In re L.S. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D087207 · 2026-03-12 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J520810
Trial judge: Daniela Reali-Ferrari
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: dependency
Panel: Truc T. Do (author), Judith D. McConnell, O'Rourke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:29Z · confidence high

The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable means to protect the child's physical health without removal, based on the mother's lack of insight into domestic violence and failure to follow court orders. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings under the high probability standard.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Disposition order removing child from mother's physical custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1). “We conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s September 19, 2025 order.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, which requires viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determining if a reasonable factfinder could find the facts highly probable. The court properly noted that the trial court was bound by the higher clear and convincing evidence standard, and the record contained sufficient evidence of the mother's lack of insight and failure to protect the child to support the finding that no reasonable means existed to protect the child without removal.

Authorities

relied: In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Section 361, subdivision (c) focuses on averting harm to the child, and the court may consider a parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances when determining if removal is necessary.
relied: Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 — The substantial evidence standard asks whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable the fact was true.
relied: In re K.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 910 — Accords with the substantial evidence standard for reviewing disposition orders, requiring a finding of high probability.
relied: In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166 — A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a child's best interest when crafting a disposition order.
relied: In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944 — Review of a disposition order is for substantial evidence, bearing in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
relied: In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227 — The appellant bears the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the dispositional removal order.
relied: In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37 — The primary goal of the dependency statutes is to ensure the safety, protection, and well-being of a child.
relied: In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533 — The child's best interest is of paramount concern in dependency proceedings.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to the specific factual findings of the trial court, focusing on the mother's lack of insight and failure to follow protective orders. It addresses the appellant's argument regarding the shelter by noting the mother was in the early stages of addressing the protective issue, which is a defensible legal conclusion based on the record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The juvenile court sustained a section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition based on the parents' pattern of domestic violence and, at the September 19, 2025 disposition hearing, found by clear and convincing evidence that there were no reasonable means to protect L.S.'s physical health short of removal, ordering him to remain placed with the maternal grandmother while Mother received reunification services. On appeal Mother challenged only the 'no reasonable means' finding, arguing she had secured housing in a domestic violence shelter, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding substantial evidence under the heightened clear-and-convincing lens supported the finding.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Dispositional removal order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1), specifically the finding that there were no reasonable means to protect L.S.'s physical health without removing him from Mother's physical custody “Evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother lacked insight into the protective issue, which endangered L.S.’s “physical health” and made his continued removal necessary.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The court correctly framed review under Conservatorship of O.B., asking whether a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that no reasonable alternative to removal existed. The record it recounts—Mother's repeated contact with Father despite a CPO and a prior dependency, her voluntary dismissal of the DVRO, the May 2025 incident in L.S.'s presence, her lies to police on July 19, 2025, evidence she was with Father days after detention, her violation of the visitation order, and her testimony showing she viewed a reliable car and not answering the door as domestic violence prevention—reasonably supports an inference that Mother could not yet be relied on to keep Father away from the child. The court also directly answered Mother's single argument (the shelter), noting she had been there only weeks and had not begun the domestic violence therapy in her case plan. Mother did not challenge the substantial-danger finding, so the court's narrow focus was appropriate. The opinion's statement that it concluded there was a 'high probability' a fact finder would so find is loosely phrased but does not alter the substance of the O.B. standard.

Authorities

relied: Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 — When reviewing a finding made under the clear and convincing standard, the appellate court asks whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable the fact was true, viewing the record favorably to the prevailing party and deferring to credibility determinations.
relied: In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Removal under section 361, subdivision (c) does not require that the parent be dangerous or the child actually harmed; the statute focuses on averting harm, and the court may consider past conduct and present circumstances.
relied: In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944 — A disposition order is reviewed for substantial evidence bearing in mind the trial court's heightened clear and convincing evidence standard.
relied: In re K.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 910 — Applies the Conservatorship of O.B. formulation of substantial evidence review to dependency removal findings.
relied: In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227 — The appellant bears the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the dispositional removal order.
relied: In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166 — The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a child's best interest in crafting a disposition order.
relied: In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37 — The primary goal of the dependency statutes is to ensure the safety, protection, and well-being of the child.
relied: In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533 — The child's best interest is the paramount concern in dependency proceedings.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the correct O.B. standard, marshals specific record facts, and answers Mother's sole argument about the shelter with record-based reasons, so the result is well supported. It does not, however, discuss the juvenile court's obligation under section 361, subdivision (e) to consider reasonable efforts to prevent removal or address the body of Court of Appeal authority on alternatives to removal (such as unannounced visits or in-home services), and it never squarely explains why protective measures like the CPO plus shelter residence and supervision would be inadequate, leaving the 'no reasonable means' analysis somewhat compressed.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 3/12/26 In re L.S. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND D087207 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J520810)

v. MELISSA P., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed. Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Melissa P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order removing her child L.S. from her physical custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 361, subd. (c)(1).) She contends no substantial evidence supports the court’s finding there was “no reasonable means” by which L.S.’s “physical health” could be protected short of removal. We conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s September 19, 2025 order. BACKGROUND I. Dependency History Between July 2021 and June 2022, Mother and S.S. (Father), who is not a party to the appeal, participated in court-ordered family maintenance services due to domestic violence. In one incident in June 2021, Mother asked Father to prepare a bottle for L.S., who was lying next to her. Father returned to their bedroom with a “metal object” and used it to “ ‘smash[ ]’ ” Mother in the face, causing her to suffer a black eye and a cut that required 12 stitches to close and left a scar. Mother initially told the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) that she and L.S. would be moving out-of-county to live with the maternal grandmother. Mother, however, changed her mind to keep the family intact. As part of the family maintenance case, she completed all services including for domestic violence. On termination of the case in June 2022, Mother received physical custody of L.S.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 That same month, the family court issued a criminal protective order (CPO) against Father. The CPO allowed for “peaceful contact” between the parents. The court, however, subsequently deleted that provision at Mother’s request. The modified CPO, which expired in February 2026, required Father to stay 100 yards away from Mother and prevented any “personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact.” In early February 2023, the family court granted Mother’s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Father. In an August 6, 2024 minute order, the family court expressed “concern[ ]” the parents were violating the DVRO while also acknowledging the CPO. At Mother’s request, the court at that hearing dissolved the DVRO and set a visitation schedule for Father. II. The Petition Between May and July 2025, there were additional incidents of domestic violence between the parents. In May, Father pushed Mother out of his truck, after he told her, “ ‘I’m going to kill you.’ ” L.S. was in the backseat during this incident. On July 13, Father shoved Mother to the ground, causing her to suffer scratches on her back. A few days later, he called law enforcement to report a physical altercation with Mother. During this incident, she entered Father’s home and locked herself inside. Father responded by breaking a window to gain entry. Law enforcement arrested Father for violating the CPO and for domestic violence, corporal injury to a spouse. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.6, subd. (a), 273.5, subd. (a), respectively.) On July 19, 2025, law enforcement responded to a report that Father was at Mother’s home. Mother refused to allow the officers inside, first claiming she was “nude” and later that she was “sick.” Mother also told the 3 officers Father already had left and that the reported disturbance was her “yelling” at L.S. because “she was pregnant.” Mother eventually admitted Father was inside and officers arrested him for violating the CPO. During the Agency’s investigation, Mother was “secretive about her location, delayed contact with the Agency, and was reluctant to give the Agency access to L.S. for an interview.” Despite the prior dependency, the Agency opined Mother lacked insight and maturity when discussing the “protective issue” of domestic violence. On August 11, 2025, the Agency filed a petition on L.S.’s behalf under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), due to the parents’ “pattern of domestic violence including a prior dependency case . . . , which remain[ed] untreated and place[d L.S.] at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” The Agency also sought a protective custody warrant to remove L.S. from Mother’s care, which the juvenile court granted that same day. III. Detention At the August 13, 2025 detention hearing, the juvenile court made a prima facie finding on the petition, removed L.S. from Mother’s physical custody, and placed him with the paternal aunt. The court ordered (1) the parents not to be at or near the property of the paternal aunt and (2) the Agency to coordinate all visitation, including virtual visitation. During that hearing, L.S.’s counsel reported L.S. “was able to express the fighting he has witnessed between his mother and his father.” Less than a week after the hearing, the paternal aunt reported she no longer could care for L.S. due to “stress,” as Mother was messaging her stating the aunt was a “ ‘monster’ ” for not allowing Mother to see L.S. The paternal aunt informed the Agency that the parents had been together 4 between August 16 and 18, 2025, and stated she wanted no further contact with them because they were “not following the CPO.” At a special hearing on August 26, the juvenile court placed L.S. with the maternal grandmother. IV. Jurisdiction/Disposition The Agency’s jurisdiction/disposition and addendum reports expressed concern for L.S.’s physical safety due to (1) the parents’ ongoing domestic violence; (2) Mother’s attempts to minimize the potential harm to L.S., including repeatedly lying to law enforcement; and (3) unresolved questions about her “mental health.” The Agency opined Mother had not learned the skills to be protective of L.S. and lacked insight regarding how her relationship with Father and their domestic violence impacted the child’s well-being. As relevant here, the Agency recommended (1) a true finding on the petition; (2) that L.S. remain out of the home; and (3) that Mother (i) receive reunification services including for domestic violence through individualized therapy, (ii) continue with supervised visitation, and (iii) follow the terms of the CPO. At the September 19, 2025 contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, a social worker testified the Agency had recommended removal of L.S. from Mother’s physical custody because of the parents’ ongoing domestic violence and her refusal to cooperate with the Agency. During the trial, the social worker was asked about attendance sheets Mother had previously provided to the Agency purportedly showing L.S. was in daycare when some of the domestic violence incidents occurred in July 2025. The social worker, however, questioned the veracity of the attendance sheets, testifying they were missing dates and showed L.S. was signed in and out at exactly the same time each day (i.e., 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.).

5 The Agency requested that Mother participate in individual therapy to “tackle domestic violence” and her “mental health” behaviors. Mother, however, claimed she was doing individual counseling with her provider from the prior dependency, which was contrary to the Agency’s recommendation. The Agency then had no knowledge of Mother engaging in domestic violence services. Mother testified she was aware that the CPO remained in effect through 2025, admitted L.S. was present during the domestic violence incident in May 2025, but denied any domestic violence on July 13, 2025, when Father pushed her to the ground, or that L.S. was present during that incident. Mother admitted there was domestic violence on July 17, 2025, but also denied L.S. was present on that occasion. Mother acknowledged L.S. was at her home on July 19, 2025, when officers arrested Father for violating the CPO. Mother stated she took domestic violence classes as part of her services in the prior dependency case. When asked about the May and July 2025 incidents and how she could prevent such violence in the future, Mother testified she had (1) “bought a new car that’s very reliable,” and thus would not need to call Father or his family for help, which she claimed had led to the May incident, and (2) learned to “always have an Uber account, to take the bus and learn the bus system, and always have a charger for [her] phone.” Regarding the July 17, 2025 incident, Mother stated she no longer would “accept help from [Father’s] parents”; and as to the July 19, 2025 incident, she would “not answer[ ] the door.” At the time of disposition, Mother had just moved into a domestic violence shelter where children could also safely reside. She had participated in individual therapy for about “two weeks,” in therapy through her previous 6 provider for about “three or four weeks,” and art therapy and parenting therapy through the shelter. Regarding the Agency’s referral for domestic violence, Mother testified she had not begun classes because after assessment, the director indicated Mother did not need the program because she already had a “good understanding of the domestic violence cycle.” Mother, however, stated she would be willing to do a domestic violence program if recommended by a resource therapy provider. Mother testified that her last contact with Father was on July 19, 2025. She denied trying to resume a relationship with him, stating she was “pursu[ing] a relationship with someone else that has a career in children’s psychology” and who was “amazing” with L.S. Mother, however, was most focused on starting a “new life.” The juvenile court admitted the Agency’s detention and jurisdiction/disposition report, including the addendum. After hearing the argument of counsel, it made a true finding on the petition, declared L.S. a dependent child, and found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “is or would be substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, [or] physical or emotional well-being” of L.S. if he returned home; and (2) there was “no reasonable means” by which L.S.’s “physical health [could] be protected without removal.” In making these findings, the court noted that Mother appeared to “really lack[ ] insight on domestic violence,” despite receiving services in the prior dependency; and that she had not demonstrated the ability to implement the skills she had learned to protect L.S.

7 DISCUSSION I. Governing Principles A juvenile court has “broad discretion” to determine a child’s best interest when crafting a disposition order. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.) The court, however, may not remove a child from a parent’s physical custody unless it “finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without removing the [child] from the [child’s] parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) For removal, or continued removal as in this case, there is no requirement that the parent be dangerous or that the child suffer harm. (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.) Instead, section 361, subdivision (c), focuses on “averting” harm to the child. (In re John M., at p. 1126 [cleaned up].) In determining whether removal is necessary, the court may consider a “parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) We review a disposition order for substantial evidence, bearing “in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960 [cleaned up].) The question before us is “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable the fact was true.” (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012; accord, In re K.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 910, 914.) Under this standard, we “view the record in the 8 light most favorable to the prevailing party . . . and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., at pp. 1011–1012.) “[T]he appellant bears the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the dispositional removal order.” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245 [cleaned up].) II. Analysis Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding there was a “substantial danger” to L.S.’s “physical or emotional well-being” if returned home. (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) Instead, she contends there is no clear and convincing evidence to support its related finding that there was “no reasonable means” to protect his “physical health” short of removal (see ibid.), since she had secured housing in the domestic violence shelter where he also could live. We disagree. Evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother lacked insight into the protective issue, which endangered L.S.’s “physical health” and made his continued removal necessary. (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother admitted taking domestic violence classes in the prior dependency, which ended in June 2022, and acknowledged at disposition that the CPO existed through 2025. She nonetheless continued to have contact with Father, despite domestic violence incidents in 2023 (when the family court granted the DVRO, which she later voluntarily dismissed), in 2024, and in 2025, including in May when Father, in L.S.’s presence, forcibly removed Mother from his truck and threatened to kill her.

9 Moreover, Mother’s testimony at disposition regarding the parents’ most recent domestic violence—including what she had learned and how she would apply that knowledge to prevent such future incidents—further demonstrated her lack of insight. Quite simply, domestic violence is not prevented by buying a “reliable car” and learning the “bus system,” or “not answer[ing] the door” when law enforcement knock, as Mother testified. In addition, Mother repeatedly lied to law enforcement about being in contact with Father when officers came to her door on July 19, 2025. There also was evidence that she and Father were together between August 16 and 18, 2025, just days after the detention hearing when the juvenile court placed L.S. with the paternal aunt. Mother also failed to follow the juvenile court’s order following detention requiring the Agency to coordinate all parental visitation. Mother instead repeatedly messaged the paternal aunt and called her a “ ‘monster’ ” for not allowing Mother to see L.S. Mother’s failure to follow court orders—including most notably the CPO—is additional support for the court’s finding that Mother has yet to understand the risk of harm to L.S. caused by her continued relationship with Father. (See In re John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 [the focus of the removal statute is to avert harm to the child].) We are also not persuaded by Mother’s contention that L.S.’s removal was unnecessary because she could care for him at the domestic violence shelter. At the time of disposition she had only lived at the shelter for a few weeks, had yet to start individual domestic violence therapy, as required under her case plan, and had only a few therapy sessions with the provider from her previous dependency. The record shows Mother was only in the early stages of addressing the protective issue that necessitated L.S.’s removal.

10 There is no doubt that Mother loves L.S. very much, as the juvenile court and the Agency also recognized. But the primary goal of the dependency statutes is “ ‘to ensure the safety, protection, and well-being’ ” of a child (In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 44), with the child’s best interest being of “paramount concern” (In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 550). But on the whole record, we conclude (1) there is “high probability” that a reasonable fact finder would find there was “no reasonable means” by which L.S.’s “physical health” could be protected without removal (see § 361, subd. (c)(1); Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011; In re K.M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 914); and (2) the juvenile court properly exercised its “broad discretion” when it ordered L.S. to remain in the care of the maternal grandmother, with Mother to receive services (see In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1179). DISPOSITION We affirm the juvenile court’s September 19, 2025 disposition order.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.