L.J. v. Christopher LaROSE, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner L.J. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, arguing he is instead subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court denied summary dismissal, finding the claim has potential merit, and ordered the government to state by January 29, 2026, whether it concedes the statutory basis and the right to a bond hearing.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of summary dismissal of the habeas petition“This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, which requires that the petition be plainly without merit. Given the recitation of numerous recent district court decisions finding that § 1226(a) governs the detention of similarly situated individuals, the court's determination that the claim has potential merit is supported by the cited record. |
Order requiring government to file a brief stating whether it concedes the statutory basis and right to a bond hearing“by Thursday, January 29, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede his right to a bond hearing under that authority.” | agree with court The court exercised its inherent authority to manage the docket and facilitate resolution, noting that respondents have routinely conceded these claims. This is a procedural order consistent with the court's findings on the merits. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions and cites a substantial body of recent district court authority supporting the petitioner's position. The court's decision to deny summary dismissal and order the government to respond is procedurally sound and consistent with the cited legal trends.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 L.J., Case No.: 26-cv-0463-AGS-KSC 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 Christopher LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner L.J. seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 10 immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is sufficiently 11 cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 12 States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from 13 the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 14 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus 15 petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims 16 that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) 17 (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or 18 incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 In August 2024, L.J., “a Venezuelan asylum seeker,” entered the United States. 20 (ECF 1, at 2.) “Border agents briefly apprehended him” before they “released him . . . via 21 humanitarian parole.” (Id.) “[A]lmost 8 months” later, the government “ordered him to 22 appear for an in-person check-in and arrested him.” (Id. at 3.) He remains in custody and 23 appears to be challenging the government’s decision to subject him to mandatory detention 24 under “8 U.S.C. § 1225,” which applies to applicants for admission. (Id. at 5.) He asserts 25 that his case is instead governed by “8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”—which authorizes release on 26 bond or conditional parole—because he is not an applicant for admission. (Id. at 23.) This 27 statutory misclassification, he argues, renders his detention “unlawful[].” (Id. at 2.) 28 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 1 ||identical cases across the country have succeeded, including a class action dealing with 2 || this very question. See Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 3 || WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (class action final judgment); Barco Mercado 4 ||v. Francis, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 5 ||(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, 6 || the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were 7 “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. 8 || Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 9 || (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 10 |/not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 11 }}01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 12 ||v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 13 |}2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 14 || statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”’). 15 Recently, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by those 16 || who are in petitioner’s position. So, by Thursday, January 29, 2026, the government is 17 || ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 18 |} and (2) intends to concede his right to a bond hearing under that authority. If respondents 19 || do not concede, they must answer the petition by February 2, 2026. 20 || Dated: January 26, 2026 2 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28