Opinion

1 2 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIKA QUINTERO McCOLLEY, Case No. 3:25-CV-2372-GPC-MSB 12 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING 13 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO Plaintiff, DISMISS 14 v. 15 [ECF Nos. 7, 8] PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION; 16 PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, INC.; APM TERMINALS PACIFIC LLC; 17 APS STEVEDORING, LLC; BENICIA PORT TERMINAL COMPANY; CERES 18 TERMINALS INCORPORATED; CRESCENT CITY MARINE WAYS& 19 DRYDOCK COMPANY, INC.; EAGLE MARINE SERVICES, LTD.; EVERPORT 20 TERMINAL SERVICES, INC.; HARBOR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 21 CORPORATION; INNOVATIVE TERMINAL SERVICES INC.; 22 INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE INC.; KINDER MORGAN 23 BULK TERMINALS LLC; LBCT, LLC; MARINE TERMINALS 24 CORPORATION; MARINE TERMINALS CORPORATION OF LOS 25 ANGELES; MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC.; MATSON 26 TERMINALS, INC.; METROPOLITAN STEVEDORE COMPANY; OCEAN 27 TERMINAL SERVICES, INC.; PACIFIC CRANE MAINTENANCE COMPANY 28 LP; PACIFIC RO-RO; STEVEDORING, 1 LTLECR;M PIANSAHLAS SLTPE; PVOERDTO RING & 2 MAINTENANCE GROUP; SSA MARINE, INC.; SSA TERMINALS, 3 LLC; TERMINAL EQUIPMENT SERVICES, INC.; TOTAL TERMINALS 4 INTERNATIONAL, LLC; TRANSPAC TERMINAL SERVICES, LLC; TRAPAC, 5 LLC; YUSEN TERMINALS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 6 Defendants. 7 8 This case concerns alleged wage and hour violations towards various 9 dockworkers employed by Defendants. Defendants have filed two, separate motions to 10 dismiss on independent grounds. The first is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 11 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)1 12(b)(6) and strike Plaintiff’s 12 complaint pursuant to Rule 11. ECF No. 7. The second is a motion to dismiss pursuant to 13 the first-to-file rule or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the Northern District of 14 California. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ first motion 15 to dismiss on November 21, 2025, ECF No. 10, to which Defendants replied on December 16 12, 2025, ECF No. 12. Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss on first- 17 to-file grounds. Instead, Plaintiff filed a notice of related case and requested that the Court 18 transfer the case to the Northern District of California. ECF No. 14. The Court finds that 19 the matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civ. R. 20 7.1(d)(1) and the January 23, 2026, hearing is hereby vacated. For the reasons explained 21 below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the first-to-file rule. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff is a former longshore worker who worked at the National City Marine 24 Terminal between October 2006 and July 2024. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 6. Defendant Pacific 25 Maritime Association (“PMA”) is a California non-profit mutual benefit corporation 26 27 1 “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. 28 1 whose members include more than fifty for-profit companies who employ dockworkers. 2 ECF No. 8-1, at 9. The other named Defendants are member companies of PMA that 3 operate as freight, operations, and logistics companies throughout the West Coast ports 4 in California. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 7; ECF No. 8-1, at 7. 5 On April 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging wage and hour violations 6 against Defendants in the Superior Court of California in the County of San Diego. ECF 7 No. 1-2, at 2. Plaintiff filed her action individually and behalf of all others similarly 8 situated, with the class members defined as “[a]ll persons who are or have been employed 9 by Defendants as Non-Exempt Employees or equivalent positions, however titled, in the 10 state of California within four (4) years from the filing of the Complaint in this action 11 until its resolution.” ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 10. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 12 failed to pay employees minimum and overtime wages; failed to provide meal periods or 13 compensation in lieu thereof; failed to provide rest periods or compensation in lieu 14 thereof; failed to indemnify business expenses; failed to provide itemized wage 15 statements; failed to pay timely wages upon separation; and violated of California 16 Business & Professions Code § 17200. Id. ¶¶ 44-89. 17 Plaintiff’s complaint is one of several class-action lawsuits filed against 18 Defendants asserting violations of California’s labor laws, the majority of which are 19 pending in California state court. See ECF No. 8-1, at 7. 20 On September 11, 2025, Defendants removed this action to this Court on the basis 21 of diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1, at 6. On October 17, 2025, Defendants filed two 22 motions to dismiss. The first is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion 23 to strike Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 11. ECF No. 7. The second is a motion to 24 dismiss—or, alternatively, to transfer—under the first-to-file rule. ECF No. 8. 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to the first-to-file rule alleges that 26 Plaintiff’s case is duplicative of Jasmine Phillips v. Pacific Maritime Association, et al., 27 No. 4:24-cv-03241-JST, a class action pending in the Northern District of California 28 1 before U.S. District Court Judge Jon S. Tigar. See generally ECF NO. 8-1. The Phillips 2 complaint was filed in state court on February 18, 2025. ECF No. 8-1, at 13. On April 10, 3 2025, the Phillips defendants—who, as here, consist of PMA and several of its member 4 companies—removed the action to federal court. ECF No. 8-1, at 13-14. On April 17, 5 2025, the Phillips defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, which Judge 6 Tigar granted with leave to amend on June 20, 2025. See Phillips, No. 4:24-cv-03241- 7 JST, Dkt. Nos. 8, 23. Judge Tigar has also denied the Phillips plaintiff’s motion to remand 8 to state court. Phillips, No. 4:24-cv-03241-JST, Dkt. No. 22. The Phillips plaintiff has 9 now filed a first amended complaint, and the case remains pending in the Northern 10 District of California. Phillips, No. 4:24-cv-03241-JST, Dkt. No. 30. 11 Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion on 12 November 21, 2025, ECF No. 10, to which Defendants replied on December 12, 2025, 13 ECF No. 12. 14 Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to the 15 first-to-file rule. Plaintiff instead filed a “notice of related case and request to transfer,” 16 referencing the same case identified by Defendants—Phillips v. Pacific Maritime 17 Association—and requesting a transfer to Judge Tigar’s docket in the Northern District 18 of California. ECF Nos. 13, 14. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 Given that Plaintiff has not opposed the motion to dismiss based upon the first-to- 21 file rule, the Court will confine itself to addressing this motion. 22 The first-to-file rule is a “recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a 23 district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same 24 parties and issues has already been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. 25 Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. 26 v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 749 (9th Cir. 1979)). The rule was developed to 27 “serve[] the purpose of promoting efficiency well,” and, while application of the rule is 28 1 discretionary, it “should not be disregarded lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prod., Inc., 2 946 F.2d 622, 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 750). 3 The first-to-file rule “allows a district court to transfer, stay, or dismiss an action when a 4 similar complaint has already been filed in another federal court.” Id. at 623. 5 In determining the applicability of the first-to-file rule, courts look to three factors: 6 (1) the chronology of the lawsuits, (2) the similarity of the parties, and (3) the similarity 7 of the issues. See id. at 625. The “rule is not a rigid or inflexible rule to be mechanically 8 applied, but rather is to be applied with a view to the dictates of sound judicial 9 administration.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 678 F.2d at 95. Exceptions to the first-to-file rule 10 include where the filing of the first suit evidences bad faith, anticipatory suits, and forum 11 shopping. Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 628. Moreover, a court may, in its discretion, decline to 12 apply the first-to-file rule in the interests of equity or upon a demonstration of 13 prejudice. Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 14 2010); Ward v. Follett Corp., 158 F.R.D. 645, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1994). When applying the 15 first-to-file rule, courts should be driven to maximize “economy, consistency, and 16 comity.” Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1999). 17 DISCUSSION 18 The Parties do not dispute the related nature of Phillips and the instant McColley 19 action. ECF Nos. 8, 13. Indeed, Plaintiff has stated that “[t]his matter and the Phillips 20 action potentially overlap in many respects in terms of parties, subject matters, causes of 21 action, class definitions, and time periods.” ECF No. 114, at 3. However, Defendant 22 argues that the first-to-file rule warrants dismissal, while Plaintiff requests a transfer 23 without any acknowledgement of either the first-to-file rule or Defendants’ arguments in 24 favor of dismissal. ECF Nos. 8, 13. Thus, the Court will first analyze the propriety of 25 applying the first-to-file rule in this case. It will then consider whether dismissal or 26 transfer is more appropriate. 27 / / / 28 1 I. Application of the First-to-File Rule Is Proper 2 In considering the chronology, similarity of the parties, and similarity of the claims 3 between the McColley and Phillips actions, the Court determines that application of the 4 first-to-file rule is appropriate. 5 A. Chronology 6 Courts should consider applying the first-to-file rule where the instant action was 7 filed later in time. Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 625. Here, Phillips was indisputably filed first in 8 state court on February 18, 2025 and, on April 10, 2025, it was removed to federal court. 9 Phillips, No. 4:24-cv-03241-JST, Dkt. No. 1. This action was filed in state court on April 10 10, 2025, and removed on September 11, 2025. ECF No. 1. Thus, chronology favors an 11 application of the first-to-file rule. 12 B. Similarity of Parties 13 To warrant application of the first-to-file rule, the parties need not be identical. 14 Kohn L. Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Mississippi, Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 15 2015). Rather, substantial similarity suffices. Id. Substantial similarity is “satisfied if 16 some of the parties in one matter are also in the other matter, regardless of whether there 17 are additional unmatched parties in one or both matters.” Mack v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18 17-cv-02515-ABR-AOX, 2017 WL 8220436, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017). 19 Here, the Defendants are nearly identical. Plaintiff’s complaint lists PMA and 20 several of its member companies, totaling 32 Defendants. ECF No. 1-2, at 2-3; ECF No. 21 8-1, at 7. However, Defendants allege that two listed Defendants are duplicative 22 misnomers of other existing Defendants.2 The Court further finds that one additional 23 24 25 2 Defendants allege that Defendant Pacific Maritime Association was also erroneously sued 26 as Pacific Maritime Association, Inc., and that Defendant Marine Terminals Corporation 27 was also erroneously sued as Marine Terminals Corporation of Los Angeles. ECF No. 7- 1, at 9 n.1. 28 1 listed Defendant appears to be an error.3 Without considering the seemingly erroneous 2 Defendants, Plaintiff’s complaint lists only two Defendants not included in the Phillips 3 complaint—Matson Terminals, Inc., and SSA Marine, Inc.4 Even so, “[m]erely naming 4 additional defendants in the second-filed action [does] not render the parties too 5 dissimilar to apply the first to file rule.” Hill v. Robert's Am. Gourmet Food, LLC, Case 6 No. 13-cv-00696-YGR, 2013 WL 3476801, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2013); see also 7 Ortiz v. Walmart, Inc. No. 2:20-cv-05052-AB-KK, 2020 WL 5835323, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 8 Sept. 18, 2020). Thus, the Court finds that the defendants in the two cases are 9 substantially similar. 10 As to the similarity of the plaintiffs, where, as here, the cases involve class actions, 11 “the classes, and not the class representatives, are compared.” Mack, 2017 WL 8220436, 12 at *2. The class definition in Phillips is as follows: 13 [A] California class, defined as all individuals who are or 14 previously were employed by [Defendants] and classified as non- exempt employees at any time during the period beginning four 15 (4) years prior to the filing of the original Complaint and ending 16 on the date as determined by the Court. 17 The class defined in the McColley action is: 18 “All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants as Non-Exempt Employees or equivalent positions, however titled, 19 in the state of California within four (4) years from the filing of 20 the Complaint in this action until its resolution.” 21 22 23 3 Plaintiff’s complaint lists “Pacific Ro-Ro; Stevedoring, LLC;”—resulting in the appearance of two separate Defendants—while the Phillips complaint lists “Pacific Ro-Ro 24 Stevedoring, LLC,” ECF No. 8-10, at 2, and Defendants refer to “Pacific Ro-Ro 25 Stevedoring, LLC,” ECF No. 7-1, at 9 n.1. 4 However, this too seems to be an error. While SSA Marine, Inc. is not listed as a 26 Defendant in the Phillips complaint, the Phillips complaint states that “Pacific Maritime 27 Association’s Board of Directors is composed of executives from these other Member Companies including, but not limited to Defendant SSA Marine.” ECF No. 8-10, at 10. 28 1 As with the named defendants, the class definitions in the two cases are nearly 2 identical and largely cover the same individuals. See Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh 3 Vegetables, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Courts have held that 4 proposed classes in class action lawsuits are substantially similar where both classes seek 5 to represent at least some of the same individuals.”). Plaintiff has also acknowledged that 6 “[b]oth the McColley and Phillips matters seek to represent a class of all non-exempt 7 employees employed by Defendants.” ECF No. 114, at 3. 8 Both cases involve non-exempt California dock workers suing PMA and several 9 of its member companies based on alleged violations of California labor law. Thus, the 10 Court finds there is substantial similarity between the parties involved in both cases, and 11 the second requirement of the first-to-file rule is satisfied. 12 C. Similarity of Issues 13 Lastly, the Court finds that the causes of action in McColley and Phillips are 14 essentially identical: 15 Causes of Action in McColley Causes of Action in Phillips 16 1. Failure to pay wages and 1. Unlawful business practices in 17 overtime wages violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 18 2. Failure to provide meal periods 2. Failure to pay minimum wages 19 3. Failure to provide rest periods 3. Failure to pay overtime wages 4. Failure to indemnify necessary 4. Failure to provide meal periods 20 business expenses 21 5. Failure to provide accurate 5. Failure to provide rest periods itemized wage statements 22 6. Failure to timely pay wages upon 6. Failure to provide accurate 23 separation itemized wage statements 7. Unfair business practices in 7. Failure to indemnify necessary 24 violation of Cal. Bus. Prof. Code business expenses 25 § 17200 26 Though it appears that the McColley Plaintiff has raised an additional claim not 27 covered by the Phillips complaint—failure to timely pay wages upon separation, ECF No. 28 1 1-2, at 21—the Phillips complaint consolidates that allegation within its “failure to pay 2 minimum wages” cause of action. See ECF No. 8-10, ¶ 103 (“To the extent minimum 3 wage compensation is determined to be owed to [class members] who have terminated 4 their employment, [Defendants’] conduct also violates Labor Code §§ 201 and/or 202, 5 and therefore these individuals are also be entitled to waiting time penalties under Cal. 6 Lab. Code § 203, which penalties are sought herein on behalf of these [class members].”). 7 Indeed, Plaintiff herself has noted that: “both plaintiffs allege class action claims against 8 Defendants, which include but are not limited to: (1) unpaid overtime; (2) unpaid 9 minimum wages; (3) unpaid meal period penalties; (4) unpaid rest period penalties; (5) 10 penalties for noncompliant wage statements; (6) waiting time penalties; (7) expense 11 reimbursements, and (8) unfair business practices.” ECF No. 14, at 3 (emphasis added). 12 While “the issues need not be identical for this factor to be satisfied,” the issues in 13 Phillips and McColley seemingly are identical. Ortiz, 2020 WL 5835323, at *4. Thus, the 14 similarity of the issues indicates that application of the first-to-file rule is warranted. 15 Lastly, there is no evidence that the Phillips action was filed in bad faith, was the 16 result of forum shopping, or that convenience factors favor this adjudication of the matter 17 in this District. Accordingly, no equitable considerations counsel against application of 18 the first-to-file rule. See Ortiz, 2020 WL 5835323, at *4 (citing MeridianLink, Inc. v. DH 19 Holdings, LLC, Case No. CV 10-2708 ABC-JEMx, 2010 WL 11512182, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 20 June 16, 2010)). 21 II. Dismissal is the Appropriate Remedy 22 Having found that application of the first-to-file rule is proper, the remaining 23 question is whether transfer or dismissal is the appropriate remedy. 24 Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed to avoid duplicative litigation 25 and inconsistent outcomes. ECF No. 8-1, at 8. Plaintiff requests transfer as opposed to 26 dismissal, but has neither opposed Defendants’ motion to dismiss on first-to-file grounds 27 28 1 nor articulated any reasoning for why transfer is a more appropriate remedy than 2 dismissal. ECF No. 14. 3 “Transfer is proper under the first-to-file rule where the complaints raise similar, 4 but not identical, claims and include similar, but not identical, plaintiffs.” Carrera v. First 5 Am. Home Buyers Prot. Co., No. CV-09-7801-GHK-FFMX, 2009 WL 10674763, at *3 6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2009). Here, the Court has found the plaintiffs and the claims in 7 McColley and Phillips to be essentially identical, and Plaintiff has not produced any 8 argument otherwise. Further, the Court finds that dismissal better reflects the aims of the 9 first-to-file rule. 10 “Two main objectives of the first-to-file rule are (1) ‘to avoid placing an 11 unnecessary burden on the federal judiciary’ and (2) ‘to avoid the embarrassment of 12 conflicting judgments.’” Ortiz, 2020 WL 5835323, at *4 (quoting Church of Scientology, 13 611 F.2d at 750). At its core, the rule exists to “serve[] the purpose of promoting 14 efficiency.” Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 625. Here, these considerations favor dismissal. If this 15 action proceeds, there is a risk of conflicting results and wasted judicial resources. Indeed, 16 “[t]his case involves the same causes of action, the same Defendants, the same location, 17 the same employees, and the same core issues as in the [Phillips] action, and the Court 18 sees no reason why two substantially similar matters warrant duplicative litigation.” Ortiz, 19 2020 WL 5835323, at *4. Further, the Phillips action fully encompasses and provides 20 redress for all allegations in McColley. See id. Thus, dismissal promotes efficiency in this 21 case. 22 Plaintiff has also not presented any compelling reasons to allow this action to 23 proceed. For example, Plaintiff has not argued this action is not duplicative of Phillips. 24 See King v. WinCo Holdings, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-05572-JLS-JDE, 2022 WL 18284892, 25 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2022). Nor does Plaintiff argue that the Phillips action would 26 provide insufficient remedies for the claims Plaintiff alleges. See De La Cruz v. Target 27 Corp., 2018 WL 3817950, at *2 (citing Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. v. Intersearch Grp., 28 1 Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 949, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Dismissal is proper where the court of 2 first filing provides adequate remedies.”)). 3 Additionally, Plaintiff does not argue that the Phillips case is likely to be dismissed, 4 such that this action should be stayed, rather than dismissed. See De La Cruz v. Target 5 Corp., No. 18-CV-0867 DMS (WVG), 2018 WL 3817950, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018); 6 Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 629 (“Where the first-filed action presents a likelihood of dismissal, 7 the second-filed suit should be stayed, rather than dismissed.”). Though Judge Tigar 8 granted the Phillips defendants’ first motion to dismiss, he did so only on the grounds 9 that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege Defendants’ liability as joint employers, and 10 did not otherwise consider the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. See Phillips, No. 4:24-cv- 11 03241-JST, Dkt. No. 22, at 1-2. The Phillips plaintiff has since filed an amended 12 complaint. Phillips, No. 4:24-cv-03241-JST, Dkt. No. 30. Plaintiff does not demonstrate 13 any concerns of dismissal, as she does not request a stay but a transfer to Judge Tigar’s 14 docket where the two cases may be consolidated. See, e.g., Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh 15 Vegetables, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Thus, the previous 16 dismissal of the Phillips complaint does not persuade this Court to exercise its discretion 17 to stay or transfer rather than dismiss this action. 18 The Court notes that the class in Phillips is not yet certified. However, even if the 19 Court dismisses this action and Phillips does not proceed as a class action, Plaintiff will 20 still be able to pursue her claims against Defendants. See King, 2022 WL 18284892, at 21 *3. As this Court has previously explained: 22 If the [Phillips] action results in a class settlement, the putative 23 class members in this suit can obtain adequate relief, and Plaintiff will likewise have the opportunity to participate in the settlement 24 or [s]he may opt out to pursue h[er] claims individually. In the 25 event the [Phillips] court denies class certification, Plaintiff may litigate h[er] individual claims as an intervenor or pursue h[er] 26 individual claims in a separate lawsuit. The putative class 27 members may also proceed with their individual claims in an appropriate forum. The proposed class and the issues presented 28 1 are essentially identical to those presented in the [Phillips] action, 2 such that there is nothing to suggest this action would be certified while the [Phillips] action would not. This case is at its infancy, 3 and allowing this case to proceed would both impede judicial 4 efficiency and run a significant risk of conflicting judgments. See De La Cruz, 2018 WL 3817950, at *2. But see Carrera v. First Am. Home Buyers 5 Prot. Co., No. CV-09-7801-GHK-FFMX, 2009 WL 10674763, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 6 2009) (finding that the fact that no class had been certified in either case weighed in favor 7 of transfer rather than dismissal.). 8 Considering the above, the Court exercises its discretion and grants Defendants’ 9 motion to dismiss pursuant to the first-to-file rule. Plaintiff has provided no compelling 10 argument in favor of transfer rather than dismissal. She has not argued that this case is 11 not duplicative of Phillips, that Phillips is likely to be dismissed, or that Phillips would 12 13 provide inadequate remedies. In fact, Plaintiff has not offered any opposition to the 14 motion to dismiss under the first-to-file rule. This failure permits the Court to grant the 15 motion as unopposed. See Civ LR 7.1(f)(3)(c) (“If an opposing party fails to file [an 16 opposition], that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a motion[.]”); 17 Velasquez v. California, 68 F. App'x 833, 834 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s 18 granting of a motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to oppose the motion per local 19 rules); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal for failure to 20 file timely opposition papers where plaintiff had notice of the motion and ample time to 21 respond); Hawk v. MortgageIt Inc., No. 08-CV-1922 W (NLS), 2009 WL 10671991, at 22 *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009) (“[T]he Court interprets Plaintiff’s failure to oppose 23 [defendant’s] motion to dismiss as a consent to its merits.”). 24 The Court finds that the Phillips action fully encompasses and provides redress for 25 all allegations in this action. Thus, the Court concludes that dismissal best promotes 26 efficiency in this case. See, e.g., Ortiz, 2020 WL 5835323, at *4; see also Dowell v. 27 WinCo Holding, Inc., No. 5:23-CV-00976-JLS-JDE, 2023 WL 5276609, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 28 1 July 17, 2023); King, 2022 WL 18284892, at *3; De La Cruz v. Target Corp., 2018 WL 2 3817950, at *2; Alvarez v. Safelite Grp., Inc., No. 2-21-CV-07874-OD-WASX, 2022 WL 3 || 19569839, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2022). 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 6 || case based on the first-to-file rule, ECF No. 8. The Court DENIES as moot Defendants’ 7 |\motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs claims are 8 || DISMISSED without prejudice. ? IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 ||Dated: January 13, 2026 Z — ( 12 Hon. athe Cae 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13