Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Kevin Antonio TREJO BLANCO, Case No.: 25-cv-3778-AGS-AHG 4 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AT SCREENING WITH LEAVE TO 5 v. AMEND AND DENYING MOTION 6 Alejandro MAYORKAS, FOR RELEASE (ECF 2) 7 Respondent. 8 9 Petitioner Kevin Trejo Blanco seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 10 to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that 11 is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 12 in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly 13 appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 14 relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting court to apply Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to 15 any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 16 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 17 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). So “long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not 18 so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 But Trejo Blanco has named an inappropriate party—the former Secretary for the 20 Department of Homeland Security—as the respondent, so his petition must be dismissed. 21 “[T]he default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the 22 prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” 23 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004); see also Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 24 1199 (9th Cir. 2024) (“affirm[ing] the application of the immediate custodian” rule to 25 “habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed by immigrant 26 detainees” and ruling a district court cannot consider a misnamed petition). As written, this 27 petition has no possible merit. 28 1 Even if he had named the correct respondent, though, his motion for immediate 2 || release (see ECF 2), or a “temporary restraining order” in the language of the federal rules, 3 || would be meritless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A temporary restraining order, like all injunctive 4 relief, is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 5 || plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 6 (2008). Trejo Blanco would need to clearly demonstrate, among other things, that “he 7 |\1s likely to succeed on the merits.” See id. at 20. But he has not. His petition and motion 8 ||simply state that he’s been in immigration detention since “October 21, 2025,” and that 9 ||he’s “not subject to a final order of removal.” (ECF 1, at 1; see ECF 2, at 1.) But his 10 ||pleadings are devoid of any details about how he came to be in immigration detention, 11 which has a substantial impact on which statutory detention scheme he falls under. 12 || Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (providing for mandatory detention without bond in certain 13 |} circumstances); with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (authorizing detention with the possibility of bond 14 || or conditional parole); id. § 1226(c) (denying bond to certain categories of aliens). Without 15 || more detail, Trejo Blanco has come nowhere near a clear showing of likelihood of success 16 the merits. 17 By January 23, 2026, Trejo Blanco must file any amended petition, remedying the 18 || deficiencies identified in this order. The amended petition must be complete in itself and 19 || may not reference or incorporate any other prior filings. Failure to timely file an amended 20 || petition will result in dismissal of this case. 21 Dated: December 29, 2025 23 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28