gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-00457 · 2026-01-26 · Unknown

Harman Singh v. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:42Z · confidence high

Petitioner Harman Singh filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention and the denial of a bond hearing based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado. The court denied summary dismissal, finding the claim sufficiently cognizable, and ordered the government to file a brief by January 30, 2026, stating whether it concedes Singh is part of the Maldonado Bautista class and his right to a bond hearing, or to answer the petition.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of summary dismissal of the habeas petition
“This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, which requires that the petition be plainly without merit. By citing Neiss v. Bludworth and noting that a petition with 'any potential merit' should not be dismissed, the court adhered to established Ninth Circuit precedent. The court’s reliance on a substantial body of recent district court decisions (Maldonado Bautista, Barco Mercado, Mosqueda, etc.) finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) likely governs the detention of similarly situated individuals provides a strong factual and legal basis for concluding that Singh’s claim is not frivolous. Therefore, the decision to require a response is legally sound.
Order requiring government response or concession by January 30, 2026
“So, by Friday, January 30, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees he is part of that class and (2) intends to concede his right to bond hearing under that authority. If respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by January 30, 2026.”
agree with court
The court’s order to require a response or concession is a standard procedural mechanism in habeas litigation to expedite resolution, particularly when the government has a pattern of conceding similar claims. Given the court’s finding that the claim has potential merit and the cited trend of government concessions in the Maldonado Bautista class action, this procedural order is appropriate and within the court’s discretion to manage the docket.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the standard for summary dismissal of a § 2241 petition and applies it to the facts presented. The court’s reliance on a large body of recent, consistent district court decisions (including a class action final judgment) to find that the petition has 'potential merit' is a reasonable and well-supported basis for denying summary dismissal. The subsequent order to require a response or concession is a standard and appropriate case management tool. There are no significant gaps in the reasoning for this preliminary stage of the litigation.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Harman Singh SINGH, Case No.: 26-cv-0457-AGS-AHG 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RETURN 5 v. 6 WARDEN OF IMPERIAL REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Harman Singh seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 10 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is 11 sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 12 the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly 13 appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 14 relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to 15 any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 16 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 17 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is 18 not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 “On March 2, 2023,” Singh, a citizen of “India,” entered the United States “without 20 inspection.” (ECF 1, at 10.) Thereafter, respondents “initiated removal proceedings against 21 Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and filed his Notice to Appear.” (Id. at 11.) Over two 22 years after entering the United States, on “December 5, 2025,” respondents arrested him, 23 and he “has been in custody” since. (Id. at 5.) When he sought a bond hearing, “the 24 Immigration Judge expressly indicated that she would deny Petitioner’s bond request as a 25 matter of law pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), on the 26 asserted ground that the Immigration Court lacked authority to conduct an individualized 27 custody determination.” (Id. at 11.) In addition to other claims, he argues that this action 28 1 “violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.” (/d. at 14.) 2 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 3 ||identical cases across the country have succeeded, including a class action dealing with 4 || this very question. See Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 5 || WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (class action final judgment); Barco Mercado 6 Francis, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, 8 ||the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were 9 || “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. 10 || Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 11 (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 12 || not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 13 |}01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 14 || v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 15 }}2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 16 statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”’). 17 Recently, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by 18 petitioners who are members of the Maldonado Bautista class, as plaintiff asserts. (See 19 || ECF 1, at 2.) So, by Friday, January 30, 2026, the government is ordered to file a brief 20 || stating whether it: (1) agrees he is part of that class and (2) intends to concede his right to 21 bond hearing under that authority. If respondents do not concede, they must answer the 22 || petition by January 30, 2026. 23 Dated: January 26, 2026 5 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 26 27 28