Angel Liliguishuzca-Chuqi v. Patrick Divver, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas corpus petition filed by an immigration detainee challenging her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies. The court ordered the respondents to file a response to the petition and the motion for injunctive relief by January 7, 2026.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Order requiring respondents to answer the petition and respond to the injunctive-relief motion“By January 7, 2026, respondent must answer the petition and respond to the injunctive-relief motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 4, as applied to § 2241 petitions via Rule 1(b). The court found that the petitioner's claim—that she is not an 'applicant for admission' under § 1225 because she entered in 2024, and thus falls under § 1226(a)—has 'sufficient potential merit' to survive summary dismissal. This determination is supported by the cited Ninth Circuit authority (Neiss v. Bludworth) and a substantial body of recent district court decisions (Barco Mercado, Mosqueda, Vazquez, Rodriguez) finding similar claims likely to succeed on the merits. The decision to require a response rather than dismiss is consistent with the law and the record recited. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the procedural standard for summary dismissal of a § 2241 petition and applies it to the specific facts presented. It accurately summarizes the petitioner's legal argument and supports the decision to deny summary dismissal by citing binding Ninth Circuit precedent and a robust set of persuasive district court authorities from multiple jurisdictions that have reached the same conclusion on the merits. The reasoning is direct, legally sound, and fully supported by the cited authorities.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
inconsistent with cited authorityOpinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Angel LILIGUISHUZCA-CHUQI, Case No.: 25-cv-3816-AGS-DEB 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 Patrick DIVVER, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Angel Liliguishuzca-Chuqi seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 to free her from immigration detention. (See ECF 1.) 11 At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant 12 a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 13 Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any 14 attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting 15 application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In 16 this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly 17 not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 18 But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to 19 justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 20 Around January 21, 2024, Liliguishuzca-Chuqi, “a citizen of Ecuador,” “entered the 21 United States without inspection.” (ECF 1, at 3, 5.) Over a year and a half later, on 22 September 8, 2025, petitioner was “apprehended” and “placed in expedited removal 23 proceedings.” (Id. at 3.) Petitioner asserts that he has been “den[ied] [] a bond hearing under 24 [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a)” because of the government’s position that he is “subject to 25 mandatory detention” under “8 U.S.C. § 1225,” which pertains to applicants for admission. 26 (Id. at 7.) He asserts that, because he crossed into the United States “in 2024,” he is not an 27 applicant for admission, and the governing statute is thus not § 1225, but “§ 1226(a),” 28 which would allow his release “on bond.” (Id. at 6.) This statutory misclassification, he 1 || argues, renders his detention “unlawful.” (/d. at 3.) 2 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 3 ||identical cases across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the 4 ||merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Barco Mercado vy. Francis, 5 F. Supp.3d.__, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 6 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, the petitioners 7 “have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were “decided by 8 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 9 ||5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 10 || (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 11 |/not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 12 ||01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 13 ||v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 14 2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 15 statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”’). 16 By January 7, 2026, respondent must answer the petition and respond to the 17 || injunctive-relief motion. Any reply by petitioner must be filed by January 12, 2026. The 18 || Court will hold oral arguments on the petition and injunctive-relief motion on January 14, 19 2026, at 11:00 a.m. 20 || Dated: December 31, 2025 2 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28