Opinion

1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 ZHYAR YASIN, No. 25cv3378-BTM-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents.

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Zhyar Yasin’s petition for a writ of habeas 2 corpus. The Court finds that the record is sufficient to rule on the papers and that oral 3 argument would not aid in the resolution of this matter. 4 A. Background 5 Petitioner, a Kurdish native of Iraq, sought to escape persecution in Iraq by 6 crossing from Mexico into the United States. Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole 7 on January 30, 2025. Petitioner filed an asylum application on April 22, 2025. 8 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents detained Petitioner on October 9, 9 2025. He has been in ICE detention since then. 10 Petitioner now seeks habeas relief and claims that his parole was unlawfully 11 revoked. He claims that his detention runs afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act, the 12 Due Process Clause, and the Fourth Amendment. The Government claims that this Court 13 lacks jurisdiction, that Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and that 14 Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim lacks merit. 15 B. Discussion 16 Whether there is jurisdiction to review the revocation of parole depends on 17 whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exercised its discretion when 18 revoking parole. See Hassan v. Chertoff, 593 F.3d 785, 789-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (per 19 curiam) (finding no jurisdiction over discretionary decision to revoke parole because 20 DHS followed the regulations at issue); see also Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824, 2025 21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *15-24 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (maintaining jurisdiction to 22 review lawfulness of parole revocation); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-CV-04212, 2025 23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160866, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that § 24 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude the Court from reviewing the lawfulness of the 25 revocation of Petitioner’s parole.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, ____ (D. 26 Or. 2025) (“[T]he Review Statute and the Parole Statute do not preclude this District 27 Court from reviewing whether the decision to terminate Petitioner’s parole was lawful.”). 28 There will be jurisdiction if DHS failed to follow the law when revoking parole. Because 1 that issue is ripe for review, Petitioner is not required to further exhaust any potential 2 administrative remedies. The Government has also waived the issue of exhaustion by 3 raising it in a footnote. See United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1015 n.8 (9th Cir. 4 2020) (finding an issue in a footnote insufficiently raised). In any event, exhaustion 5 would be futile because of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). 6 Congress allows for the revocation of parole “when the purposes of such parole 7 shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served.” 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1182(d)(5)(A). When the Secretary so opines, “the alien shall forthwith return or be 9 returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue 10 to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the 11 United States.” Id. Under regulations, the Secretary has delegated the decision making 12 to various officials. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(a) (listing the officials). 13 Due process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate 14 official on whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the 15 reasons for the termination; and (3) a fair opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the 16 termination. See Noori, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194953, *29 (“Petitioner was entitled to 17 due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was entitled to both notification of 18 revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and 19 contest the determination.”); Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at ____ (“[A]s a noncitizen with 20 connections in the United States who is no longer at the threshold of initial entry, 21 Petitioner is entitled to due process rights.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 22 Here, Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole without complying with 8 U.S.C. § 23 1182(d)(5)(A). Respondents have not submitted evidence showing that the Secretary or a 24 designee found that the purposes of Petitioner’s parole have been served. The revocation 25 of Petitioner’s parole is thus neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) nor the 26 demands of due process. See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at ____ (explaining that 27 1182(d)(5)(A) “has a mandatory requirement—parole may be terminated or revoked only 28 1 | when in the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s purposes have been met”). The Court also 2 | adopts and incorporates the reasoning from Y-Z-L-H and Noori. 3 C. Conclusion 4 For the reasons stated, the Court grants counts one and two of the Petition For A 5 | Writ of Habeas Corpus. Count three is otherwise denied as moot. Respondents are 6 | ordered to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the previous conditions 7 | imposed for his parole. Respondents shall confirm compliance with this order no later 8 | than December 16, 2025. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: December 15, 2025 = 11 6:10 P.M. nrg (et Mgehnch Honorale Barry Ted Moskowit 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28