Pedro Diaz Jimenez v. Christopher LaRose, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Pedro Jimenez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention, arguing he is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court denied summary dismissal, finding the claim has potential merit, and ordered the government to state by January 30, 2026, whether it will concede the claim or file an answer by February 3, 2026.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of summary dismissal of the habeas petition“This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, which requires that the petition be plainly without merit. Given the recitation of numerous recent district court decisions across the country finding that § 1226, not § 1225, governs the detention of similarly situated individuals, the court's determination that the petition has potential merit is supported by the cited authorities. |
Order requiring the government to file a brief stating whether it concedes the claim or will answer the petition“by Friday, January 30, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2) intends to concede his right to a bond hearing under that authority. If respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by February 3, 2026.” | agree with court The court exercised its inherent authority to manage the docket and facilitate the resolution of the case. Given the high rate of government concessions in similar cases, as noted by the court, this procedural order is a reasonable and efficient method to resolve the petition. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the standard for summary dismissal of a habeas petition and applies it to the facts presented. It cites a substantial body of recent, persuasive district court authority from multiple jurisdictions that supports the petitioner's statutory interpretation. The court's conclusion that the petition has potential merit is well-supported, and the procedural order to compel a concession or an answer is a sound exercise of judicial authority to manage the case efficiently.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Pedro Diaz JIMENEZ, Case No.: 26-cv-0483-AGS-AHG 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 Christopher LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 Petitioner Pedro Jimenez seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 9 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is 10 sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 11 the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly 12 appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 13 relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to 14 any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 15 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 16 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is 17 not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 18 In October 2018, Jimenez, “a citizen of Guatemala,” entered the United States and 19 was “released” “on his own recognizance.” (ECF 1, at 1–2.) Respondents “re-detained” 20 him in “December 2025,” and Jimenez now challenges the government’s decision to 21 subject him to mandatory detention under “8 U.S.C. § 1225,” which applies to applicants 22 for admission. (Id. at 1, 4.) He asserts that his case is instead governed by “8 U.S.C. 23 § 1226”—which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole—because he is not an 24 applicant for admission. (Id. at 8.) This statutory misclassification, he argues, renders his 25 detention “unlawful.” (Id. at 1.) 26 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 27 identical cases across the country have succeeded, including a class action dealing with 28 1 || this very question. See Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 2 || WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (class action final judgment); Barco Mercado 3 Francis, ___ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 4 ||(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, 5 ||the petitioners “prevailed, cither on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were 6 || “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. 7 || Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 8 || (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 9 ||not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 10 ||/01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 11 ||v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 12 ||2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 13 || statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”). 14 Recently, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by those 15 || who are in petitioner’s position. So, by Friday, January 30, 2026, the government is 16 || ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 17 (2) intends to concede his right to a bond hearing under that authority. If respondents 18 || do not concede, they must answer the petition by February 3, 2026. 19 Dated: January 27, 2026 1 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28