Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Manuel AVILA-HEBRA, Case No.: 25-cv-3140-AGS-BJW 4 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 5 v. APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF 2) AND REQUIRING RESPONSE 6 Kristi NOEM, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Manuel Avila-Hebra requests appointed counsel and emergency 10 injunctive relief in support of his habeas corpus petition. (See ECF 2, 3); see also 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2241 (habeas corpus). For the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion to appoint 12 counsel and order a response to the petition and to the injunctive-relief request. 13 A. Appointed Counsel 14 Courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when “the 15 interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) 16 (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate a 17 petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to articulate his 18 claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. 19 Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 20 As a threshold matter, Avila-Hebra sufficiently alleges that he “cannot afford an 21 attorney.” (See ECF 1, at 30.) Prior to his detention, he made “$2,100” a month working at 22 “Manuel Diaz Farm” (id.), does not own a home (id.), has an old-model pickup truck and 23 a 2021 car he still owes most of the value on (id.), and “has no savings” (ECF 2, at 4). 24 Turning to his likelihood of success, Avila-Hebra argues that he will establish that 25 his continued custody is unlawful because, among other things, the government failed to 26 comply with its own regulations in detaining him. (ECF 1, at 12.) Based on the current 27 record, Avila-Hebra has a point. According to the regulation at issue here, ICE “may revoke 28 an alien’s release” and “return the alien to custody” for certain specified reasons. 8 C.F.R. 1 § 241.13(i)(1)–(2). But the regulation requires that “the alien will be notified of the reasons 2 for revocation of his or her release,” and then ICE must “conduct an initial informal 3 interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Yet, 4 according to Avila-Hebra, he “was never told the reasons for [his] detention” nor “given 5 an interview” to challenge that detention. (ECF 1, at 29.) 6 Courts have routinely found that when “ICE fails to follow its own regulations in 7 revoking release, the detention is unlawful and the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” 8 Rokhfirooz v. Larose, No. 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 9 Sept. 15, 2025) (granting habeas petition due to ICE’s failure to “follow” its “own 10 regulations” and collecting cases); see also United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a well-known maxim that agencies must comply with their own 12 regulations.”); Mendez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 563 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 13 1977) (“[C]ourts have generally invalidated adjudicatory actions by federal agencies which 14 violated their own regulations promulgated to give a party a procedural safeguard.”). In 15 fact, the “norm when ICE fails to conduct an informal interview promptly is that courts 16 across the country have ordered the release of individuals stemming from ICE’s illegal 17 detention.” Soryadvongsa v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2663-AGS-DDL, 2025 WL 3126821, at *3 18 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2025) (cleaned up). 19 The complexity of the legal issues also favor appointing an attorney. The parties here 20 must interpret intricate statutes, grapple with detention-related common law, and navigate 21 agency regulations. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 8 C.F.R. 22 § 241.13(i). This undertaking is within the immigration legal context, which has “provoked 23 comparisons to a morass, a Gordian knot, and King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete,” 24 Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), and been deemed “second 25 only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity,” United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 26 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). 27 While Avila-Hebra’s habeas petition and motions sensibly grapple with these 28 complex issues, “Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,” “drafted the instant petition” and 1 || offered “assistance” with all filings. (ECF 2, at 1 n.1.) Without that aid, it’s not clear that 2 || Avila-Hebra would have successfully framed these arguments himself. After all, he is a 3 ||farm worker who lacks “any legal education,” does not have “unrestricted access to the 4 ||internet in custody,” and does not “speak much English.” (ECF 1, at 30.) So, he has 5 adequately shown that he cannot articulate his claims without a lawyer. See, e.g., Nguyen 6 || v. Warden, No. 25-cv-2441-AGS-MMP, 2025 WL 2971654, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025) 7 (appointing counsel for a habeas petitioner whose claims implicated similar immigration 8 || authorities). 9 Avila-Hebra’s attorney-appointment request is GRANTED. As Federal Defenders 10 ||of San Diego has expressed its willingness to represent Avila-Hebra, it is appointed to 11 ||represent him. 12 ||B. Habeas Screening 13 Finally, given Avila-Hebra’s likelihood of success, as discussed above, his habeas 14 || petition necessarily survives the required screening for “frivolous” or “incredible” habeas 15 || applications. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 16 ||Rule 4; id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any 17 ||‘‘habeas corpus petition”); Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024). 18 By November 18, 2025, respondents must answer the petition as well as the 19 |/injunctive-relief motion. Any reply is due November 21, 2025. The Court will hold oral 20 argument on November 26, 2025, at 11:00 a.m. 21 || Dated: November 14, 2025 23 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28