People v. Carrillo CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D085324 · 2026-03-05 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Bernardino County · No. FSB039094
Trial judge: Donna G. Garza (retired judge)
Outcome: reversed — Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), Judith D. McConnell, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:29Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Carrillo's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), ruling he was not eligible because his youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 meant his sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without parole. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that Carrillo's 164-year aggregate sentence constitutes the functional equivalent of life without parole and that his later-acquired parole eligibility under section 3051 does not negate his eligibility for section 1170(d) relief.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) based on the argument that youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 negates the functional equivalent of life without parole. “The trial court denied the petition on the grounds Carrillo was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP because of his youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051.”	de novo	error	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the de novo standard to the legal question of statutory interpretation and the application of undisputed facts. It properly relied on People v. Heard to establish that a sentence exceeding the natural lifespan is the functional equivalent of LWOP and that later-acquired parole eligibility under section 3051 does not alter the original sentence's character for purposes of section 1170(d). The court also correctly distinguished or rejected the contrary reasoning in People v. Ortega, which had been granted review, by citing its own prior decision in People v. Bagsby which had already rejected the Franklin-based argument that section 3051 moots the LWOP claim.

Authorities

relied: People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 — Established that a juvenile offender sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole is eligible for resentencing under section 1170(d), and that later-acquired parole eligibility under section 3051 does not change the fact that the original sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence.
relied: People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 — Established that a sentence of 40 years plus 70 years to life constitutes the functional equivalent of life without parole for a juvenile offender.
relied: People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 — Established that a sentence of 10 years plus 130 years to life constitutes the functional equivalent of life without parole.
relied: People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 — Considered and rejected the argument that parole eligibility under section 3051 moots a claim that a defendant's sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole.
relied: People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252 — Represented the contrary view that parole eligibility under section 3051 excludes consideration under section 1170(d), which the court rejected in favor of its prior precedent in Bagsby.
relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — Cited by Ortega to support the argument that section 3051 parole eligibility moots the LWOP claim, but rejected by this court based on Bagsby.
relied: People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303 — Established that statutory interpretation and the application of undisputed facts to a statute are questions of law reviewed de novo.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the de novo standard of review to the legal question of whether the sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP and properly relies on binding precedent (Heard, Caballero) to support its conclusion. It also adequately addresses the contrary authority (Ortega) by distinguishing it based on the court's own prior precedent (Bagsby) and the specific facts of the case.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The San Bernardino Superior Court denied Joe Carrillo's Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) petition for recall and resentencing, reasoning that his sentence of four years plus 160 years to life for crimes committed at age 17 was not the functional equivalent of LWOP because he is eligible for youth offender parole under section 3051. The Court of Appeal, accepting the Attorney General's concession and following its own decisions in Heard and Bagsby, held that eligibility turns on the sentence as originally imposed, that section 3051 (enacted after sentencing) does not change that the sentence was de facto LWOP, and reversed and remanded with directions to consider the petition on the merits.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of section 1170(d)(1) resentencing petition on the ground that section 3051 youth offender parole eligibility means the defendant was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP “The trial court denied the petition on the grounds Carrillo was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP because of his youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051.”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court The court correctly applied de novo review to a question of statutory interpretation on undisputed facts. Under Heard, equal protection extends section 1170(d) eligibility to juveniles sentenced to de facto LWOP, and the statute's past-tense 'was sentenced to' language focuses on the sentence at imposition; Carrillo's 164-year aggregate term exceeds the sentences held functionally LWOP in Heard, Sorto, and Caballero, and was imposed in 2005, before section 3051's 2014 effective date. The court acknowledged the contrary Ortega/Isayev line (Ortega under review) and explained it had already rejected the Franklin-based argument in Bagsby, so the result is consistent with controlling Fourth District authority and the People's concession, though the issue is unsettled pending Supreme Court review.

Authorities

relied: People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 — Equal protection extends section 1170(d) resentencing eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP; eligibility is measured by the sentence as originally imposed, and later-enacted section 3051 parole eligibility does not change that the sentence was de facto LWOP when imposed.
relied: People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 — Rejected the argument, based on People v. Franklin, that section 3051 parole eligibility moots or defeats a juvenile's functional-LWOP claim for section 1170(d) purposes.
relied: People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 — A sentence of 10 years plus 130 years to life imposed on a juvenile is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
relied: People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 — A juvenile nonhomicide offender's sentence of 110 years to life (40 years plus 70 years to life) is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
relied: People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303 — Statutory interpretation and application of undisputed facts to a statute are questions of law reviewed de novo.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve conceded or straightforward matters by memorandum opinion.
relied: Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86 — A court of appeal may decline to depart from its own prior decision when the contrary argument has already been considered and rejected.
relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — Section 3051 youth offender parole eligibility mooted a juvenile's Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence alleged to be the functional equivalent of LWOP; cited as the basis for the contrary Ortega view that the court declined to follow.
missed: People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 — Clarified the equal protection framework for classifications in section 3051 and related youth sentencing statutes, holding that courts ask whether the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate purpose; the opinion rests on Heard's equal protection extension of section 1170(d) without addressing whether Hardin's framework affects that analysis.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the correct de novo standard, follows binding Fourth District precedent (Heard, Bagsby) on both the functional-LWOP and section 3051 points, accepts a well-supported concession, and candidly notes the contrary Ortega/Isayev line and the pending Supreme Court review. It does not, however, engage with the Supreme Court's intervening equal protection decision in Hardin or independently analyze why the Fourth District view should prevail over the split, instead relying on the People's concession and prior panel decisions.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 3/5/26 P. v. Carrillo CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085324

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB039094)

JOE CARRILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Donna G. Garza, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded with instructions. Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Joe Carrillo appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing. He contends, and the People concede, he was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and is therefore eligible to seek resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1). Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851–854), we accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand for further proceedings on the resentencing petition. I. A jury convicted Carrillo of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1); count 1) and four counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187(a); counts 2–5) and found true various enhancements for each count. Carrillo committed those crimes when he was 17 years old. In 2005, the trial court originally sentenced Carrillo to prison for a determinate term of nine years followed by an indeterminate sentence of 160 years to life. On direct appeal, we struck the enhancement associated with count 1, which resulted in a reduced sentence of four years determinate plus an indeterminate term of 160 years to life. (People v. Carrillo (May 4, 2007, D049607) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2024, Carrillo filed a petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). The trial court denied the petition on the grounds Carrillo was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP because of his youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051. II. Carrillo contends he is eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1) on equal protection grounds because his sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP despite section 3051. The People concede error.

2 Statutory interpretation and the application of undisputed facts to a statute are questions of law we review de novo. (People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311.) A juvenile defendant who “was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” is eligible to seek resentencing under section 1170(d). (§ 1170(d)(1)(A).) Although Carrillo’s sentence does not fall within the statute’s plain language, the constitutional right of equal protection extends section 1170(d) eligibility to juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 633–634.) Carrillo’s aggregate 164-year sentence, consisting of four determinate years plus 160 years to life, is the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d)(1). In Heard, we concluded the defendant’s aggregate sentence of 103 years, consisting of 23 determinate years plus 80 years to life, was the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) Carrillo’s sentence exceeds the sentence in Heard, and the People concede it “unquestionably exceeds the juvenile offender’s natural lifespan.” (See also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440, 450–451 [10 years plus 130 years to life constituted functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 267–268 [40 years plus 70 years to life].) Carrillo’s youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 does not affect his eligibility to seek section 1170(d) resentencing because section 3051 relief became available only after Carrillo’s sentence was imposed. As relevant here, under section 3051, a youth offender sentenced to a life term of 25 years to life or more is eligible for parole after 25 years of incarceration. (§ 3051(b)(3).) Because section 1170(d)(1) refers to what the defendant “was 3 sentenced to,” what matters is the defendant’s original sentence. (Heard, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) Carrillo was sentenced long before section 3051’s 2014 effective date. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) As a result, his later-acquired eligibility for parole under section 3051 does not “change the fact that the sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the time it was imposed.” (Heard, at p. 629.) Therefore, his youth parole eligibility has no bearing on his eligibility under his section 1170(d) petition. Some courts of appeal have parted ways with Heard by concluding parole eligibility under section 3051 excludes consideration under section 1170(d), even if the defendant was sentenced before section 3051’s enactment. (See, e.g., People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1140–1141.) Ortega relied on People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 in concluding section 3051 parole eligibility moots a claim the defendant’s sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Ortega, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1260.) We, however, already considered and rejected this same Franklin-based argument (People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056–1059), so it does not persuade us to depart from Heard. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9.) Because section 3051 does not alter that Carrillo “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP, the trial court erred in denying Carrillo’s section 1170(d) petition on that ground. We give no opinion regarding the other requirements of section 1170(d), which are not at issue in this appeal.

4 III. We reverse and remand the order denying Carrillo’s section 1170(d) petition for recall and resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall consider the petition on the merits and proceed under section 1170(d).

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Franklin S217699 · 2016-05-26
People v. Caballero S190647 · 2012-08-16
People v. Salcido D050330 · 2008-09-16