Salvador Orozco Jaracuaro v. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — at 4.) On December 8, 2025, the immigration judge denied (See id.) A Ninth Circuit (Id.) 1) and
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and related motions to expedite proceedings filed by a noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court granted the petition, ordering the government to provide a bond hearing within seven days or release the petitioner, and denied the motions to expedite as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court relied on the respondents' concession that the petitioner is a member of the 'Bond Eligible Class' certified in *Bautista v. Santacruz* and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Given the concession and the pending class certification, granting the petition to secure the statutory right to a bond hearing is a logical and defensible outcome. |
Motions to Expedite denied as moot“The Motions to Expedite (Docs. 2, 3) are DENIED AS MOOT.” | agree with court Because the court granted the underlying petition and ordered immediate relief (a bond hearing within seven days), the specific request to expedite the proceedings is no longer necessary or relevant. Denying them as moot is procedurally correct. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise and relies heavily on the respondents' concession that the petitioner falls within a certified class entitled to bond hearings. It correctly identifies the statutory basis (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) and the applicable standard of proof (clear and convincing evidence) based on recent district court precedent. The reasoning is sufficient to support the grant of the petition given the stipulated facts.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 SALVADOR OROZCO JARACUARO, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03652-RBM-SBC 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, et al., [Docs. 1–3] 13 Respondents. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Salvador Orozco Jaracuaro’s (“Petitioner”) 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1), Emergency Motion for Immediate 18 Hearing and Release, or, in the Alternative, Constitutional Bond Hearing (Doc. 2), and 19 Motion to Expedite Habeas Corpus Proceedings (Doc. 3) (together with Doc. 2, “the 20 Motions to Expedite”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States as a teenager and has resided 23 here for the vast majority of his life. (Doc. 1 at 2.) He has been detained by Respondents 24 since July 9, 2025. (Id. at 4.) On December 8, 2025, the immigration judge denied 25 Petitioner’s motion for a custody redetermination hearing. (See id.) A Ninth Circuit 26 Petition for Review is pending, and merits proceedings are scheduled for April 2026. (Id.) 27 On December 18, 2025, Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) and Motions to 28 Expedite. (Doc. 2, 3.) The next day, the Court set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 5.) On 1 December 23, 2025, Respondents filed their Response to Petition (“Response”). (Doc. 6.) 2 On December 24, 2025, Petitioner filed his Reply. (Doc. 8.) 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 5 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 6 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 7 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 8 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 9 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 10 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 11 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 12 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Petitioner argues that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the 15 Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 4–6.) Respondents concede that 16 Petitioner, as a class member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz,1 17 is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 6 at 2.) Because 18 the Parties agree that Petitioner is detained under § 1226, the Court grants the Petition. 19 IV. CONCLUSION2 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 21 Court ORDERS: 22 23 24 25 1 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). 26 27 2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief. 28 1 1. Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1226(a) within seven days of the entry of this Order.’ At the bond hearing, 3 Respondents shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing 4 evidence,’ that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.> 5 2. If the bond hearing is not conducted within seven days of the entry of this Order, 6 Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody until it is determined that his 7 detention is warranted under § 1226(a). 8 3. The Motions to Expedite (Docs. 2, 3) are DENIED AS MOOT. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || DATE: December 24, 2025 et Barrie, Mottaryys > ON. RUTH BERM@GDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 3 See Arce-Cervera v. Noem, Case No. 2:25-cv-01895-RFB-NJK, 2025 WL 3017866, at *7_-8 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2025). 19 0 4 See Sadegqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which 21 ||Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”’) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds 23 || by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty 4 interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] 1s a flight risk or a danger to the community to 25 || justify denial of bond”). 26 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324; 27 || Duong v. Kaiser, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2689266, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 28 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025).