gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03582 · 2025-12-16 · Unknown

Alfredo Cabrera-Ruiz v. Christopher LaROSE, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:45Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the petitioner's immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court ordered the respondent to file a response to the petition by December 23, 2025, finding the claim sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response.

What the court decidedThe model
Order requiring response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus
“By December 23, 2025, respondent must answer the petition.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (applied to § 2241 petitions via Rule 1(b)). The court determined that the petitioner's argument—that he is not an 'applicant for admission' under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 but rather subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because he entered in 1994—has 'sufficient potential merit' to survive summary dismissal. This aligns with the cited Ninth Circuit authority (Neiss v. Bludworth) and the substantial body of recent district court decisions cited by the court (e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, Mosqueda v. Noem) which have found similar claims likely to succeed on the merits. Therefore, denying summary dismissal and requiring a response is the legally correct procedural step.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable standard for summary dismissal of a § 2241 petition by borrowing from the § 2254 rules via Rule 1(b). It cites the correct Ninth Circuit precedent (Neiss) for the proposition that a claim with potential merit must be allowed to proceed. It supports its finding of 'potential merit' with a robust list of recent, persuasive district court decisions from across the country that have reached the same conclusion on identical facts. The reasoning directly answers the threshold question of whether the petition is cognizable.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Alfredo CABRERA-RUIZ, Case No.: 25-cv-3582-AGS-JLB 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 Christopher LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Alfredo Cabrera-Ruiz seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim 11 that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 12 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it 13 plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled 14 to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 15 to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary 16 dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 17 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is 18 not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 Cabrera-Ruiz “is a Mexican national who has lived in the United States since 1994.” 20 (ECF 1, at 2.) Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers detained him on 21 “November 26, 2025,” “during a routine check-in appointment,” and he has been in 22 custody ever since. (Id. at 7.) He “challenges the government’s position that Petitioner is 23 subject to mandatory custody under” “8 U.S.C. § 1225” as an “applicant for admission.” 24 (Id. at 3, 5.) He asserts that, because he crossed into the United States “in 1994,” he is not 25 an applicant for admission, and “8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)” should govern instead, which would 26 allow his release “on bond or conditional parole.” (Id. at 9.) The statutory misclassification, 27 he argues, renders his detention “unlawful.” (Id. at 2.) 28 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 1 identical cases across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the 2 ||merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Barco Mercado □□ Francis, 3 ||___ F. Supp. 3d. __, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 4 ||2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to address this issue, the petitioners 5 || ““have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and these cases were “decided by 6 ||over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 7 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) 8 (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), 9 section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv- 10 ||01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); Rodriguez 11 ||v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 12 ||2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of 13 || statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”). 14 By December 23, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Any reply by 15 || petitioner must be filed by December 30, 2025. The Court will hold oral arguments on the 16 || petition on January 6, 2026, at 2:30 p.m. 17 ||}Dated: December 16, 2025 19 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28