Marriage of Hoxie CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D083731 · 2025-11-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a postjudgment order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 20FL000259N
Trial judge: Daniel Segura
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: family
Panel: William S. Dato (author), Laurence D. Rubin, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:44Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Hoxie's request for a continuance and awarded Duarte $15,000 in sanctions and $12,500 in attorney's fees, finding Hoxie was timely served. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Hoxie failed to provide an adequate appellate record to demonstrate error in service or the trial court's discretion.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of continuance and award of sanctions/fees based on finding of timely service “On this record, we are unable to conclude the trial court abused its discretion either by accepting Duarte’s January 8 filings or by denying a continuance.”	abuse of discretion	not reached	agree with court The court affirmed the trial court's order because the appellant failed to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error, applying the presumption of correctness. The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance and accepting the filings, noting Hoxie actually responded at the hearing.
Service of RFO and sanctions papers “Section 215 does not apply to these circumstances, as Duarte’s motion for sanctions was served before judgment was entered.”	de novo	not reached	agree with court The court determined Family Code section 215 was inapplicable because the motion was served before the judgment of dissolution was entered. The court also rejected the argument that counsel had withdrawn, noting the attorney remained of record until the notice of withdrawal was filed.

Authorities

relied: Gortner v. Gortner (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 996 — Section 215 addresses service after entry of judgment in dissolution cases where jurisdiction is retained indefinitely.
relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — A trial court judgment is presumed correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error based on the record.
relied: Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498 — An appellant's failure to provide an adequate record generally requires the appellate court to resolve issues in favor of the judgment below.
relied: Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252 — A trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers.
relied: J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1136 — A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a continuance.
relied: Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 — Mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment in appellate procedure.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the presumption of correctness and the requirement for an adequate record to affirm the trial court's discretionary rulings. It accurately distinguishes the applicability of Family Code section 215 based on the timing of service relative to the judgment.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:20Z · confidence low

The San Diego family court, after denying Hoxie's request for a continuance and finding he had been timely served, awarded Duarte $15,000 in Family Code section 271 sanctions and $12,500 in section 2030 attorney fees against Hoxie following entry of the dissolution judgment. On Hoxie's pro se appeal, the Court of Appeal held section 215 did not apply because the RFO was served before judgment, that service on counsel of record was proper until the notice of withdrawal was filed, that the sparse record could not show any violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 or any abuse of discretion in accepting late papers or denying a continuance, and that the claim of false statements by counsel rested on matters outside the record; it affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Finding that Hoxie was properly served with the RFO for sanctions and fees; rejection of argument that Family Code section 215 required post-judgment personal service on the party “Section 215 does not apply to these circumstances, as Duarte’s motion for sanctions was served before judgment was entered.”	de novo	correct	agree with court Section 215 by its terms governs notice for orders sought after entry of judgment; the RFO here was filed and served in October 2023, before the November 21, 2023 judgment, so the statute's text and the Gortner rationale (addressing stale dissolution cases) do not reach it. The court also correctly noted section 215 does not require personal service in any event. The reading of the statutory text is straightforward.
Implicit ruling that service on Hoxie's attorney of record in October 2023 was sufficient because counsel had not yet withdrawn “Hoxie’s contention that he became unrepresented in this matter on October 10 is incorrect, as is the suggestion Duarte should have served him instead of his counsel at this time.”	de novo	correct	agree with court Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 284 and 285, an attorney remains attorney of record until the substitution or withdrawal is filed with the clerk or entered in the minutes and notice is given to the adverse party; the notice of withdrawal was filed November 21, 2023, so service on counsel in October was proper. The statutes cited directly support the conclusion.
Finding that Hoxie was timely served with the January 8, 2024 supplemental filings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), and acceptance of those filings “Without knowing what exactly Duarte filed, we cannot conclude the filing contravened any deadline in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b).”	mixed	correct	agree with court The appellant bears the burden to furnish a record showing error (Jameson; Hernandez), and Hoxie did not include the January 8 papers, so the appellate court properly presumed the trial court's timeliness finding correct. The court also correctly observed that section 1005(b) permits a shorter time and that trial courts have broad discretion to accept late papers (Rancho Mirage). The application of the presumption of correctness is standard.
Denial of Hoxie's request for a continuance of the January 16, 2024 hearing “On this record, we are unable to conclude the trial court abused its discretion either by accepting Duarte’s January 8 filings or by denying a continuance.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court Continuance rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion (J.M. v. W.T.); the matter had already been continued once from November to January, Hoxie appeared, argued, and submitted responsive pleadings that the court considered, so no prejudice or abuse appears on the limited record. The conclusion follows from the cited authority and the record quoted.
Award of $15,000 in section 271 sanctions and $12,500 in section 2030 fees, challenged on the ground that Duarte's counsel made false statements to the court “But his argument relies entirely on material outside of the record on appeal. Accordingly, he has not shown he is entitled to reversal.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court The court did not reach the merits of the false-statement claim because Hoxie relied solely on matters outside the appellate record; under Hernandez and Jameson an appellant cannot establish error by reference to extra-record material, and Rappleyea confirms self-represented status does not relax that rule. Declining to review the claim was correct, though it means the substantive propriety of the sanctions and fee amounts was never examined.
Denial of lenient treatment based on Hoxie's self-represented status in assembling the appellate record “Hoxie’s status as a self-represented litigant does not excuse his failure to provide an adequate record.”	de novo	correct	agree with court Rappleyea v. Campbell is the controlling Supreme Court authority that self-represented litigants are held to the same procedural rules as represented parties; the court applied it correctly.

Authorities

relied: Gortner v. Gortner (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 996 — The predecessor to Family Code section 215 addresses notice for post-judgment motions in dissolution cases where the court retains jurisdiction indefinitely and years may pass before a new motion is filed.
relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — A trial court judgment is presumed correct and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error on the record presented.
relied: Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498 — An appellant's failure to provide an adequate record requires issues to be resolved in favor of the judgment.
relied: Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252 — A trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers.
relied: J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1136 — A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a continuance.
relied: Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 — Mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment in applying procedural rules.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion addresses each of Hoxie's arguments with the correct statutory text (Family Code section 215, Code of Civil Procedure sections 284, 285, 1005(b)) and controlling authority on the presumption of correctness and the appellant's burden to furnish an adequate record. Its only soft spot is that the January 8 filings were themselves post-judgment and could arguably implicate section 215, but the court adequately disposed of that by noting Hoxie conceded electronic service and that section 215 does not require personal service.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 11/24/25 Marriage of Hoxie CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Marriage of SCOTT HOXIE and NICHOLE DUARTE-HOXIE. D083731 SCOTT HOXIE, Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 20FL000259N) v.

NICHOLE DUARTE-HOXIE,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel Segura, Judge. Affirmed. Scott Hoxie, in pro. per., for Appellant. Nichole Duarte-Hoxie, in pro. per., for Respondent. Scott Hoxie (Hoxie) appeals a postjudgment sanctions and attorney fee order in a marital dissolution case against his former spouse, Nichole Duarte- Hoxie (Duarte). Hoxie argues he was not properly served with Duarte’s request for order (RFO) papers and that Duarte’s attorney made false representations to the family court. Hoxie has failed to show he was not properly served, in part because he has not provided a sufficient record on appeal. The inadequate appellate record also precludes us from finding error with respect to counsel’s purportedly false representations. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Based on an exceedingly limited appellate record we discern that in October 2023, Duarte filed an RFO seeking: (1) entry of a stipulated judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6; (2) sanctions against Hoxie under Family Code1 section 271, subdivision (a); and (3) attorney’s fees under section 2030. The trial court register of actions notes that Duarte filed a proof of service on October 23, 2023, though it is not clear from the entry what was served, or on whom. On November 21, 2023, the court conducted an RFO hearing and family resolution conference. A judgment of dissolution was entered, and Hoxie’s attorney filed a notice of withdrawal that same day. The court continued the hearing on sanctions and fees to January 16, 2024. On January 8, 2024, Duarte filed a “supplemental declaration,” an “amended” lodgment of exhibits, and (possibly) another declaration. Hoxie apparently did not file anything in advance of the hearing.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 2 At the January 16 hearing, Hoxie requested “a continuance to be able to file his Response.” The court denied the request, noting “this matter has previously been continued” and that Hoxie “was timely served.” Duarte, through counsel, “request[ed] attorney fees and sanctions and present[ed] argument.” Hoxie responded and “submitted his responsive pleadings, which were reviewed and considered by the Court.” “After hearing from both parties[] and reviewing all pleadings,” the court awarded $15,000 in sanctions against Hoxie and ordered him to pay $12,500 of Duarte’s fees. (See § 271, subd. (a); § 2030.)

DISCUSSION

Hoxie claims he was not properly served with Duarte’s request for order or notice of hearing on the issue of sanctions and attorney’s fees. He relies on section 215, subdivision (a), which states: “[A]fter entry of a judgment of dissolution of marriage . . . no subsequent order in the proceedings[] is valid unless any prior notice otherwise required to be given to a party to the proceeding is served, in the same manner as the notice is otherwise permitted by law to be served, upon the party. For the purposes of this section, service upon the attorney of record is not sufficient.” Section 215 does not apply to these circumstances, as Duarte’s motion for sanctions was served before judgment was entered. Section 215 concerns how service must be made “after entry of a judgment,” and it is intended to address the peculiarities of dissolution cases in which a court “may retain jurisdiction indefinitely, and years may pass before” a new motion is filed. (See Gortner v. Gortner (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 996, 999–1000 [discussing prior version of statute].) Neither the literal language nor the purpose of section 215 applies here.

3 Hoxie contends his counsel withdrew on October 10, 2023, which he claims is the date the notice of withdrawal was signed. However, counsel remained the attorney of record until a notice of withdrawal was filed on November 21. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 284 [counsel may withdraw “[u]pon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes”], 285 [“When an attorney is changed, as provided in the last section, written notice of the change and of the substitution of a new attorney, or of the appearance of the party in person, must be given to the adverse party. Until then he must recognize the former attorney”].) Hoxie’s contention that he became unrepresented in this matter on October 10 is incorrect, as is the suggestion Duarte should have served him instead of his counsel at this time. Hoxie also takes issue with Duarte’s January 8, 2024 filings. First, although Hoxie appears to concede he was served with these filings, he claims he was not served personally, but electronically. Contrary to Hoxie’s contention, section 215 does not require personal service. (See § 215, subd. (a) [party must be served “in the same manner as the notice is otherwise permitted by law to be served”].) Hoxie also argues he was not timely served with these papers in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), which provides default time limits for filing and serving motion papers. It is unclear how these time limits may apply to Duarte’s January 8 filings because Hoxie has not provided us with copies of those papers on appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct[,] and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies 4 reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) An appellant’s failure to provide an adequate record generally requires us to resolve issues in favor of the judgment below. (See, e.g., Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502 (Hernandez).) Without knowing what exactly Duarte filed, we cannot conclude the filing contravened any deadline in Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b). The sparse appellate record thus does not permit us to conclude the trial court erred in finding that Hoxie “was timely served.”2 In any event, Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), gives the trial court the authority to “prescribe a shorter time” for filing or service of motion papers, and “a trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers.” (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262.) The court has similarly broad discretion in determining whether to grant a continuance. (See J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1139.) On this record, we are unable to conclude the trial court abused its discretion either by accepting Duarte’s January 8 filings or by denying a continuance. Contrary to Hoxie’s contention that he did not have sufficient time to respond, the family court’s order notes he appeared at the hearing, responded to Duarte’s arguments, and “submitted his responsive pleadings, which were reviewed and considered by the Court.” Finally, Hoxie argues that Duarte’s attorney made false statements in support of the request for sanctions and fees. But his argument relies entirely on material outside of the record on appeal. Accordingly, he has not 2 Hoxie’s status as a self-represented litigant does not excuse his failure to provide an adequate record. (See, e.g., Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984 [“[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment”].) 5 shown he is entitled to reversal. (See Hernandez, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is affirmed. Duarte is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

RUBIN, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Jameson v. Desta S230899 · 2018-07-05
Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass'n v. Hazelbaker E063272 · 2016-08-09
Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center B128311 · 2000-02-23
Rappleyea v. Campbell S035028 · 1994-12-01
Gortner v. Gortner Civ. 48145 · 1976-08-13