gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03567 · 2025-12-15 · Unknown

Julieth Mayerly Duran Romero v. Christopher J. LaROSE, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:46Z · confidence high

Petitioner Julieth Duran Romero filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging her immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The court ordered the respondents to file a response to the petition by December 30, 2025, finding that the petition was sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response.

What the court decidedThe model
Order requiring response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus
“This challenge is sufficient to warrant a response.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the standard for summary dismissal of habeas petitions, which requires that the petition be 'clearly not cognizable' or 'frivolous or incredible.' The petitioner alleged specific statutory and interpretive challenges to her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) versus § 1226(a), citing a specific BIA decision (Matter of Yajure Hurtado) and arguing statutory interpretation issues. The court cited multiple recent district court decisions from various jurisdictions (including two in the Ninth Circuit) that found similar claims to have a 'likelihood of success on the merits' or that the government's interpretation was contrary to statutory text and practice. Given this record, the petition clearly had 'potential merit' and was not frivolous, making the order to require a response the correct procedural step.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the procedural standard for summary dismissal of a habeas petition (Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, applied via Rule 1(b)). It correctly cites Neiss v. Bludworth for the proposition that a petition with potential merit cannot be summarily dismissed. The court then examines the specific allegations in the petition, noting the petitioner's challenge to the government's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) versus § 1226(a) in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado. The court supports its finding that the petition is cognizable by citing multiple recent, functionally identical district court cases (including two within the Ninth Circuit) that have found similar claims to have a likelihood of success on the merits. The reasoning is direct, applies the correct legal standard, and relies on relevant, recent authority to support the procedural decision to require a response rather than dismiss.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Julieth Mayerly DURAN ROMERO, Case No.: 25-cv-3567-AGS-VET 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 Christopher J. LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Julieth Duran Romero seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 challenging her immigration detention. At this stage, she need only make out a 11 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 12 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if 13 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 14 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 15 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit 16 “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 17 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential 18 merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 Duran Romero alleges that she’s been in immigration custody since “November 11, 20 2025,” after originally being detained upon entry in “January 2023” and being released on 21 “her own recognizance.” (ECF 1, at 6.) She claims to be subject to “mandatory detention” 22 and categorically ineligible for a “custody redetermination” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 23 (ECF 1, at 4, 6.) This is because a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of 24 Yajure Hurtado” “affirm[ed] the government’s new interpretation of § 1225” to apply to 25 individuals in her circumstances. (ECF 1, at 5.) Petitioner challenges her detention under 26 Yajure Hurtado and the government’s allegedly new, broader interpretation of § 1225, 27 claiming it “(a) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (b) disregards the 28 relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (c) would render a recent amendment to 1 ||section 1226(c) superfluous; and (d) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory 2 interpretation and practice.” (ECF 1, at 5.) 3 This challenge is sufficient to warrant a response. Functionally identical cases across 4 || the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the merits” or have resulted 5 ||in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 6 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[T]he Court concludes that petitioners 7 ||are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), not section 8 || 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB- 9 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); see also Rodriguez vy. 10 || Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) 11 ||(noting at the time “[e]very district court to address this question has concluded that the 12 ||government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory 13 |/interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Quispe v. 14 || Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 15 |}2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework, not 16 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal district courts around 17 || the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced with habeas petitions 18 || from comparably situated petitioners.”). 19 By December 30, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Any reply by 20 || petitioner must be filed by January 8, 2026. The Court will hold oral arguments on the 21 || petition on January 14, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. 22 ||Dated: December 15, 2025 4 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28