Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Jolee KIMBLE, Case No.: 25-cv-3507-AGS-SBC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL SIGNATURE (ECF 9) 5 v. 6 Frank BIRCHANK, 7 Defendant. 8 9 Self-represented plaintiff Jolee Kimble seeks an ex parte order to grant her a 10 “signature for CA State Bar acknowledging” a non-defendant’s “fraud to debar him” as 11 well as “a DVRO [Domestic Violence Restraining Order] on” another non-defendant. 12 (ECF 9, at 1.) In other words, it appears she seeks yet another temporary restraining order, 13 after the Court denied her last one. (See ECF 6.) For many of the same reasons—including 14 that her complaint has been dismissed—this new request is also denied. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 17 A temporary restraining order is a form of emergency injunctive relief without notice 18 to the other side. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Such emergency relief is “an extraordinary remedy 19 never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 20 Under the Winter test, plaintiffs seeking such relief must establish that: (1) they are “likely 21 to succeed on the merits,” (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 22 preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] favor,” and (4) “an injunction 23 is in the public interest.” Id. at 20; see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 24 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are 25 substantially identical.” (cleaned up)). 26 Just as last time, “Kimble’s request never leaves the starting gate.” (ECF 6, at 1.) An 27 emergency injunction at a case’s start “is appropriate when it grants relief of the same 28 nature as that to be finally granted.” Pacific Radiation Oncology v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 1 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). But when a court “dismissed Plaintiff[’s] complaint 2 before [she] moved for a TRO [temporary restraining order],” as here, there is “no 3 underlying complaint to which the motion could relate,” and this Court lacks “authority to 4 grant injunctive relief in the form of a TRO.” See Yoshimoto v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 5 24-6692, 2025 WL 2911144, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025); (ECF 4 (order dismissing 6 complaint)). So, the request must be denied. 7 Even if Kimble’s complaint weren’t already dismissed, her motion would again fail 8 to meet the temporary-restraining-order standard. In fact, it stumbles on the first step, 9 success on the merits, which “is the most Winter factor.” Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 10 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs must typically show a 11 “likelihood”—or “probability”—of prevailing. Coffman v. Queen of the Valley Med. Ctr., 12 895 F.3d 717, 725 (9th Cir. 2018). But under the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, 13 a plaintiff who merely raises “serious questions” about the merits is still entitled to 14 preliminary relief if the other elements are met and the balance of equities “tips sharply in 15 the plaintiff’s favor.” Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. 16 of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 684 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). 17 Kimble has not clearly shown that she is likely to prevail on the merits, nor even 18 raised serious questions on that score. Most of her filing, difficult as it is to decipher, 19 complains about the behavior of non-defendants. (See, e.g., ECF 9, at 1.) She mentions the 20 captioned defendant—Superior Court Judge Michael Birchank—only once in a partially 21 illegible and incomprehensible discussion concerning “massive amounts of corruption”: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 On. Buy (arma DWE OF am rai er 3] Virveuriry Ben oe (aun He pare Wik 46 we Morn = Cife MY Ae pity ot Silly ak Yak Under OOM by Bethe CUFOTEY Gotha Syann Overy fi pur Paid Xn Trane Birchanv. Tu □□□ Narayan □ 10 (ECF 9, at 2.) Whatever that passage may mean, it does little to suggest that Kimble will 1 prevail on any claim against Birchank. Because “success on the merits is the most 12 important factor” for a temporary restraining order, when “a movant fails to meet this B threshold inquiry,” the Court “need not consider the other factors.” Geo Grp., Inc. v. Inslee, 14 151 F.4th 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). 15 Thus, the motion for emergency injunctive relief is DENIED. “Furthermore, the 16 Court must now exercise its ‘inherent power to control its docket and promote efficient use 7 of judicial resources.’” Ryan v. Best In Slot, LLC, No. 25-CV-2348-AGS-BLM, 2025 WL 18 2656279, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (quoting Dependable Highway Exp. v. 19 Navigators Ins., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)). Temporary restraining order 0 requests, like all “[e]mergency motions,” “are extremely disruptive to a court’s schedule,” 1 and Kimble “has now filed two such motions—in the matter of a few days—that were patently deficient.” See id. “As a result, the Court will not consider any further injunctive- 3 relief requests until” she files her amended complaint and “service is complete.” Jd. A Dated: January 7, 2026 26 United States District Judge 27 28