Daniel Aragon v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court considered Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.'s motion to set aside an entry of default and extend the time to file a responsive pleading. The court granted the motion to set aside the default, directed the Clerk to withdraw the entry of default, and terminated as moot the defendant's motion to extend time and the plaintiff's motion to strike the answer.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant Defendant's motion to set aside default judgment“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgement. (ECF No. 17.)” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's Falk factors (prejudice, meritorious defense, culpable conduct). The record indicates the default resulted from a holiday and staff issues rather than willful neglect, and the case was in its early stages, meaning prejudice to the plaintiff was minimal. The decision to resolve the case on the merits aligns with the cited authorities. |
Terminate as moot Defendant's motion to extend time“The Court further TERMINATES AS MOOT Defendant’s motion to extend time, given that Defendant preemptively filed its answer. (ECF Nos. 17, 19.)” | agree with court Because the defendant filed an answer (ECF No. 19) before the court ruled on the motion to extend time, the motion for an extension was rendered moot. This is a standard procedural disposition. |
Terminate as moot Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's answer“The Court TERMINATES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant’s answer. (ECF No. 20.)” | agree with court The plaintiff's motion to strike the answer was premised on the validity of the default or the untimeliness of the answer. By granting the motion to set aside the default and accepting the answer as a valid responsive pleading, the basis for striking the answer is removed, rendering the motion moot. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (Rule 55(c) and the Falk factors) and applies it to the specific facts (holiday delay, early stage of litigation, lack of prejudice). The reasoning is concise but sufficient to support the outcome.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 DANIEL ARAGON, Case No. 25-cv-0814-BAS-SBC 14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 15 v. MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF No. 17) 16 EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., 17 Defendant. 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s 20 motion to set aside default judgment and extend time for a responsive pleading. (ECF No. 21 17.) The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted. See 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS 23 Defendant’s motion to aside default judgment. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On October 6, 2025, the Clerk of Court issued a summons for Plaintiff Daniel 26 Aragon’s first amended complaint. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff returned the executed summons 27 on October 27, 2025. (ECF No. 13.) On November 13, 2025, Plaintiff requested an entry 28 of default against Defendant, which the Clerk of Court issued. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) Shortly 1 thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 16.) That same day, 2 Defendant filed a motion to set aside default and extend time for a responsive pleading. 3 (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff responded in opposition. (ECF No. 18.) Defendant then filed an 4 answer to Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff submitted a motion to 5 strike Defendant’s answer. (ECF No. 20.) 6 II. ANALYSIS 7 Failure to defend a properly served complaint allows entry of default. Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 55(a). But under Rule 55(c), the court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). 10 The court’s good cause analysis considers the three “Falk factors”: “(1) whether the 11 plaintiff will be prejudiced, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) 12 whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. 13 Co. of Fla., 653 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 14 (9th Cir. 1984)). 15 “Where timely relief is sought from a default . . . doubt, if any, should be resolved 16 in favor of the motion to set aside the [default] so that cases may be decided on their 17 merits.” Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945–46 (9th Cir. 1986) 18 (quotation omitted); see also Falk, 739 F.2d at 463 (“[J]udgment by default is a drastic step 19 appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be decided 20 on the merits.”). 21 The “party seeking to vacate a default judgment bears the burden of demonstrating 22 that these factors favor vacating the judgment.” TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 23 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001) (overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. 24 Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)). 25 Here, Defendant’s failure to timely reply was due to a federal holiday and error by 26 counsel and counsel’s staff. Defendant’s deadline to respond to the first amended complaint 27 fell on November 11, 2025, which coincided with the federal holiday Veteran’s Day. (Mot. 28 ¶ 7, ECF No. 17.) Defendant further alleges that its lead counsel fell ill on November 10, 1 2025, and that a paralegal was absent. (Mot. § 8.) This delay does not rise to the level of 2 ||culpable conduct. As discussed in Plaintiff's opposition, the Court acknowledges that 3 Experian is a corporation, but even so, Plaintiff will not be hindered from pursuing his 4 ||claim. This case is just beginning. As Plaintiff's brief recognizes, a prejudicial setting aside 5 an entry of default judgment “must result in greater harm than simply delaying 6 || resolution.” (Opp’n 3:7-10, ECF No. 18.) Given the lack of prejudice, early stage of the 7 || litigation, and preference to decide cases on the merits, the Court grants the motion to set 8 || aside default judgment. 9 CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to set aside default 11 ||judgement. (ECF No. 17.) The Court directs the Clerk of Court to withdraw the entry of 12 ||default. The Court further TERMINATES AS MOOT Defendant’s motion to extend 13 |/time, given that Defendant preemptively filed its answer. (ECF Nos. 17, 19.) The Court 14 TERMINATES AS MOOT Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant’s answer. (ECF 15 || No. 20.) 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ~ 18 || DATED: November 25, 2025 yatta Bahar □□ 19 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 48
Cites, in this corpus
- Brandt v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida 10-35764 · 2011-08-10