Sanders-Toledo v. MacFarland CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 24HR028389C
- Trial judge
- Blair Soper
- Outcome
- dismissed — Dismissed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), Judith D. McConnell, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court issued a one-year civil harassment restraining order against MacFarland, which subsequently expired before the appeal was resolved. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the order was no longer in effect and no discretionary exception to the mootness doctrine applied.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dismissal of appeal as moot“Because the restraining order is no longer in effect and no discretionary exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss the appeal as moot.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the mootness doctrine, noting that the underlying order had expired and the appellant failed to demonstrate that any of the three discretionary exceptions (broad public interest, likelihood of recurrence, or material question remaining) were met. The court distinguished the appellant's claim of collateral consequences from the specific 'future proceedings' requirement established in prior case law. |
Authorities
- relied: Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139 — An appeal is moot if the relief granted by the trial court is temporal and expires before the appeal can be heard.
- relied: Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 — Identifies the three discretionary exceptions to the mootness doctrine: broad public interest, likelihood of recurrence, or a material question remaining for determination.
- relied: Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484 — An appeal from an expired civil harassment restraining order is not moot if the order was renewed.
- relied: San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550 — Courts may exercise discretion to hear moot appeals if the order has collateral consequences in future proceedings, is likely to evade review, or presents an issue of broad public interest.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound, correctly applying the mootness doctrine and distinguishing the appellant's arguments from established exceptions. It clearly explains why the specific facts (lack of future proceedings or public interest) do not warrant exercising discretion to hear the case.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court, after an evidentiary hearing with multiple witnesses, found Sanders-Toledo carried her burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 and issued a one-year civil harassment restraining order barring MacFarland from harassing or contacting Sanders-Toledo, her husband, and her son. The Court of Appeal did not reach MacFarland's challenge to the sufficiency of the harassment showing; it held the appeal moot because the order expired February 9, 2026 and was not renewed, declined to apply any discretionary exception, and dismissed the appeal with each party bearing her own costs.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Issuance of a one-year civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 protecting Sanders-Toledo, her husband, and her son after a contested hearing“The court found Sanders-Toledo carried her burden of proof and issued a civil harassment restraining order protecting Sanders-Toledo, her husband, and her son from any harassment or contact by MacFarland.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The appellate court never evaluated whether the evidence met the statutory definition of harassment because it dismissed the appeal as moot. The order had expired, the record showed no renewal (distinguishing Harris v. Stampolis), and the court found no exception applied: the appellant identified employment-disclosure consequences but no pending or future proceeding, no issue of broad public interest, and no likely recurrence between the parties; and section 527.6(j)(1) orders can last up to five years so the category does not generally evade review. The mootness analysis follows the cited authorities, though the exercise of discretion against reaching the merits is debatable given the appellant's stated collateral harm, and the court did not name the remaining authorities it deemed distinguishable. Without the merits being addressed and with no record of the evidence in the opinion, I cannot assess the correctness of the trial court's order. |
Authorities
- relied: Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139 — When relief granted by the trial court is temporal and expires before the appeal can be heard, the adverse party's appeal is moot.
- relied: Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473 — Discretionary exceptions to mootness: issue of broad public interest likely to recur, likely recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material question remaining for the court's determination.
- relied: Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484 — An appeal from an expired civil harassment restraining order that has been renewed is not moot; distinguished because nothing in the record showed renewal here.
- relied: San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550 — Court may reach the merits of an appeal from an expired one-year restraining order where it could have collateral consequences in future proceedings, is likely to evade review, and presents an issue of broad public interest; distinguished because MacFarland identified no future proceedings or public-interest issue.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the settled rule that an appeal from an expired, unrenewed temporal order is moot and reasonably distinguished Harris and Geoffrey S. on the record before it, and whether to invoke a discretionary exception was within its province. The opinion has gaps, however: it rejects the collateral-consequences argument somewhat summarily by requiring identified future proceedings even though the appellant described concrete employment-disclosure harm, and it dismisses the appellant's 'remaining authorities' as distinguishable without identifying or analyzing them.
Opinion
Filed 2/26/26 Sanders-Toledo v. MacFarland CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TAMMY SANDERS-TOLEDO, D085752
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. 24HR028389C)
EMMA MACFARLAND,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Blair Soper, Judge. Dismissed. Emma MacFarland, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Emma MacFarland appeals from a one-year civil harassment restraining order that prevented her from harassing or contacting her neighbor, Tammy Sanders-Toledo, as well as Sanders-Toledo’s husband and son. The restraining order expired on February 9, 2026. Because the restraining order is no longer in effect and no discretionary exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss the appeal as moot. I. MacFarland and Sanders-Toledo are neighbors. In December 2024, Sanders-Toledo obtained a temporary restraining order protecting her, her husband, and her son from any harassment or contact by MacFarland. MacFarland filed a response, supported with exhibits and a declaration, contesting the veracity of Sanders-Toledo’s allegations of harassment. The trial court held a hearing on February 10, 2025. During the hearing, multiple witnesses testified, including the parties. The court found Sanders-Toledo carried her burden of proof and issued a civil harassment restraining order protecting Sanders-Toledo, her husband, and her son from any harassment or contact by MacFarland. The restraining order expired at midnight on February 9, 2026. II. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), a “person who has suffered harassment” “may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” MacFarland claims the restraining order must be reversed because her alleged conduct “fails to meet the statutory requirements for harassment” under section 527.6. Because we conclude the appeal is moot, however, we need not address this argument. “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.” (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) Such an appeal should be dismissed unless one of the discretionary exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies: “(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is 2 likely to recur; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties; [or] (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination.” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479-480 [cleaned up].) Here, it is undisputed the restraining order expired on February 9, 2026, and nothing in the record indicates the restraining order was renewed. (Cf. Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495-496 [appeal from expired but renewed civil harassment restraining order is not moot].) Thus, MacFarland’s appeal from the expired restraining order is moot. (Environmental Charter High School, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 144.) We requested supplemental briefing from MacFarland on the issue of mootness. In her supplemental brief, MacFarland contends an exception to the mootness doctrine applies because she must disclose the existence of the restraining order when applying for her primary employment as a public school substitute teacher and a children’s yoga and exercise teacher. She contends the scope of the restraining order implies she undertook actions involving gun violence and physical and sexual assault despite her not having done so. In San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564- 565—where the appellant was facing investigation by the Ohio State Bar into his law license—we elected to reach the merits of an appeal from an expired restraining order because (1) the order “could have collateral consequences in future proceedings,” (2) the one-year gun violence restraining order at issue was likely to evade normal appellate review, and (3) the appeal presented an issue of broad public interest concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence in hearings on gun violence restraining order petitions. (Italics added.) But while MacFarland identifies collateral consequences of the civil 3 harassment restraining order, she does not identify any “future proceedings”—like a state bar investigation—that will be affected by her expired restraining order. Nor does she identify any issue of broad public interest raised by her appeal. MacFarland does not contend it is likely that the controversy between her and Sanders-Toledo is likely to recur. And while the short duration of this particular restraining order made it difficult to obtain timely judicial review, timely review of civil harassment restraining orders generally is not impossible to obtain given they can have a duration of up to five years. (§ 527.6(j)(1).) On these facts, the remaining authorities on which MacFarland relies are similarly distinguishable. While we may exercise our discretion to hear a moot case, the circumstances do not warrant doing so here. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot. III. We dismiss the appeal. Each party shall bear her own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.278(a)(5).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Harris v. Stampolis H041795 · 2016-06-24
- Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School District B171813 · 2004-09-10
- Cucamongans United for Reasonale Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga E024244 · 2000-07-20