People v. Englebrecht CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN228485
- Trial judge
- Lisa R. Rodriquez
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court erred by imposing an indeterminate seven-year-to-life sentence on a witness dissuasion count under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), despite the absence of a finding that the defendant used an implied or express threat of force. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing, accepting the People's concession that the sentence was unauthorized.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of an indeterminate seven-year-to-life sentence on count 4 (attempting to dissuade a witness) under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4).“In imposing the indeterminate term, the trial court mistakenly relied upon the gang-related sentence enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), which is not triggered by a conviction for dissuading a witness under 131.6, subdivision (a)(2), despite the finding the offense was for the benefit of a gang.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lopez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1049 — Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) permits a seven-year-to-life sentence only if the defendant is convicted of attempting to dissuade a witness by the use of an implied or express threat of force pursuant to section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1).
- relied: People v. Bucyks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — When a sentence is unauthorized, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Matters may be resolved by memorandum opinion under certain circumstances.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies that the statutory prerequisite for the indeterminate sentence under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) was not met because the conviction did not involve an implied or express threat of force as required by section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1). It relies on People v. Lopez, which directly addresses this statutory limitation, and correctly applies the remedy of vacatur and remand.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAt a Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court struck Englebrecht's prison priors, strikes, and serious felony enhancement but re-imposed an indeterminate seven-year-to-life term on count 4 (attempting to dissuade a witness, § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) under the gang statute, section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C). On appeal, with the People conceding error, the Court of Appeal held the indeterminate term was unauthorized because subdivision (b)(4)(C) applies only to witness dissuasion by express or implied threat under section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1), vacated the count 4 sentence, and remanded for a full resentencing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition at resentencing of an indeterminate seven-year-to-life term on count 4 (attempting to dissuade a witness, § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C), rather than a determinate gang enhancement under subdivision (b)(1).“As in Lopez, the trial court here erred in re-imposing the seven-year-to-life sentence on the fourth count for dissuading or threatening a witness for the benefit of a criminal street gang” | unclear | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The opinion does not articulate a standard of review, but treats the sentence as unauthorized, a pure question of statutory interpretation. Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) reaches only 'threats to victims and witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1,' which Lopez correctly read to mean a conviction under section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) involving an express or implied threat of force. Englebrecht was convicted under subdivision (a)(2) with no threat finding, so the indeterminate term was unauthorized and the gang finding instead supports a determinate enhancement under subdivision (b)(1). The People's concession and the on-point authority make the result clear. The opinion contains typographical errors (citing 'section 131.6' and inconsistently referring to subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(4) in describing the trial court's action, and spelling Buycks as 'Bucyks'), but they do not affect the substance. Remand for full resentencing is consistent with Buycks. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lopez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1049 — Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) permits a seven-year-to-life term only where the defendant is convicted of dissuading a witness by express or implied threat of force under section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1); a conviction under section 136.1 without a threat finding does not trigger the indeterminate term.
- relied: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — When part of a sentence is vacated on appeal, the trial court on remand may conduct a full resentencing to reconsider all sentencing choices under the full resentencing rule.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve appeals presenting no new or unsettled legal issues by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied Lopez's plain-language reading of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) to a conviction under section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) lacking any threat finding, accepted a well-founded concession, and ordered full resentencing under Buycks. The opinion contains clerical errors (statutory misnumbering as '131.6,' inconsistent subdivision references, and a misspelled case name) and does not state a standard of review, but these do not undermine the result.
Opinion
Filed 12/9/25 P. v. Englebrecht CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084744
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN228485)
MARTIN ENGLEBRECHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lisa R. Rodriquez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Martin Englebrecht appeals from an amended judgment after resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He argues, and the People concede, the trial court erred by failing to reduce his sentence on the witness dissuasion count, based on the lack of an express or implied threat of force. We find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847) and, accepting the People’s concession, vacate the sentence on the witness dissuasion count and remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. In 2010, Englebrecht was convicted of three attempted murder counts (counts 1 to 3) and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness (count 4). The jury also found that he committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. Due to his three prior strikes and other enhancements, which included two prison priors, the trial court imposed a 235-year-to-life sentence, which was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Englebrecht (May 3, 2012, D058075) [nonpub. opn.].) In August 2024, after determining that Englebrecht was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court conducted a full resentencing hearing. It struck his two prison priors pursuant to section 1172.75 and found that reducing his sentence would not endanger public safety. It then struck all three of his prior strikes. Next, it declined to strike any of his gang or gun enhancements but struck the prior serious felony enhancement. As relevant here, the trial court imposed an indeterminate seven-year- to-life sentence under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) on count 4 and struck 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 the punishment on that count for the gang enhancement. It resentenced Englebrecht to a total term consisting of 46 years to life, plus 20 years. On appeal, Englebrecht’s sole argument is the court’s imposition of an indeterminate seven-year-to-life sentence for dissuading a witness for the benefit of a street gang under sections 131.6, subdivision (a)(2) and 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (count 4), is unauthorized and requires a remand for resentencing. The People concede that Englebrecht is correct. In imposing the indeterminate term, the trial court mistakenly relied upon the gang- related sentence enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), which is not triggered by a conviction for dissuading a witness under 131.6, subdivision (a)(2), despite the finding the offense was for the benefit of a gang. Rather, Englebrecht’s gang-related offense for dissuading a witness triggered an additional determinate term under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2). Both parties note that People v. Lopez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1049 is on point. In Lopez, the Court of Appeal explained that section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) “permits imposing a sentence of seven years to life only if the defendant makes ‘threats to victims and witnesses, as defined in [s]ection 136.1.’ ” (Lopez, p. 1065.) It reasoned that section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) “refers to the use of an implied or express threat” and therefore, “the plain meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) is that a seven-year-to-life sentence can be imposed only if the jury convicts the defendant of attempting to dissuade a witness by the use of an implied or express threat of force pursuant to section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1).” (Lopez, p. 1065.) The appellant there had not been convicted of violating section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1), and he was not found to have “used an implied or express threat of force in committing the crime.” (Lopez, p. 1065.) Therefore, 3 the appellate court concluded that the lower court erred when it imposed a sentence of seven years to life pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C). (Lopez, p. 1065.) As in Lopez, the trial court here erred in re-imposing the seven-year-to- life sentence on the fourth count for dissuading or threatening a witness for the benefit of a criminal street gang, in violation of section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2), because such sentence can be imposed only where the dissuasion consists of “threats” against a victim or witness, which was not the case here. (Lopez, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at 1064–1065.) We will therefore vacate the sentence on count 4 and remand the matter for a full resentencing. (People v. Bucyks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) DISPOSITION The sentence on count 4 is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
HUFFMAN, J.* * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 4
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Buycks S231765; S232900; S238888 · 2018-07-30
- People v. Lopez No. F062740 · 2012-08-22