Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-00457-DMS-SBC PLATFORM SCIENCE, INC., 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 13 MOTION FOR 14 v. RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 15 FLEET CONNECT SOLUTIONS LLC, DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 16 Defendant. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 17 COMPLAINT 18 [ECF No. 55] 19 20 21 Pending before the Court is Defendant Fleet Connect Solutions LLC’s motion for 22 reconsideration of this Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s 23 motion to dismiss Plaintiff Platform Science, Inc.’s First Amended Complaint (“MTD 24 Order”). (Mot., ECF No. 55-1). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, (Opp’n, ECF No. 25 63), and Defendant filed a reply, (Reply, ECF No. 63). The matter is submitted on the 26 briefs without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 67). For 27 the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is denied. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a leading manufacturer and provider of modern fleet telematics solutions 3 to customers who operate long-haul, tractor trailer fleets that ship products across the 4 country. (MTD Order, ECF No. 47, at 1). Defendant is the owner of numerous United 5 States Patents related to fleet management (“patents-in-suit”), including: U.S. Patent Nos. 6 6,941,223 (“’223 patent”), 7,206,837 (“’837 patent”), 7,741,968 (“’968 patent”), 6,429,810 7 (“’810 patent”), 6,961,586 (“’586 patent”), 7,593,751 (“’751 patent”), 8,862,184 (“’184 8 patent”), 9,299,044 (“’044 patent”), 9,747,565 (“’565 patent”), 7,742,388 (“’388 patent”), 9 7,058,040 (“’040 patent”), 7,260,153 (“’153 patent”), 7,596,391 (“’391 patent”), and 10 7,656,845 (“’845 patent”). (Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges Defendant has pursued an aggressive 11 enforcement campaign and sued five of its customers in six different lawsuits in California 12 and Texas (“Customer Litigations”) for infringement of the patents-in-suit for use of 13 Plaintiff’s products and services, including Connected Vehicle Device (“CVD”), ELD 14 Tablets, PS DVIR, PS Workflow, PS HOS, PS Navigation, and PS Messages (“Accused 15 Products”). (Id.). 16 Plaintiff alleges it has contractual indemnity obligations to customers who use its 17 products and is presently defending two of those customers in the Customer Litigations— 18 Schneider National Carrier, Inc. (“Schneider”) and Werner Enterprises, Inc. (“Werner”). 19 (Id.). On December 4, 2024, Defendant filed a complaint in the Central District of 20 California against Schneider for infringement of the ’223, ’837, ’968, ’586, ’751, ’184, and 21 ’388 patents based on Schneider’s “making, using, [and] selling” of products, which 22 included all of Plaintiff’s Accused Products at issue in this declaratory judgment action 23 (“Schneider Litigation”). (Id. at 3 (citations omitted)). On January 29, 2025, Defendant 24 filed another lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against Werner for infringement of 25 the ’810, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391, and ’845 patents based on Werner’s “making, using, [and] 26 selling” of the products, which included Platform Science’s CVD and ELD Tablets 27 (“Werner Litigation”). (Id. at 3–4 (citations omitted)). 28 1 To address Defendant’s flurry of lawsuits, Plaintiff filed the present action on 2 February 27, 2025, seeking declaratory judgment that none of its Accused Products or use 3 of those products by its customers infringes any of the patents-in-suit. (Id. at 4). On May 4 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 16). Defendant 5 filed its motion to dismiss the FAC on May 28, 2025. (ECF No. 19). On August 11, 2025, 6 the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC. (MTD 7 Order, ECF No. 47). Specifically, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as to the 8 ’565 and ’044 patents, but denied as to all other patents-in-suit. (Id. at 20). The Court also 9 denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper 10 venue.1 (Id.). 11 Defendant now moves this Court to reconsider part of the MTD Order. Specifically, 12 Defendant argues that the Court was incorrect in deciding that it has subject matter 13 jurisdiction over (1) the ’040, ’153, ’845, and ’388 patents, and (2) the ’810 and ’391 14 patents as to the Accused Products other than the CVD and ELD Tablets.2 (Mot. 8–9). 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for 17 reconsideration.3 However, a motion for reconsideration may be construed as a motion to 18 amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See In re Arrowhead Estates 19 20 21 1 The MTD Order contains further background information not necessary to repeat here. (See MTD Order 22 2–5).

23 2 The Court held it had subject matter jurisdiction over these patents based on Plaintiff’s indemnification obligations, rather than a separate totality of the circumstances analysis, as described in detail below, see 24 infra III. (See Mot. 3–4). 25 3 However, Local Rule 7.1(i) does permit motions for reconsideration. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Under 26 Local Rule 7.1(i)(1), a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” 27 Id. The party seeking reconsideration must show “what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.” Id. 28 1 Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). Rule 60(b) states that a court may 2 relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for: 3 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been 4 discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ..., 5 misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based 6 on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 7 prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 8 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Subject matter jurisdiction exists for declaratory judgment—satisfying Article III’s 12 “case or controversy” requirements—when “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, 13 show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, 14 of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” 15 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S 118, 127 (2007) (internal quotations 16 omitted). In Arris Grp., Inc. v. Brit. Telecomms. PLC, the Federal Circuit held that a 17 supplier has standing to commence a declaratory judgment action “where a patent holder 18 accuses customers of direct infringement based on the sale or use of a supplier’s 19 equipment[] . . . if (a) the supplier is obligated to indemnify its customers from infringement 20 liability, or (b) there is controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier's 21 liability for induced or contributory infringement based on the alleged acts of direct 22 infringement by its customers.” 639 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 23 In its MTD Order, the Court held “[b]ased upon Plaintiff’s indemnity obligations in 24 the Schneider and Werner cases, Plaintiff has shown that subject matter jurisdiction exists 25 over 12 of the 14 patents-in-suit: the ’223, ’586, ’837, ’751, ’968, ’388, and ’184 patents 26 asserted against Schneider, and the ’810, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391, and ’845 patents asserted 27 against Werner.” (MTD Order 11). Defendant argues that the Court, in coming to this 28 ruling, misapplied and misinterpreted Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899 1 (Fed. Cir. 2014). (See Mot. 8). Defendant raises only Rule 60(b)(1) as the basis for its 2 motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Court only considers whether the MTD Order 3 contained “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 60(b)(1). 5 Defendant argues that “DataTern makes clear that the first prong of the Arris test 6 only confers subject matter jurisdiction if the declaratory judgment action was filed before 7 the accused customer was sued.” (Mot. 15 (emphasis in original)). In support of its 8 argument, Defendant cites the following: 9 Importantly, even if there were such an obligation—to indemnify a customer already sued by the patentee in Texas—it would not justify what Appellees 10 seek here. A case has already been filed against these customers in the Eastern 11 District of Texas. Appellees cannot seek a declaration from a New York court on behalf of customers they must indemnify where a suit against these very 12 same customers on all the same issues was already underway in a Texas court. 13 See Futurewei Techs., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., 737 F.3d 704, 708 (Fed. Cir. 2013). By agreeing to indemnify any one of their customers, Microsoft 14 could defend its customers and efficiently and effectively participate in the 15 Texas action. We do not address whether Appellees would be entitled to file a declaratory judgment action if they were obligated to indemnify a customer 16 who had not already been sued by DataTern. 17 18 (Id. (quoting DataTern, 755 F.3d at 904 (emphasis in original))). Thus, Defendant 19 contends that because the Schneider and Werner cases were filed before the present action, 20 Plaintiff must intervene in those cases and cannot establish jurisdiction under the 21 indemnification prong in a separate, later-filed declaratory action. 22 However, Plaintiff correctly argues that DataTern “definitively states that ‘[i]f [the 23 suppliers] had an obligation to indemnify their customers, they would then have standing 24 to bring suit.’” (Opp’n 4 (emphasis omitted) (citing DataTern, 755 F.3d at 907)). 25 Additionally, Plaintiff correctly distinguishes the facts of DataTern from the present case. 26 In DataTern, the patent infringement suit against “multiple customers of the same suppliers 27 [was] already underway in another single court, and the declaratory judgment suit dealt 28 with the ‘very same customers on all same issues’ in the already filed customer cases.’” 1 ||(Opp’n 5). Conversely, here, Defendant filed “multiple suits against different customers 2 ||in different courts asserting different but overlapping sets of patents.” (/d.). Indeed, the 3 || Schneider Litigation, in the Central District of California, involves the ’223, °837, ’968, 4 ||’586, 751, °184, and °388 patents, while the Werner Litigation, in the Northern District of 5 || Texas, involves ’810, 7388, ’040, °153, ’391, and ’845 patents (only one common patent- 6 ||in-suit). Thus, Plaintiff would have to intervene in both cases, whereas, in DataTern, the 7 supplier “could defend its customers and efficiently and effectively participate” in a single 8 |laction. See DataTern, 755 F.3d at 904; see also Futurewei Techs., Inc. v. Acacia Rsch. 9 || Corp., 737 F.3d 704, 708 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding “[w]hen two actions that sufficiently 10 || overlap are filed in different federal district courts, one for infringement and the other for 11 declaratory relief, the declaratory judgment action, if filed later, generally is to be stayed, 12 || dismissed, or transferred to the forum of the infringement action” (emphasis added)). 13 Considering the above, the Court stands on its previous determinations: (1) DataTern 14 || does not require Plaintiff to intervene in the existing infringement suits (rather than bring 15 || this declaratory action), (see MTD Order 11); and (2) “it would be neither ‘efficient’ nor 16 || ‘effective’ to require Plaintiff to ‘participate in the [Werner] Texas action’ in the Northern 17 || District of Texas and the California Schneider action in the Central District of California 18 || to address the patents-in-suit,” particularly when the district court in Schneider stayed that 19 ||action and deferred to this Court (id. at 19-20 (citing DataTern, 755 F.3d at 904)). 20 || Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: December 31, 2025 35 2 inn Yn. L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 26 United States District Judge 27 28