grounds for denial: that Compre was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, and that the amended felony-murder rule did not apply because the victim was a peace officer“reasoning Compre was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, that the changes in the felony murder rule did not apply to him because the victim was a peace officer” | de novo | not reached | unsure The Court of Appeal reversed on the natural and probable consequences ground and did not separately analyze these alternative rationales. Under Lewis, a trial court may not engage in factfinding or weigh evidence at the prima facie stage, so a finding of major participation and reckless indifference without an evidentiary hearing would have been improper unless the record of conviction compelled it; nothing in the opinion suggests it did. The peace-officer exception in section 189, subdivision (f), concerns felony-murder liability and would not foreclose relief where the petition rests on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Because the appellate court did not address these grounds, I cannot assess them beyond noting they appear unsupported on this record. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.4th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition the court accepts the petitioner's allegations as true, may consult the record of conviction, and may deny relief only if the record conclusively establishes ineligibility as a matter of law; otherwise it must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Correct reporter citation is 11 Cal.5th 952.)
- relied: People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206 — Section 1172.6 applies to defendants who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder; denial at the prima facie stage is reviewed de novo; the natural and probable consequences doctrine is one theory of aiding and abetting, so a generic plea admission to aiding and abetting a murder does not establish ineligibility as a matter of law.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court applied the correct prima facie standard from Lewis and the directly on-point holding of Gaillard, and the trial court's reasoning (including its mistaken reference to an attempted murder conviction) plainly did not satisfy the conclusive-ineligibility requirement, so the reversal is well supported. The opinion, however, does not explicitly address whether Compre's admission that he personally discharged a firearm bears on whether he was the actual killer, nor does it address the trial court's improper prima facie-stage factfinding on major participation and reckless indifference, leaving small gaps in an otherwise correct, concession-based decision.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Compre CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085962
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN365678)
v.
JOSE DOMINGO COMPRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David G. Brown, Judge. Reversed. Annie Fraser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Seth M. Friedman and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jose Domingo Compre appeals an order summarily denying his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. The People concede error. We accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand with instructions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Given the nature of this appeal, a lengthy recitation of the facts is not necessary. The People charged Compre with the murder of a police officer and assault with a semiautomatic firearm upon another. In 2018, Compre pled guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, admitting a firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1), (c)). In his plea, Compre admitted that he “aided and abetted the murder of a police officer and did so in association with a criminal street gang,” admitting he personally discharged a firearm. Pursuant to his plea, the court sentenced Compre to a prison term of 25 years. Effective January 2019, the Legislature amended the law to eliminate liability for murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or theories of imputed malice predicated solely on one’s participation in a crime. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) As relevant here, section 1172.6 “applies to those who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder and who would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a felony-murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211 (Gaillard).) Section 1172.6 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 provides a procedure for defendants convicted under the now invalid theories to seek resentencing. In 2023, Compre petitioned the court for resentencing under what is now section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief, reasoning Compre was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, that the changes in the felony murder rule did not apply to him because the victim was a peace officer, and that he “was convicted of attempted murder as a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, rather than under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”2 DISCUSSION Compre contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage because his plea does not eliminate the possibility of being convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People concede error, and we agree. A trial court considering a section 1172.6 petition must first determine whether the petitioner made a prima facie showing he or she could not presently be convicted under the amended laws. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In doing so, the court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true. (Ibid.) “The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction”—which includes facts admitted in a guilty plea— “conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” (Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211.) Otherwise, the court 2 It is undisputed that Compre was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not attempted murder.
3 must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, at p. 971.) We review de novo the trial court’s resentencing denial at the prima facie stage. (Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211.) Here, as the People concede, the record did not foreclose the possibility that Compre was convicted under the invalid natural and probable consequences theory. The complaint did not allege that Compre was the individual who shot the victim and there was no bar to the People proceeding on a theory of natural and probable consequences. Nor did the factual basis rule out use of the now disfavored theory. His admissions and factual basis for the guilty plea were generic and did not establish the specific theory of aiding and abetting under which Compre admitted guilt. Accordingly, they do not establish that Compre is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. He pled that he aided and abetted a murder, but “[t]he natural and probable consequences doctrine is one theory of aiding and abetting.” (Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1212, italics added.) The court did not consider that the invalid natural and probable consequences theory could be subsumed in Compre’s plea. We therefore agree that Compre’s petition should have proceeded past the prima facie stage to an evidentiary hearing.
4 DISPOSITION We reverse the trial court’s order denying the resentencing petition. On remand, the trial court is instructed to issue an order to show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).) We express no opinion on the appropriate outcome of such hearing.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Lewis S260598 · 2021-07-26