Ligia Violeta Perez Cruz v. Pamela Bondi, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Ligia Violeta Perez Cruz moved for an ex parte temporary restraining order to prevent her detention during an upcoming USCIS adjustment of status interview, alleging a pattern of detentions by the agency. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm based on individualized facts rather than general speculation.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for ex parte Temporary Restraining Order denied“Plaintiff's motion for an ex parte TRO is therefore DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Winter v. NRDC standard, which requires a showing of likely irreparable harm. The plaintiff's reliance on general reports of other detainees and press articles, without evidence of a specific policy targeting her or individualized communications, constitutes speculation rather than a clear showing of likely harm. The court's refusal to issue an extraordinary remedy based on speculation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the high bar for injunctive relief and applies it to the specific facts presented. It distinguishes between general allegations of agency practice and the specific, individualized showing required for a TRO. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the deficiency in the plaintiff's motion (lack of concrete evidence of likely detention).
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LIGIA VIOLETA PEREZ CRUZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00034-CAB-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 PAMELA BONDI, et al., 15 Defendants. [Doc. No. 3.] 16 17 Plaintiff Ligia Violeta Perez Cruz filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive 18 relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Fifth Amendment based 19 on her belief that she may be detained at her upcoming adjustment of status interview with 20 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on January 14, 2026. 21 [Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”).] Plaintiff additionally filed a motion for an ex parte emergency 22 temporary restraining order and order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction. 23 [Doc. No. 3 (“TRO”).] Plaintiff “seeks a TRO enjoining [Defendants] from detaining her, 24 removing her, and for her release from [Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’)] 25 custody.” [TRO at 3.] For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for an ex 26 parte TRO. 27 A TRO, like all injunctive relief, “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 28 right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The legal standard 1 for issuing a TRO is essentially identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary 2 injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 3 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs must meet either the Winter test or the Ninth Circuit’s “serious 4 questions” test. Under the Winter standard, a party must show that they are likely to 5 succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 6 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is 7 in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Under the Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” 8 test, a “sliding scale variant of the Winter test, if a plaintiff can only show that there are 9 serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 10 merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips 11 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. For the 12 Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 13 omitted) (emphasis in original). 14 Here, Plaintiff has not satisfied either test because she has not shown that she is 15 “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief[.]” See Winter, 555 16 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). She asserts that “[t]he USCIS San Diego Field office has 17 started the practice of referring Adjustment of Status Applicants under Section 245(a) of 18 the INA, such as Plaintiff, to [ICE] in the middle of their interviews without finalizing 19 adjudication of the case, resulting in detention.” [TRO at 3.] Plaintiff asserts that she will 20 be subject to this practice based on “reports from other immigration attorneys, the press 21 articles describing clients in the same or similar situation as Plaintiff that were detained, 22 and both the economic burdens and liberty violation if [she is] held in detention.” [TRO 23 at 8.] Beyond these general allegations, however, Plaintiff does not cite to any actual 24 policies, practices, or individualized communications demonstrating that she is likely to be 25 illegally detained at her upcoming interview. [See generally Doc. Nos. 1, 3.] Similarly, 26 Plaintiff does not cite any final agency action to form the basis of a claim under the APA, 27 which permits judicial review of final agency action. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 28 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). 1 “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is 2 inconsistent with [the] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that 3 ||may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 4 || Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Thus, without more concrete or individualized facts about the 5 likelihood of Plaintiff's detention, the court will not enjoin Defendants based on 6 ||speculation. Plaintiff's motion for an ex parte TRO is therefore DENIED. Plaintiff may 7 || pursue her underlying civil complaint by properly serving Defendants. 8 □□ □□ SO ORDERED. 9 10 || Dated: January 7, 2026 1 — be Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28