Anthony Jose Mendoza Perez v. Christopher LaROSE, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Anthony Mendoza Perez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his immigration detention is unlawful because he is not an 'applicant for admission' subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, but rather subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court ordered the respondents to file a response to the petition and the motion for injunctive relief by January 7, 2026, finding that the claim has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Order requiring respondents to answer the petition and respond to the injunctive-relief motion“By January 7, 2026, respondent must answer the petition and respond to the injunctive-relief motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (applied by reference to § 2241 cases), which permits dismissal only if the petition is plainly not entitled to relief. The court cited recent Ninth Circuit authority (Neiss v. Bludworth) and multiple district court decisions from 2025 (Barco Mercado, Mosqueda, Vazquez, Rodriguez) indicating that the petitioner's statutory argument—that § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2) governs his detention—has 'likelihood of success on the merits.' Given this consensus in recent case law, the court's determination that the claim has 'sufficient potential merit' to survive summary dismissal and require a response is legally sound. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally correct and legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable standard for summary dismissal in habeas cases and applies it to the specific facts. The court relies on a robust body of recent, persuasive district court authority (including a Ninth Circuit case) to support its conclusion that the petitioner's claim is cognizable and has potential merit. There are no significant gaps in the reasoning for this preliminary stage of the litigation.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Anthony Jose MENDOZA PEREZ, Case No.: 25-cv-3845-AGS-MMP 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 Christopher LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Anthony Mendoza Perez seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 to free her from immigration detention. (See ECF 1.) 11 At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant 12 a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 13 Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any 14 attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting 15 application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In 16 this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly 17 not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 18 But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to 19 justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 20 “On or about September 16, 2023,” Mendoza Perez, a “Venezuelan asylum seeker” 21 “entered the United States and was released on his own recognizance.” (ECF 1, at 2.) After 22 some allegedly attorney-driven delays, on “September 18, 2025,” he filed his “Application 23 for Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Protection under the Convention Against 24 Torture with the immigration court.” (Id.) Respondents then allegedly “dismissed” his 25 ongoing claim and placed him in “expedited removal” proceedings. (Id. at 3.) He was then 26 “redetained” “without a meaningful opportunity to seek a bond or custody redetermination 27 hearing” because of the government’s position that he is “subject to mandatory detention” 28 under “8 U.S.C. § 1225.” (Id. at 3.) He asserts that, because he crossed into the United 1 || States in “2023,” he is not an applicant for admission, and the governing statute is thus not 2 || § 1225, but “§ 1226(a),” which would allow his release “on bond.” (/d. at 2-3, 7, 10.) This 3 ||statutory misclassification, he argues, renders his detention “unlawful.” Ud. at 7.) 4 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 5 identical cases across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the 6 merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, 7 F.Supp.3d.__, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 8 ||2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, the petitioners 9 || “have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were “decided by 10 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 11 |]/5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 12 || (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 13 |/not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 14 01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 15 ||v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 16 |}2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 17 statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”’). 18 By January 7, 2026, respondent must answer the petition and respond to the 19 || injunctive-relief motion. Any reply by petitioner must be filed by January 12, 2026. The 20 || Court will hold oral arguments on the petition and injunctive-relief motion on January 14, 21 || 2026, at 10:00 a.m. 22 ||Dated: December 31, 2025 4 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28